Wenyu Wang
Associate Professor of Finance | Indiana University, Kelley School of Business
Indianapolis, IN, UNITED STATES
Professor Wang specializes in corporate control and restructuring, corporate governance and macro finance.
Biography
Professor Wang specializes in corporate finance, asset pricing, and macro finance.
Industry Expertise (1)
Education/Learning
Areas of Expertise (3)
Corporate Control and Restructuring
Corporate Governance
Model Estimation
Accomplishments (2)
“Durable Goods, Inflation Risk, and Equilibrium Asset Prices”, Best Paper Award in Asset Pricing, Midwest Finance Association Meeting (MFA) (professional)
2012
“Bid Anticipation, Information Revelation, and Merger Gains”, Semi-Finalist, Best Paper Award in Corporate Finance, Financial Management Association Meeting (FMA) (professional)
2012
Education (3)
University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School: Visiting Doctoral Student 2013
University of Wisconsin-Madison: Ph.D., Finance 2013
Tsinghua University: B.Eng., Computer Engineering 2004
Articles (6)
Weak Governance by Informed Active Shareholders
European Corporate Governance Institute - Finance Working Paper
2018 Do informed shareholders who can influence corporate decisions improve governance? We demonstrate this may not be generally true in a model of takeovers. The model suggests that a shareholder’s ability to collect information and trade ex post may cause him, ex ante, to support value-destroying takeovers or oppose value-enhancing takeovers.
Managerial Control Benefits and Takeover Market Efficiency
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
2018 How and to what extent do managerial control benefits shape the efficiency of the takeover market? We revisit this question by estimating both the dark and bright sides of managerial control benefits in an industry equilibrium model. On the dark side, managers’ private benefits of control distort firms’ takeover incentives and hinder the reallocation role of the takeover market.
Inefficiencies and Externalities from Opportunistic Acquirers
Journal of Financial Economics
2018 If opportunistic acquirers can buy targets using overvalued shares, then there is an inefficiency in the merger and acquisition (M&A) market: The most overvalued rather than the highest-synergy bidder may buy the target. We quantify this inefficiency using a structural estimation approach. We find that the M&A market allocates resources efficiently on average.
Bid Anticipation, Information Revelation, and Merger Gains
Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
2017 Because firms' takeover motives are unobservable to investors, mergers are only partially anticipated and often appear as mixed blessings for acquirers. I construct and estimate a model to study the causes and consequences of bid anticipation and information revelation in mergers. Controlling for the market's reassessment of the acquirer's stand-alone value, I estimate acquirers gain 4% from a typical merger.
Durable Goods, Inflation Risk, and Equilibrium Asset Prices
AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper
2016 High expected inflation is known to have a negative impact on future real growth. We show that this effect is significantly more pronounced in durable relative to non-durable goods sectors of the economy. Consistent with this macroeconomic evidence, the equity returns of durable-goods-producing firms have a larger negative exposure to expected inflation risks.
Corporate Innovation along the Supply Chain
Management Science, Forthcoming
2014 In this paper, we document a positive effect of supplier-customer geographic proximity on supplier innovation. To establish causality, we explore plausibly exogenous variation in proximity caused by customer relocations. The positive effect of supplier-customer proximity on supplier innovation is stronger when customers are more innovative themselves, when suppliers and customers are closer in technological space, and when customers' demand accounts for a larger fraction of suppliers' total sales.
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