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for-trumps-perceived-enemies-the-process-may-be-the-punishment

For Trump’s Perceived Enemies, the Process may be the Punishment

by Paul M. Collins Jr., Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science, UMass Amherst

Professor of Legal Studies and Political Science / Director of Legal Studies

Bias in Judicial Appointments

Judicial Appointments

Public Law

Inequality in the Legal System

American Politics

Judicial Ethics

Judicial Elections

Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings

  This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. Former FBI Director James Comey pleaded not guilty to two criminal charges in a federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, on Oct. 8, 2025. The charges allege that Comey lied to Congress in September 2020 when he stood by earlier testimony that he did not authorize a leak of an FBI investigation involving Hillary Clinton. Numerous legal commentators on both the left and right have argued that Comey’s indictment is little more than the Trump administration seeking vengeance on one of the president’s perceived enemies. They allege that the president has it out for Comey, who investigated Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and was fired by Trump in 2017.

The president’s own words support the idea that the Trump administration is targeting Comey. In a social media post on Sept. 20, 2025, Trump directed Attorney General Pam Bondi to move forward with prosecutions against Comey, Democratic U.S. Sen. Adam Schiff and New York Attorney General Letitia James: “They’re all guilty as hell, but nothing is going to be done. …JUSTICE MUST BE SERVED, NOW!!!”

If the case against Comey is exceedingly weak – and little more than a political prosecution – then, in my view as a scholar of the U.S. legal system, it should result in the dismissal of charges by the judge or a not guilty verdict by the jury.

But even when an individual is not convicted, the process of defending against charges can itself be a form of punishment, as renowned legal scholar Malcolm Feeley pointed out almost 50 years ago.

Here’s how the criminal justice process punishes even innocent people.

The criminal justice process  The criminal justice process is complex. After a grand jury returns an indictment at the request of a prosecutor, the accused appears in court for their arraignment. They are informed of the charges against them and typically enter a plea. During what’s called “discovery,” the prosecution and defense investigate the evidence the other side plans to rely on. There are also pretrial motions in which the parties ask judges to dismiss charges and accept or exclude evidence.

The defense and prosecution may also meet to discuss a plea bargain, wherein the accused may plead guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence or reduced charges.

If there is no plea bargain, then the case moves to trial, which is itself a complicated process. If a defendant is found guilty, they can mount an appeal to higher courts in an attempt to have their conviction overturned.

To help navigate this process, criminal defendants typically hire a lawyer.

And good lawyers don’t come cheap.

Money and time  Indigent defendants, who do not have the financial resources to pay their own legal fees, can rely on public defenders paid for by the government.

But individuals who can afford to pay for their own lawyer face a substantial financial burden for attorney services and court fees. An experienced criminal defense lawyer can charge more than US$1,000 per hour, with fees quickly adding up. This means that mounting a legal defense can easily cost tens of thousands of dollars.

On top of this, it takes a great deal of time to prepare for a criminal case. While lawyers and their staff do much of the legwork for trial preparation, a client works with their attorneys to help formulate a defense.

As a result, criminal defendants lose one of the most precious commodities in the world: their time.

And this time can come at a tangible cost in the form of lost wages, which harms their day-to-day lives. Put simply, every hour spent preparing for trial is an hour defendants could spend working or enjoying their lives.

Stress and embarrassment  It’s not pleasant being charged with a crime.

The criminal process, which typically lasts months, takes a toll on one’s mental health. This is largely driven by the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of a criminal trial and the possibility of losing one’s freedom if convicted.

In addition, there is a social stigma that comes with being accused of a crime. This can result in reputational damage, anxiety and embarrassment.

The Trump administration appears to recognize this reality.

Several media outlets have reported that FBI leadership had planned a public perp walk for Comey.

According to a CBS News report, this was to have included “‘large, beefy’ agents … ‘in full kit,’ including Kevlar vests and exterior wear emblazoned with the FBI logo.” Apparently, the plan was aborted after several FBI supervisors refused to cooperate, viewing it as inappropriate. One agent was disciplined for insubordination after refusing to go along with the plan to embarrass Comey in this way.

Not all criminal defendants suffer the same  The extent to which criminal defendants experience the criminal justice process as a form of punishment varies from person to person.

For high-status people like Comey, lost wages and attorneys’ and court fees may not be that big of a deal.

But these costs may be incredibly significant for other people who have been, or are likely to be, targeted by the Trump administration.

The high costs of lawyers’ fees are well known to the president. For instance, his political action committee spent millions of dollars on attorneys’ fees in an unsuccessful effort to defend Trump from criminal charges in New York.

