András Danis is an assistant professor of finance at Scheller College of Business. His current research topics are the effects of credit derivatives on financial restructuring, the capital structure of firms, and shareholder activism. He teaches corporate finance at both the graduate and undergraduate levels. Danis' research has been published in the Journal of Financial Economics and Management Science.
Dr. Danis received his doctoral degree in 2012 from the Vienna Graduate School of Finance, a joint Ph.D. program of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, the University of Vienna, and the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business. He pursued his undergraduate studies at the University of Vienna, where he received a Diplom in International Business Administration (equivalent to MSc).
Areas of Expertise (7)
Right-to-Work Laws on Workers and Firms
Capital Structure of Firms
Credit Default Swaps
Selected Accomplishments (4)
Brady Family Award for Teaching Excellence
Scheller College of Business, 2018
SAC Capital Ph.D. Candidate Award for Outstanding Research
WFA Annual Meetings, 2012
Best Paper Award at the Vienna Graduate School of Finance
Sponsored by the WU Gutmann Center for Portfolio Management, 2011
University of Vienna Award (professional)
Awarded for second-best business administration student in the graduating class, 2007
Vienna Graduate School of Finance: Ph.D., Finance 2012
Joint doctoral program of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, the University of Vienna, and the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
University of Vienna: Diploma, Social and Economic Sciences 2007
Specializations: Corporate Finance and Operations Research
Selected Media Appearances (1)
Alabama Coca-Cola strike: Are unions gaining 'momentum'?
Labor strife in Alabama during the early 20th Century is full of wild tales of shootouts, bloody strikes and the National Guard trying to control the mayhem.
Selected Articles (5)
András Danis, Andrea Gamba
2018 The effects of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm value are examined. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive effects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the probability of costly debt renegotiation and reduce costly equity financing. After calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage. The effect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low productivity firms.
Sudheer Chava, András Danis, Alex Hsu
2017 The impact of staggered introduction of right-to-work (RTW) laws across various states in the U.S. on worker wages is examined. After the introduction of RTW laws, there is a decrease in wages negotiated through collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in the affected states. Further, the number of CBAs decreases, and the gap between the fraction of workers covered by a CBA and the fraction of union members increases. Firms increase investment and employment, and reduce their financial leverage. Our results are consistent with the view that RTW laws decrease the bargaining power of unions, which reduces unions' ability to negotiate higher wages.
2016 In this paper, I examine the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on the restructuring of distressed firms. Using a sample of U.S. distressed exchange offers during the period 2006–2011, I show that the participation rate among bondholders is significantly lower if the firm has CDSs traded on its debt. To address endogeneity concerns, I use the introduction of the Big Bang Protocol as a natural experiment. The results suggest that firms with CDSs find it difficult to reduce debt out of court. This is important because it can increase the likelihood of future bankruptcy, which is inefficient. The findings are consistent with the empty creditor hypothesis, which posits that bondholders who are hedged with CDSs are less likely to participate in a debt restructuring. The paper also contains direct evidence for the existence of empty creditors.
András Danis, Daniel A. Rettl, Toni M. Whited
2014 A revisit the well-established puzzle that leverage is negatively correlated with measures of profitability. In contrast, we find that at times when firms are at or close to their optimal level of leverage, the cross-sectional correlation between profitability and leverage is positive. At other times, it is negative. These results are consistent with dynamic trade-off models in which infrequent capital structure rebalancing is optimal. The time series of market leverage and profitability in the quarters prior to rebalancing events match the patterns predicted by these models. Our results are not driven by investment layouts, market timing, payout, or mechanical mean reversion of leverage.
2011 Develop a simple methodology to identify firms that are at or close to their optimal capital structure. Using this methodology we present cross-sectional and time series evidence in favor of dynamic tradeoff theory. In particular, at rebalancing points the relationship between profitability and leverage is positive, consistent with theoretical predictions. Also, the time series of market leverage, profitability, and equity payouts in the years prior to rebalancing events match the patterns obtained from simulated data. Our methodology is robust to recent critiques of empirical tests of dynamic tradeoff theory.