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Allen Goss - Ted Rogers School of Management. Toronto, ON, CA

Allen Goss Allen Goss

Associate Professor, Accounting; Associate Dean, Students | Ted Rogers School of Management

Toronto, ON, CANADA

Professor of Accounting and Finance, former Chair of the Finance department, and Academic Director of the National Institute on Ageing.

Biography

Goss is an Associate Professor in the School of Accounting and Finance and has served as Chair of the Finance department. He is also the Academic Director of the National Institute on Ageing. He holds an MBA and PhD from the Schulich School of Business at York University.

Areas of Expertise (4)

Accounting and Finance Corporate Responsibility Debt and Financial Distress Student Affairs

Education (2)

York University: M.B.A.

York University: Ph.D.

Affiliations (1)

  • National Institute on Ageing: Academic Director

Selected Articles (4)

Do clickers work for students with poorer grades and in harder courses? Journal of Further and Higher Education

Scott Anderson, Allen Goss, Mike Inglis, Alan Kaplan, Laleh Samarbakhsh & Melissa Toffanin

2017

We studied the impact of clickers, also known as electronic student response systems, on the performance of students on two undergraduate finance courses. Consistent with some of the recent literature, we found that clickers have very little impact on student performance, as measured by final course grades. Further, we found that clickers do not have a significant impact on course grades for students in relation to their designated performance ability (weak versus strong) or whether the course in question is less or more difficult. However, after simultaneously controlling for course difficulty and student aptitude, we found that clickers have a meaningfully positive impact on the performance of poorly performing students on more challenging quantitative courses. Our results suggest that the impact of clickers on student performance may depend on the type of student (academically weak, average or strong) and the type of course (average or difficult). This finding has particular implications for curriculum planners at the post-secondary level, although the findings may also have application at the secondary school level.

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Short-Run Momentum and Book-to-Market Effects SSRN

Ming Dong & Allen Goss

2013

We present evidence from an event study that runs counter to the notion that the momentum and book-to-market (B/M) effects can be fully explained by time-varying risk premia. We minimize the joint hypothesis problem in market-efficiency tests by examining a relatively short (26-day) window that exhibits both momentum and reversal effects. There is return continuation during the first 17 days but sharp reversal during the last 9 days. The co-existence of strong momentum and reversal over this small event window rules out risk premium or chance as possible causes of momentum, leaving investor misvaluation as the only explanation for this anomaly during this period. Furthermore, several patterns of interaction between B/M and momentum also point to a behavioral interpretation of the B/M effect during the period. The general implication of our evidence is that investor behavioral biases are a necessary ingredient for the explanation of both the momentum and B/M anomalies.

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Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Distress Social Responsibility

Allen Goss

2009

Using both multivariate regressions, simultaneous nonlinear equations and a discrete time hazard model, I find that the level of CSR in a firm is a significant determinant of distress, even after controlling for previously identified drivers of firm distress. The relationship is robust to the endogeneity of CSR investments and free cash flow and suggests that there is informational value in extra financial metrics.

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Corporate Social Responsibility and the Cost of Debt Financing Financial Economics

Allen Goss, Gordon S. Roberts

2008

This study examines the link between corporate social responsibility and bank debt. Our focus on banks exploits their specialized role as quasi-insider delegated monitors. We find that firms with the worst social responsibility scores pay higher spreads (16 bps) but firms with average or good social scores benefit very little from increasing them further. The modest premium charged the worst firms together with the absence of a payoff for the best firms suggest that banks do not regard corporate social responsibility as significantly value enhancing or risk reducing.

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