In addition, people no doubt experience the psychological stress and stigma of a possible criminal conviction differently. But regardless of one’s wealth, the lost time spent preparing a criminal defense is something that cannot be replaced.

The recognition that the criminal process is itself a form of punishment is one of the reasons that the Department of Justice has maintained independence from the president. By violating the tradition of staying out of politics, the Justice Department in the Trump administration has opened the door for the president to seek retribution on his perceived political enemies.

The mere act of putting them through the criminal process ensures that they suffer, regardless of their guilt or innocence.


israels-attack-in-doha-underscores-a-stark-reality-for-gulf-states-looking-for-stability-and-growth-they-remain-hostage-to-events

Israel’s attack in Doha Underscores a Stark Reality for Gulf States Looking for Stability and Growth: They Remain Hostage to Events

by David Mednicoff, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy, UMass Amherst

Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy

Middle Eastern, Comparative, and International Law and Politics

U.S. Foreign Policy

Human Rights

Refugee Politics

 This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. The oil-rich states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a lot going for them: wealth, domestic stability and growing global influence. In recent months, these Gulf kingdoms also appear closer to something they have long sought: reliable U.S. support that has become stronger and more uncritical than ever, just as Iranian power in the region has significantly degraded. In Donald Trump, the nonelected Gulf Arab monarchs have an ally in Washington who has largely shed previous American concerns for democracy and human rights. That the American president made his first scheduled international trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE only underscores their international clout.

Additionally, the popular overthrow of the Assad government in Syria and Israel’s war against Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Yemen have served to greatly weaken Tehran’s perceived threat to Gulf Arab interests.

Yet, as an expert on Middle Eastern politics, I believe Gulf Arab countries must still navigate a regional political tightrope. And as the Israeli targeting of senior Hamas leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, shows, events by other Middle Eastern actors have a nasty habit of derailing Gulf leaders’ plans.

How these countries manage four particular uncertainties will have a significant effect on their hopes for stability and growth.

1. Managing a post-civil war Syria  In Syria, years of civil war that had exacerbated splits among ethnic and religious groups finally ended in December 2024. Since then, Arab Gulf countries, which once opposed the Iranian-allied government of Bashar Assad, have been pivotal in supporting new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. They successfully lobbied the U.S. to drop sanctions. In addition to sharing mutual regional interests with Sharaa, the leaders of Gulf Arab states want a Syrian state that is free from internal war and can absorb the millions of refugees that fled the conflict to other countries in the Middle East.

Gulf states can support postwar Syria diplomatically and financially. However, they can’t wish away the legacy of long war and sectarian strife. Israeli attacks on Syrian soil since Assad’s fall, as well as recent outbreaks of fighting in the Sweida region of southern Syria, underscore the ongoing fragility of the Syrian government and concerns over its ability to contain violence and migration outside of its borders.

2. The challenge of regional politics  Syria illustrates a broader policy challenge for Gulf states. As their wealth, military strength and influence have grown, these countries have become dominant in the Arab world. As a result, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of dollars in efforts to influence governments and groups across the world. This includes the mostly authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Egypt’s. But here, Gulf states are torn politically. If democratic systems form elsewhere in the Arab world, this could encourage Gulf citizens to push for elected government at home. Yet overly coercive Arab governments outside of the Gulf can be prone to popular unrest and even civil war.

Propping up unpopular regional governments risks backfiring on Gulf Arab leaders in one of two ways.

First, it can entice Gulf states into protracted and damaging wars, such as was the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failed military intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. Second, it can drive a wedge between Gulf states, as is seen with the current conflict in Sudan, in which the Saudis and Emiratis are backing rival factions. 3. Watching which way Iran will turn  Always looming behind complicated Middle Eastern politics is Iran, the historically powerful, populous, non-Arab country whose governing Shiite Islam ideology has been the chief antagonist to the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Opposing Gulf Arab and American strategic interests, Iran has for years intervened aggressively in Middle Eastern politics by funding and encouraging militant Shiite groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

An assertive Iran has been especially a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia, which strives to be the dominant Muslim majority power in the region. Dealing with Iran has required careful balancing from Qatar and the UAE, which are more directly exposed to Tehran geographically and have maintained relatively stronger relations.

Given this, Gulf countries may silently welcome the decrease in Iran’s military power in the wake of Israel’s recent war against Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, while also fearing further Iranian-Israeli conflict. At the same time, a less powerful Iran runs two types of new potential dangers for Gulf states. Should Iran become more unstable, the resulting turmoil could be felt across the region.

In addition, should Iran’s military, policy and economic turmoil lead to a new political system, it could disturb Gulf countries. Neither a Muslim majority democratic government nor a more hard-line nationalist variant in Iran would sit well with nearby Gulf monarchs.

