M.K. Chin is an Assistant Professor of Management in the department of Management and Entrepreneurship. His areas of expertise include strategic leadership, corporate governance, stakeholder theory, values and political ideologies of top executives.
Industry Expertise (2)
Areas of Expertise (4)
The Pennsylvania State University: Ph.D., Management 2014
Seoul National University: M.S., Strategy and International Business 2009
Seoul National University: B.A., Economics 2006
We examine how two dimensions of CEOs’ political ideologies – social and economic – each influences top management team (TMT) decision-making processes and in turn corporate entrepreneurship. We theorize that CEOs’ social liberalism influences the amount and types of information used during TMT decision-making processes, while CEOs’ fiscal liberalism influences the degree of cooperation occurred during TMT decision-making processes. We also hypothesize that these two ideology dimensions influence corporate entrepreneurship through TMT decision-making processes. We test our theory with a sample of 141 small and medium-sized Iranian firms. We find that TMTs with socially liberal CEOs tend to go through more extensive information search processes, which in turn is negatively related to corporate entrepreneurship, and that TMTs with fiscally liberal CEOs tend to go through more cooperative processes, which in turn is positively related to corporate entrepreneurship. This study re-conceptualizes executive political ideology by disentangling the distinct effects of social and economic dimensions of ideology and yields new theoretical insights on the implications of executive political ideologies for firm strategies and outcomes. In addition, through explicit examination of the mediating mechanisms, this study develops more precise theoretical explanations of how CEO political ideologies affect strategic behaviors.
This symposium aims to explore the implications of political ideologies in the management literature, which has begun to show that various organizational outcomes can be traced back to the political ideologies of organizational actors. In light of this growing interest for considering the implications of political ideology for various theories of organizations, different levels of analyses, and organizational types, we propose a panel symposium on this topic to bring together a community of scholars who have conducted high-quality research and help scholars engage in cross-fertilization of ideas. By bring these scholars together, this symposium will provide an opportunity for both presenters and audiences to discuss not just what we know from this body of research, but also what are the gaps in scholarly understanding on this topic."
Research summary: We examine the influence of CEO and compensation committee liberalism on top management teams (TMT) pay arrangements. Given that politically liberal individuals tend to value egalitarianism, we test whether firms with liberal CEOs tend to (1) reduce pay dispersion among non‐CEO executives; and (2) reduce pay gaps between CEO and non‐CEO executives, and whether compensation committee liberalism moderates these relationships. We find some evidence of a direct effect of CEO liberalism on TMT pay arrangements as well as some interaction between CEO and compensation committee liberalism on the pay arrangements. This study provides a better understanding of the antecedents of TMT pay arrangements and empirical evidence showing the influence of values at the top of organization.
Managerial summary: Do the values of the CEO and compensation committee influence the pay of other top managers? Our study provides evidence that political ideology affects top manager pay. We examine whether CEO liberalism produces more egalitarian pay arrangements among top managers, and whether the liberalism of the compensation committee affects that relationship. We find that CEO liberalism reduces differences in the total pay among top managers, but does not influence the difference between CEO total pay and the total pay of top managers. We also find that compensation committee liberalism strengthens the negative influence of CEO liberalism on differences in total pay among top managers. Finally, we find that CEO liberalism reduces the difference between CEO bonus pay and the bonus pay of other top managers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In an effort to comprehend activism toward corporations, scholars have proposed the concept of corporate opportunity structure, or the attributes of individual firms that make them more (or less) attractive as activist targets. We theorize that the personal values of the firm's elite decision makers constitute a key element of this corporate opportunity structure. We specifically consider the political ideology—conservatism versus liberalism—of the company's CEO as a signal for employees who are considering the merits of engaging in activism. To test of our theory, we examine the formation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender employee groups in major companies in the period 1985–2004, when the formation of such groups was generally perceived to be risky for participants. Using CEOs' records of political donations to measure their personal ideologies, we find strong evidence that the political liberalism of CEOs influences the likelihood of activism. We also find that CEOs' ideologies influence activism more strongly when CEOs are more powerful, when they oversee more conservative (i.e., less liberal) workplaces, and when the social movement is in the early phase of development. We identify theoretical and practical implications, as well as future research opportunities.
This article examines the influence on organizational outcomes of CEOs’ political ideology, specifically political conservatism vs. liberalism. We propose that CEOs’ political ideologies will influence their firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, hypothesizing that (1) liberal CEOs will emphasize CSR more than will conservative CEOs; (2) the association between a CEO’s political ideology and CSR will be amplified by a CEO’s relative power; and (3) liberal CEOs will emphasize CSR even when recent financial performance is low, whereas conservative CEOs will pursue CSR initiatives only as performance allows. We test our ideas with a sample of 249 CEOs, measuring their ideologies by coding their political donations over the ten years prior to their becoming CEOs. Results indicate that the political ideologies of CEOs are manifested in their firms’ CSR profiles. Compared with conservative CEOs, liberal CEOs exhibit greater advances in CSR; the influence of CEOs’ political liberalism on CSR is amplified when they have more power; and liberal CEOs’ CSR initiatives are less contingent on recent performance than are those of conservative CEOs. In a corroborative exploration, we find that CEOs’ political ideologies are significantly related to their corporate political action committee (PAC) allocations, indicating that this largely unexplored executive attribute might be more widely consequential.