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Andres Almazan - The University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business. Austin, TX, US

Andres Almazan Andres Almazan

Professor, Department of Finance | The University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business


An expert in corporate finance


Areas of Expertise (6)

Capital Markets

Agency Theory

Capital Structure

Corporate Governance

Mergers and Acquisitions



Dr. Andres Almazan is a Professor in the finance department. His research and teaching interests include corporate finance, financial intermediation, capital markets, M&A, and banking and contact theory.

Education (3)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Ph.D., Economics

CEMFI, Madrid (Spain): M.S., Economics

University of Malaga: B.A., Business Administration

Media Appearances (2)

Following several resignations, top administrative positions still vacant.

The Daily Texan  online


Andres Almazan, chair of the business school search committee and professor in McCombs, said at this time, the committee is bound by confidentiality and cannot talk about the specifics of its search.

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US News ranks UT number 16 among public US universities

The Daily Texan  online


Finance professor Andres Almazan said students play an important role in UT’s history of academic achievement.
“It’s difficult to be good if you don’t have good students and resources,” Almazan said. “UT is lucky in that we have both. We do everything we can to make sure the content and delivery is absolutely first class. We have good students, and we make sure they get the education they deserve.”

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Articles (9)

Andres Almazan citations Google Scholar

Listing of top scholarly works by Andres Almazan.

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Firm Investment and Stakeholder Choices: A Top-Down Theory of Capital Budgeting Journal of Finance


This paper develops a top‐down model of capital budgeting in which privately informed executives make investment choices that convey information to the firm's stakeholders (e.g., employees). Favorable information in this setting encourages stakeholders to take actions that positively contribute to the firm's success (e.g., employees work harder). Within this framework we examine how firms may distort their investment choices to influence the information conveyed to stakeholders...

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Debt, Labor Markets, and the Creation and Destruction of Firms Journal of Financial Economics


We analyze the financing and liquidation decisions of firms that face a labor market with search frictions.... We examine policy interventions that influence the firms׳ financing and liquidation choices. We consider the role of monetary policy, which can reduce debt burdens during economy-wide downturns, and tax policy, which can influence the incentives of firms to use debt financing.

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Financial Structure, Acquisition Opportunities and Firm Locations Journal of Finance


This paper investigates the relation between firms' locations and their corporate finance decisions. We develop a model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to make acquisitions, and to facilitate those acquisitions, firms within clusters maintain more financial slack.

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Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring Journal of Finance


We provide a theory of informal communication—cheap talk—between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value.

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Firm Location and the Creation and Utilization of Human Capital The Review of Economic Studies


This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. Our analysis indicates that the choice of locating within rather than away from industry clusters is influenced by ...

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Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation Financial Management


Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that examines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive ...

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Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager? Journal of Financial Economics


We examine the form, adoption rates, and economic rationale for various mutual fund investment restrictions. A sample of US domestic equity funds from 1994 to 2000 reveals systematic patterns in investment constraints, consistent with an optimal contracting ...

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Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures The Journal of Finance


This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement. Such policy depends on the presence and the size of severance pay in the ...

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