Conversely, concerns that the Israeli and U.S. bombing of Iran may actually lead to increased Iranian determination to pursue a nuclear program also worry Gulf leaders.

4. Living with Israel’s military assertiveness  Israel, the unquestioned military power and sole nuclear weapons state in the region, has long posed particularly deep political dilemmas to Gulf Arab states. The current challenge is how to balance the immense global unpopularity of the Israeli government’s war in Gaza – including among Gulf Arab citizens – with common strategic interests the Gulf states hold with Israel.

Gulf Arab leaders face domestic and regional pressure to show solidarity for Palestinians and their aspirations for statehood.

Yet Gulf rulers also share strategic goals with Israel. Along with opposition to Iranian influence, Gulf states maintain strong military links to the U.S, like Israel. They also appreciate the economic and other security value of Israel’s high-tech products, including software used for espionage and cybersecurity. This helps explain the UAE’s 2019 decision to join the short list of Arab states with full diplomatic relations with Israel. Hamas attacked Israel in 2023 in part to stop Saudi Arabia from following suit – something that might have further sidelined Palestinians’ bargaining power.

Indeed, moves toward open Saudi diplomatic recognition of Israel were stopped by Hamas’ attack and the global backlash that followed Israel’s ongoing devastation of Gaza.

Gulf leaders may still believe that normalized ties with Israel would be good for the long-term economic prospects of the region. And Bahrain and the UAE – the two Gulf Arab states with diplomatic relations with Israel – have not backed away from their official relationship.

Yet expanding open relations with Israel further, and taking in other Gulf states, is unlikely without a real reversal in Israel’s policy toward Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. All this is more true in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s attack in Qatar – the first time Israel has launched a direct strike within a Gulf Arab state. That action, even if ostensibly directed at Hamas, is likely to exacerbate tensions not only with Qatar but place increasing stress on the calculus allied Gulf Arab countries make in their dealings with Israel.

Tricky way forward for Gulf Arab states  These challenges underscore an inescapable truth for Gulf leaders: They are hostage to events beyond their control.

Insulating them from that reality takes regional unity.

The Gulf Cooperation Council, nearly 45 years old, was established precisely for this purpose. While it remains the most successful regional organization in the Middle East, the GCC has not always prevented major rifts, such as in 2017 when a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia cut ties with and blockaded Qatar. The conflict was resolved in 2021. Since then, the six members of the GCC have worked together more closely. No doubt, rivalries and disagreements still exist. Yet Arab Gulf leaders have learned that cooperation is useful in the face of major challenges. This can be seen in the recent collaborative diplomatic approaches toward Syria and the U.S.

A second lesson comes from the broader Middle East. Key issues are often interdependent, particularly the status of Palestinians. Hamas’ attack on Israel, and the resulting destruction of much of Gaza, resurfaced the deep popularity across the region of addressing Palestinian needs and rights.

The monarchs of the Arab Gulf would like to maintain their unchallenged domestic political status while expanding their influence in the Middle East and beyond. However, even when Gulf leaders wish to be done with the region’s challenges, those challenges are not always done with them.

Isabella Ishanyan, a UMass Amherst undergraduate, provided research assistance for this article. 

4-out-of-5-us-troops-surveyed-understand-the-duty-to-disobey-illegal-orders

4 out of 5 US Troops Surveyed Understand the Duty to Disobey Illegal Orders

by Charli Carpenter, Professor of Political Science at UMass Amherst and Geraldine Santoso, Doctoral Student in Political Science at UMass Amherst

Professor of Political Science and Director of Human Security Lab

International Relations

International Law

Laws of War

Human Rights and Humanitarian Law

Nuclear Weapons

Protection of Civilians

  This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. With his Aug. 11, 2025, announcement that he was sending the National Guard – along with federal law enforcement – into Washington, D.C. to fight crime, President Donald Trump edged U.S. troops closer to the kind of military-civilian confrontations that can cross ethical and legal lines.

Indeed, since Trump returned to office, many of his actions have alarmed international human rights observers. His administration has deported immigrants without due process, held detainees in inhumane conditions, threatened the forcible removal of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and deployed both the National Guard and federal military troops to Los Angeles to quell largely peaceful protests.

When a sitting commander in chief authorizes acts like these, which many assert are clear violations of the law, men and women in uniform face an ethical dilemma: How should they respond to an order they believe is illegal?

The question may already be affecting troop morale. “The moral injuries of this operation, I think, will be enduring,” a National Guard member who had been deployed to quell public unrest over immigration arrests in Los Angeles told The New York Times. “This is not what the military of our country was designed to do, at all.”

