Areas of Expertise (6)
Dr. Andres Almazan is a Professor in the finance department. His research and teaching interests include corporate finance, financial intermediation, capital markets, M&A, and banking and contact theory.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Ph.D., Economics
CEMFI, Madrid (Spain): M.S., Economics
University of Malaga: B.A., Business Administration
Media Appearances (3)
Following several resignations, top administrative positions still vacant.
The Daily Texan online
Andres Almazan, chair of the business school search committee and professor in McCombs, said at this time, the committee is bound by confidentiality and cannot talk about the specifics of its search.
US News ranks UT number 16 among public US universities
The Daily Texan online
Finance professor Andres Almazan said students play an important role in UT’s history of academic achievement.
“It’s difficult to be good if you don’t have good students and resources,” Almazan said. “UT is lucky in that we have both. We do everything we can to make sure the content and delivery is absolutely first class. We have good students, and we make sure they get the education they deserve.”
"U.S. Financial Regulation" with Dr. Andres Almazan
McCombs Today online
Dr. Andres Almazan conducted a Knowledge To Go (KTG) Webinar entitled, "U.S. Financial Regulation." Almazan notes that the financial system is one of the most heavily regulated industries in our economy. He discusses the modern approach to regulation and the steps that must be taken in order to weigh the costs and benefits. Almazan goes on to discuss the U.S. bank regulation and the eight categories of bank regulation.
Listing of top scholarly works by Andres Almazan.
This paper investigates the relation between firms' locations and their corporate finance decisions. We develop a model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to make acquisitions, and to facilitate those acquisitions, firms within clusters maintain more financial slack.
We provide a theory of informal communication—cheap talk—between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value.
This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. Our analysis indicates that the choice of locating within rather than away from industry clusters is influenced by ...
Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that examines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive ...
We examine the form, adoption rates, and economic rationale for various mutual fund investment restrictions. A sample of US domestic equity funds from 1994 to 2000 reveals systematic patterns in investment constraints, consistent with an optimal contracting ...
This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement. Such policy depends on the presence and the size of severance pay in the ...