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Kishore Gawande - The University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business. Austin, TX, US

Kishore Gawande

Professor, Department of Business, Government and Society | The University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business

Austin, TX, UNITED STATES

Empirical political economy, international development and trade, and applied econometrics

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Areas of Expertise (8)

Econometrics Economic Development Economics International Business Political Economy Trade Policy Global Economic Development Quantitative Analysis

Biography

Kishore S. Gawande is a professor in the Department of Business, Government and Society at the McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin.

Gawande specializes in empirical political economy and trade policy in which he has published extensively. His current research interests focus on the politics of free trade areas, globalization and regime quality, and determinants of conflict. His work has been published in top economics journals around the world.

Media

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Int'l Pol. Econ. Res. Conf. Kishore Gawande: Openness, Closeness and Regime Quality (6 of 6) Int'l Pol. Econ. Res. Conf. Kishore Gawande: Openness, Closeness and Regime Quality (1 of 6) Int'l Pol. Econ. Res. Conf. Helios Herrara: Turnout and Power Sharing (1 of 4)

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Education (4)

University of California Los Angeles: Ph.D., Economics 1991

University of California Los Angeles: M.A., Mathematics 1988

Indian Institute of Management: M.B.A., Business Administration 1981

St. Stephen's College: B.A., Economics 1979

Media Appearances (3)

The Export-Import Bank: What the Scholarship Says

The Heritage Foundation  online

2014-08-08

Trade theory also assumes that corporations do not spend money lobbying for higher subsidies and that government is impervious to such entreaties. That would be nice. But as Kishore Gawande and Usree Bandyopadhyay found, trade policy is responsive to lobbying and more closely linked to maximizing profits than to maximizing national income...

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Beyond Chhattisgarh: Are the Maoist rebels without a cause?

First Post  online

2013-05-31

In a paper published last year, economists Devesh Kapur, Kishore Gawande, and Shanker Satyanath suggested a variant explanation. The declining availability of minor forest produce, or MFP, to adivasi communities, could have generated a crisis-inducing shock...

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The Time is Right for a Carbon Tax

The Houston Chronicle  online

2010-09-19

The case for a carbon tax is a compelling one, given our current macroeconomic quandary and our apparent inability to deal with climate change, says Professor Kishore Gawande.

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Articles (7)

A Political Economic Account of Protection in Developing Countries Economics and Politics

2015

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Global Supply Chains and Trade Policy Responses to the 2008 Crisis World Bank Economic Review

2015

The Long-Run Impact of Nuclear Waste Shipments on the Property Market: Evidence from A QuasiExperiment Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

2013

We use evidence from a quasi-experiment – the shipping of radioactive spent nuclear fuel by train through South Carolina – to assess whether many years of incident-free transport of nuclear waste no longer negatively affects market valuation of properties along the route.

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Comparing Discrete Distributions: Survey Validation and Survey Experiments. Political Analysis

2012

Field survey experiments often measure amorphous concepts in discretely ordered categories, with postsurvey analytics that fail to account for the discrete attributes of the data. This article demonstrates the use of discrete distribution tests, specifically the chi-square test and the discrete Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test, as simple devices for comparing and analyzing ordered responses typically found in surveys.

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Free Riding on Protection for Sale International Studies Quarterly

2012

Olson hypothesized that a latent group’s ability to organize and contribute toward providing a public good might be jeopardized by free riding. The politics of trade protection feature the collective action problem, since protection benefits all firms in the industry including those who contributed nothing to attaining it. This paper examines the extent of free riding in lobbying over tariffs in the context of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection-for-sale model in which industry lobbies seek to bend government policy in their favor.

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Lobbying Competition and US Trade Policy International Economic Review

2012

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers.

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More Inequality More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal American Journal of Political Science

2011

The hypothesis of inequality as the source of violent conflict is investigated empirically in the context of killings by Nepalese Maoists in their People's War against their government during 1996–2003.

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