Troops who are ordered to do something illegal are put in a bind – so much so that some argue that troops themselves are harmed when given such orders. They are not trained in legal nuances, and they are conditioned to obey. Yet if they obey “manifestly unlawful” orders, they can be prosecuted. Some analysts fear that U.S. troops are ill-equipped to recognize this threshold.

We are scholars of international relations and international law. We conducted survey research at the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Human Security Lab and discovered that many service members do understand the distinction between legal and illegal orders, the duty to disobey certain orders, and when they should do so.

Compelled to disobey  U.S. service members take an oath to uphold the Constitution. In addition, under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial, service members must obey lawful orders and disobey unlawful orders. Unlawful orders are those that clearly violate the U.S. Constitution, international human rights standards or the Geneva Conventions.

Service members who follow an illegal order can be held liable and court-martialed or subject to prosecution by international tribunals. Following orders from a superior is no defense.

Our poll, fielded between June 13 and June 30, 2025, shows that service members understand these rules. Of the 818 active-duty troops we surveyed, just 9% stated that they would “obey any order.” Only 9% “didn’t know,” and only 2% had “no comment.”

When asked to describe unlawful orders in their own words, about 25% of respondents wrote about their duty to disobey orders that were “obviously wrong,” “obviously criminal” or “obviously unconstitutional.”

Another 8% spoke of immoral orders. One respondent wrote that “orders that clearly break international law, such as targeting non-combatants, are not just illegal — they’re immoral. As military personnel, we have a duty to uphold the law and refuse commands that betray that duty.”

Just over 40% of respondents listed specific examples of orders they would feel compelled to disobey.

The most common unprompted response, cited by 26% of those surveyed, was “harming civilians,” while another 15% of respondents gave a variety of other examples of violations of duty and law, such as “torturing prisoners” and “harming U.S. troops.”

One wrote that “an order would be obviously unlawful if it involved harming civilians, using torture, targeting people based on identity, or punishing others without legal process.”

 Soldiers, not lawyers  But the open-ended answers pointed to another struggle troops face: Some no longer trust U.S. law as useful guidance.

Writing in their own words about how they would know an illegal order when they saw it, more troops emphasized international law as a standard of illegality than emphasized U.S. law.

Others implied that acts that are illegal under international law might become legal in the U.S.

“Trump will issue illegal orders,” wrote one respondent. “The new laws will allow it,” wrote another. A third wrote, “We are not required to obey such laws.”

Several emphasized the U.S. political situation directly in their remarks, stating they’d disobey “oppression or harming U.S. civilians that clearly goes against the Constitution” or an order for “use of the military to carry out deportations.”

Still, the percentage of respondents who said they would disobey specific orders – such as torture – is lower than the percentage of respondents who recognized the responsibility to disobey in general.

This is not surprising: Troops are trained to obey and face numerous social, psychological and institutional pressures to do so. By contrast, most troops receive relatively little training in the laws of war or human rights law.

Political scientists have found, however, that having information on international law affects attitudes about the use of force among the general public. It can also affect decision-making by military personnel.

This finding was also borne out in our survey.

When we explicitly reminded troops that shooting civilians was a violation of international law, their willingness to disobey increased 8 percentage points.

Drawing the line  As my research with another scholar showed in 2020, even thinking about law and morality can make a difference in opposition to certain war crimes.

The preliminary results from our survey led to a similar conclusion. Troops who answered questions on “manifestly unlawful orders” before they were asked questions on specific scenarios were much more likely to say they would refuse those specific illegal orders.

When asked if they would follow an order to drop a nuclear bomb on a civilian city, for example, 69% of troops who received that question first said they would obey the order.

But when the respondents were asked to think about and comment on the duty to disobey unlawful orders before being asked if they would follow the order to bomb, the percentage who would obey the order dropped 13 points to 56%.

While many troops said they might obey questionable orders, the large number who would not is remarkable.

Military culture makes disobedience difficult: Soldiers can be court-martialed for obeying an unlawful order, or for disobeying a lawful one.

Yet between one-third to half of the U.S. troops we surveyed would be willing to disobey if ordered to shoot or starve civilians, torture prisoners or drop a nuclear bomb on a city.

The service members described the methods they would use. Some would confront their superiors directly. Others imagined indirect methods: asking questions, creating diversions, going AWOL, “becoming violently ill.”

Criminologist Eva Whitehead researched actual cases of troop disobedience of illegal orders and found that when some troops disobey – even indirectly – others can more easily find the courage to do the same.

Whitehead’s research showed that those who refuse to follow illegal or immoral orders are most effective when they stand up for their actions openly.

The initial results of our survey – coupled with a recent spike in calls to the GI Rights Hotline – suggest American men and women in uniform don’t want to obey unlawful orders.

Some are standing up loudly. Many are thinking ahead to what they might do if confronted with unlawful orders. And those we surveyed are looking for guidance from the Constitution and international law to determine where they may have to draw that line.

Zahra Marashi, an undergraduate research assistant at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, contributed to the research for this article. 

teen-drivers-face-unique-challenges-during-100-deadliest-days-of-summer-but-safety-measures-can-make-a-difference

Teen Drivers Face Unique Challenges During ‘100 Deadliest Days’ of Summer, but Safety Measures can Make a Difference

by Shannon Roberts, Associate Professor of Industrial Engineering at UMass Amherst, and Anuj Kumar Pradhan, Assistant Professor of Mechanical & Industrial Engineering at UMass Amherst

Associate Professor of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering

Technology and driving behavior

Young drivers' behavior

Smart Communities and Infrastructure

Driving behavior

  This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. The last few weeks of summer, heading into Labor Day weekend, can sometimes mean vacations and driving more miles on the road for all people, including teens.

Traffic crashes are the No. 1 cause of death for teens, and the crash rate for teen drivers is disproportionately higher than the share of licensed teen drivers.

In addition to this grim statistic, summer is the riskiest time for teen drivers. The 100 deadliest days represent the period from Memorial Day to Labor Day when the number of fatal crashes involving teen drivers dramatically increases. A third of each year’s teen driver crashes occur during the summer.

We are scholars who research transportation safety and teen driver behavior. Our expertise helps us understand that these 100 days are not just a statistical fluke – they reflect a dangerous intersection of factors such as inexperience and a propensity to take risks.

What makes summer different?  Regardless of the season, some teen drivers engage in risky behaviors that increase their likelihood of a fatal crash, such as getting distracted, driving with friends in the vehicle, driving under the influence, not wearing seat belts and a lack of hazard awareness. Teens also have more free time in the summer, since most aren’t in school. Combined with the longer days and better weather, teens drive more over the summer. More time on the road means more risk, especially for inexperienced drivers.

Teens may also be more likely to drive after dark during the summer, in comparison to more experienced drivers. But nighttime driving is also when visibility is reduced and crash risks are higher, particularly for teens who haven’t fully developed the skills necessary for night driving. This increased exposure, in addition to teens’ general risky driving tendencies, contributes to the 100 deadliest days for teen drivers.

The increased crash risk for teens over the summer isn’t equally distributed either. Crashes with teen drivers that lead to serious injuries are more likely to occur with male drivers, in rural areas, for those of lower socioeconomic status and for those with disorders, such as attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder. Teaching young drivers  Driver’s education programs are the formal method to teach teen drivers the rules of the road.

In driver’s education programs, teens receive information about driver and road safety though classroom and behind-the-wheel instruction in preparation for the licensing exam. Some states require teens to complete a driver’s education course if they want to receive a license under the age of 18. Of teens who have a license, nearly 80% of them have gone through some form of driver’s education.

Though driver’s education programs can be helpful, their effects are not equally felt. In some states, teens and their guardians must pay out of pocket for driver’s education courses to obtain a license. This makes driver’s education and, as a consequence, obtaining a driver’s license inequitable.

There are also driving school deserts – areas where the poverty rate is 20% or above and there are no behind-the-wheel driver education courses within a 10- to 15-minute drive. This makes driver education courses inaccessible. Many of these driving school deserts happen to be in areas with high populations of minorities. Over 20 years ago, graduated driver licensing was introduced to reduce teen crash rates. This is a phased licensing system wherein teen drivers are restricted in terms of when, where and with whom they can drive until they turn 18. Such a system allows teens to gradually learn and gain experience with driving over time.

Graduated driver licensing has been implemented in all 50 states, and it has been shown to reduce teen driver crash rates. However, its effectiveness is limited to those who participate in the system. A large number of teens are unlicensed and are of low socioeconomic status. Many of these unlicensed teens forgo the entire process and remain unlicensed but still drive, well into their 20s when the graduated driver licensing restrictions are lifted.

Making summer safer  There are two things people can do to turn the 100 deadliest days into the 100 safest days.

First, it is important that communities offer free supplementary training programs for teen drivers, because becoming a safe and responsible teen driver shouldn’t be limited to those with resources. As one example, in collaboration with industry partners, we have developed a program called Risk-ATTEND. It is a free, online, evidence-based program that teaches teen drivers how to anticipate risks while driving. Our research has shown that programs such as these can improve teen driving skills and may be especially effective for teen drivers in high-poverty areas. Second, our research has shown that parents and guardians still play an important role in influencing teen driver behavior. Studies show that teens mirror the behaviors they observe: If they see adults text and drive, they’re more likely to do the same.

Once teenagers become old enough to drive, it is also important to establish rules and guidelines about expectations to establish clarity and accountability. Written agreements or checklists can address high-risk conditions such as nighttime driving, driving with other young passengers, phone use and adherence to speed limits.

Systems to help monitor and enforce rules have been shown to be effective in improving teen driver behavior. One such program is Checkpoints, which is a Connecticut-based program in which families agree to limit teen driving during high-risk conditions. Teens face consequences for violating these limits, such as a temporary loss of driving privileges. However, the limits are gradually lifted as they gain driving experience.

More than rules matter  Ultimately, preventing crashes in the summer and beyond extends beyond mere adherence to regulations. Avoiding them fundamentally hinges on cultivating a robust safety culture that emphasizes a collective commitment to risk reduction and continuous improvement in driving practices.

For teens, the summer months present unique challenges and opportunities.

Drawing on best practices, such as training programs, teens can build essential skills in varied conditions before gaining full, unsupervised privileges.



new-national-umass-amherst-poll-finds-president-trumps-job-approval-gap-slides-6-points-since-april

New National UMass Amherst Poll Finds President Trump’s Job Approval Gap Slides 6 Points Since April

The survey finds Trump’s net approval drops to -20 six months into his term, while his approval rating on immigration falls 9 points since April; additionally, 70% say he has not handled Epstein situation well and 81% blame him for hiding info on case

Provost Professor of Political Science / Director of UMass Poll

Political Polls

Politics and Political Analysis

Race  Culture  and Ethnicity

Polling

Professor of Political Science / Associate  Director of UMass Poll

Public Policy and Organizations

Elections and Polling

Political Science

Campaign Finance

Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the UMass Poll

Polls

Political Polling

Voting Rights

Civil Rights

Associate Professor of Political Science / Co-director of UMass Poll

Public Opinion and American Politics

Political Behavior

Public Opinion and Public Policy

  Topline results and crosstabs for the poll can be found at www.umass.edu/poll Public approval of Donald Trump’s presidency has dropped by 6 percentage points since April and his approval rating is now 20 points underwater, 38-58, according to a new national University of Massachusetts Amherst Poll of 1,000 respondents conducted July 25-30.

“Six months into his second term as president, Donald Trump looks to be on the ropes with the American public,” says Tatishe Nteta, provost professor of political science at UMass Amherst and director of the poll. “Trump’s approval ratings, already historically low for a newly elected president, continue to sink with close to 6-in-10 Americans (58%) expressing disapproval of the job that Trump is doing in office. While Trump remains a popular figure among Republicans and conservatives, Trump’s time in office is viewed more negatively across genders, generations, classes and races, with majorities of each of these groups disapproving of Trump’s performance. With over three years left in the Trump administration, there is still time for him to right the ship and fulfil the promises that catapulted him to the presidency, but the president is not off to the start he or his supporters envisioned.”

 In the previous UMass Poll, conducted as Trump approached the three-month anniversary of his return to the White House, Trump held a 44-51 approval rating, buoyed by a positive overall approval on his handling of immigration. The new poll, however, has found a significant shift in views on this issue.

“Immigration has been central Trump’s political campaigns and his strongest issue in his first few months in office, but the percentage of people who say he is handling it well has dropped substantially from 50% four months ago to just 41% today, a 9-point drop,” explains Raymond La Raja, professor of political science at UMass Amherst and co-director of the poll.

“Trump came into the presidency promising change, and he’s made significant alterations in many areas of federal policy,” says Jesse Rhodes, professor of political science at UMass Amherst and co-director of the poll. “He came into office believing that he had limited time to make the changes he promised his most ardent supporters, and moved with unparalleled speed to enact these changes, including sometimes by legally questionable means. Now, it seems, he’s reaping the consequences as a large majority of Americans don’t like these changes. Clear majorities say that Trump has handled his key issues – immigration (54%), inflation (63%), jobs (55%) and tariffs (63%) – not very well or not well at all. With so many Americans grading his handling of public policy poorly, it’s no wonder they disapprove of his presidency.”

Rhodes also notes that the president is seeing an erosion in support from one of his most reliable groups of supporters: men.

“Trump has cultivated a ‘masculine’ reputation and sought to build support among American men but, strikingly, we find that support for Trump has deteriorated most substantially among members of this group,” says Rhodes. “In April, Trump enjoyed approval from 48% of men, compared with 39% of women. Now, only 39% of men express approval of Trump, compared with 35% of women.

“In addition to losing support among men, Trump has seen approval for his presidency crumble among political independents, a critical swing constituency,” Rhodes adds. “While 31% of independents approved of his presidency in April, that number is now down 10 percentage points to 21%. This is really bad news for Trump, and for Republicans who depend on support from independents in close elections.”

 “Polarization has changed the interpretation of presidential approval ratings,” says Alexander Theodoridis, associate professor of political science at UMass Amherst and co-director of the poll. “Partisans just aren’t willing to evaluate presidents from the other side positively and are reluctant to say negative things about presidents from their own party. So, approval numbers fluctuate within a narrower range. Gone are the days when George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush both achieved approval numbers over 90%. This is certainly true for Trump, who is likely the most polarizing figure in modern American politics. Even in this polarized environment, though, Trump’s approval ratings are low by any standard – he is very close to the practical floor. Especially noteworthy is that nearly half of Americans say they strongly disapprove of Trump and the percentage of Americans who say they strongly approve of Trump has decreased substantially. Even among Republican respondents, only half strongly approve of the president. The GOP should be concerned about these numbers heading into the odd-year elections in 2025 and, especially, the midterm elections in 2026. It is very difficult for a party to win when its leader is this unpopular.”
 

Americans’ views on Epstein and Trump  Of all issues surveyed in the latest University of Massachusetts Amherst Poll, one appears to be the greatest drag on Trump’s presidency: Jeffrey Epstein and Trump’s handling of the evidence gathered in the federal investigation of the accused sex-trafficker and his long-time friend.

“The Epstein scandal remains a serious vulnerability – indeed, quite possibly, the most serious vulnerability – for Trump right now,” Rhodes says. “Fully 70% of Americans believe he has handled this issue ‘not too well’ or ‘not well at all,’ and nearly two-thirds (63%) believe his administration is hiding information about Epstein. The Epstein scandal is also likely undermining public confidence in Trump more broadly. Indeed, we find that nearly two-thirds of Americans believe that Trump is corrupt and nearly 70% believe he is dishonest. Critically, these numbers mean that many Republicans and conservatives are disappointed with Trump’s handling of the Epstein situation. Republican frustration with Trump’s handling of the Epstein case could erode enthusiasm for his presidency and for Republicans in 2026.”

 “If Trump and those around him have been wishing the Jeffrey Epstein story would disappear, their wishes have not been granted,” Theodoridis says. “Most Americans (77%) tell us they have heard a lot or some about the Epstein case. In addition to believing that the Trump administration is hiding important Epstein case information, the vast majority of respondents say that a special prosecutor should be appointed to investigate the Trump DOJ’s handling of the Epstein case (59%), that Donald Trump was good friends with Epstein (67%), and that a list of Epstein’s clients exists (70%). Even substantial numbers of Trump voters believe these things. And, when it comes to an Epstein ‘cover-up,’ it seems the buck stops with Trump himself. While a lot of Americans blame Attorney General Pam Bondi (59%), FBI Director Kash Patel (49%), and House Speaker Mike Johnson (47%) for hiding information about the Epstein case, a whopping 81% blame President Trump.”

“The controversy over the handling of the Epstein files by the Trump administration has – interestingly – brought Americans together,” Nteta adds. “While on most issues, we see clear and persistent generational, class and racial divisions; on Epstein, Americans across these divides speak with one voice. This controversy has even resulted in agreement across partisan lines as majorities of Democrats and Republicans support a special prosecutor and believe a list of clients exists, and disapproval of Trump’s handling of the whole matter is surprisingly seen among members of Trump’s base, as 43% of Republicans and conservatives indicate that Trump has not handled this issue well.”

 “Where Trump faces his poorest rating in our poll is on perceived corruption and dishonesty,” adds La Raja. “A clear plurality (49%) sees Trump as ‘very dishonest,’ with an additional 20% saying that he is ‘somewhat dishonest.’ And 45% see him as ‘very corrupt,’ with an additional 20% as ‘somewhat corrupt.’ Only about one-third reject those labels entirely. Trump also gets low ratings on transparency – a majority (52%) say Trump is not at all transparent, his weakest score after dishonesty. Only 23% believe that he’s very transparent. For a candidate who brands himself as a truth-teller and disruptor, this appears to be a credibility gap.”

“Strength is Trump’s strongest attribute,” La Raja explains. “Fifty-eight percent see him as very or somewhat strong, indicating appeal among his base and possibly swing voters who value ‘toughness.’ However, views on his competence are split evenly, with 52% saying he’s competent to some degree, while 48% say not at all.”
 

Voter Regret?  “Since President Trump took office, a number of reports of regretful Trump voters have been covered in the nation’s leading media outlets,” Nteta says. “From voters upset with Trump’s immigration policies to supporters who take issue with the president’s unwillingness to release the files associated with the Epstein case, there seemed to be a wellspring of regret among Trump’s once loyal base. Our results suggest that while there are, in fact, areas where the president is weak, most notably on his handling of the economy and the Epstein controversy. When asked directly, close to 9-in-10 (86%) would vote for Trump again if given the opportunity to revisit their 2024 presidential vote choice. These results indicate that the number of regretful voters covered in the mainstream press may be overblown, as the overwhelming majority of Trump voters remain in the president’s camp.”

“Only 1% of Trump voters say they regret their vote and would choose differently, 2% say they ‘might’ choose differently and 3% say they wish they hadn’t voted at all,” Theodoridis says. “When we simply ask voters how they would vote if they could go back and recast their ballot, 6% of Trump voters tell us they would vote for Harris, while only 2% of Harris voters say they would switch to Trump. There is clearly more erosion in support among Trump voters than among Harris voters and, in what is likely small consolation to Harris and her campaign team, significantly more 2024 non-voters who say they wish they had voted indicate they would now cast a vote for the former vice president. In a relatively close election, shifts of these magnitudes might have been decisive, but there are no ‘take-backs’ in electoral politics, so these numbers are best used to inform choices going forward.”

“Our results are not wholly positive for President Trump, and there exist areas of concern for his team moving forward,” Nteta warns. “Since April, the number of Trump voters expressing strong confidence in their vote for Trump has declined by 5 percentage points. Additionally, we find small increases in the number of Trump supporters who have mixed feelings about their vote and who indicate that they would ‘rather not have voted.’ Finally, 14% of Trump voters indicate that they would not vote for Trump if given the chance to revisit, while only 8% of Harris voters express a similar sentiment. Time will tell whether the growing number of disaffected Trump voters are the canaries in the coal mine, indicating a larger problem among the Trump coalition and the MAGA movement more generally.”

“We do find a meaningful percentage – 31% – of Trump voters unwilling to say they feel very confident they made the right choice,” Theodoridis adds. “Nineteen percent of Trump voters tell us they are still confident but have concerns, and 6% tell us they have mixed feelings about their vote. Given what we know about the psychological predispositions against admitting to having been wrong, these numbers suggest some softening in support for Trump among the very voters who returned him to the White House last November. This should certainly be alarming for Republican politicians. However, for Democrats or journalists looking for a mass mea culpa from Trump voters, our numbers are, perhaps, sobering.”
 

Methodology  This University of Massachusetts Amherst Poll of 1,000 respondents nationally was conducted by YouGov July 25-30. YouGov interviewed 1,057 total respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 1,000 to produce the final dataset. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2023 American Community Survey (ACS) one-year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file).

The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined, and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, region, and home ownership. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.

The weights were then post-stratified on 2020 and 2024 presidential vote choice as ranked on gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories) and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight. The demographic marginals and their interlockings were based on the sample frame. The marginal distribution of 2020 presidential vote choice and its demographic interlockings were based on a politically representative “modeled frame” of US adults, using the 2019 American Community Survey (ACS) public use microdata file, public voter file records, the 2020 Current Population Survey (CPS) Voting and Registration supplements, the 2020 National Election Pool (NEP) exit poll, and the 2020 CES surveys, including demographics and 2020 presidential vote.

The marginal distribution of 2024 vote choice was based on official ballot counts compiled by the University of Florida Election Labs and CNN. Demographic interlockings for 2024 vote choice were based on CNN’s 2024 Exit Polls.

The margin of error of this poll is 3.5%.

Topline results and crosstabs for the poll can be found at www.umass.edu/poll 

survey-by-umass-amhersts-human-security-lab-finds-militarytrained-americans-trust-in-the-presidents-nuclear-launch-authority-dropped-during-iran-crisis

Survey by UMass Amherst’s Human Security Lab Finds Military-trained Americans’ Trust in the President’s Nuclear Launch Authority Dropped During Iran Crisis

Director of the Lab, Charli Carpenter, is available to explain what it means and why it is important

  Charli Carpenter, professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and director of the Human Security Lab, is available to discuss a recent survey she led of U.S. military members and veterans that found a real-time drop in their trust in the president’s nuclear launch authority that occurred during the recent Iran crisis.

Carpenter and colleagues Grace Bernheart, Joseph Mara and Zahra Marashi recently published an article on the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists explaining what their findings mean and why they are important, and Carpenter also appeared on the podcast The Fire This Time to discuss the survey.

To speak with Carpenter about the survey, contact her via her ExpertFile profile here. 

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