Brett Katzman, Ph.D.
Chair of the Department of Economics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis and Professor of Economics | Kennesaw State University
Kennesaw, GA, UNITED STATES
Brett Katzman is a leading national expert on the competitive bidding process.
Biography
Brett Katzman is chair of the Department of Economics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis in Kennesaw State University’s Michael J. Coles College of Business, where he oversees nearly 40 full-time faculty.
His research focuses on competitive bidding, specifically Medicare auctions, which he has studied since 2001.
Industry Expertise (6)
Accounting
Banking
Capital Markets
Education/Learning
Government Relations
Financial Services
Areas of Expertise (4)
Competitive Bidding
Medicare Auctions
Health Care Auctions
Government Auctions
Accomplishments (1)
Benjamin Franklin Academic Research Award (professional)
2016-08-01
Research Award for Theoretical Innovations in the study of Medicare's Competitive Bidding Program
Education (1)
Duke University: Ph.D., Economics 1996
Affiliations (1)
- American Economics Association
Links (1)
Media Appearances (1)
Medicare's DME Bidding Program Criticized
MedPage Today
2013-08-26
"The CMS procedure gives a strong incentive for firms to low-ball bid in an attempt to game the system," Brett Katzman, PhD, economics department chair at Kennesaw State University in Georgia, told MedPage Today in an email. "This is usually a dangerous strategy because when everyone tries it, prices plummet and firms are stuck with losses."...
Recent Papers (5)
Comment on Hoerger: Early Pilots of Medicare Auctions Bring No Solace to Auction Experts
The Economist's Voice
2015 Peter Cramton and Brett Katzman stick to their guns: Medicare auctions remain fatally flawed and must be fixed. They argue that contrary to Hoerger's comment, no comfort can be drawn from the fact that the market was able to withstand price reductions in early pilots.
Designed to fail: The Medicare auction for durable medical equipment
Economic Inquiry
2014 We examine the theoretical properties of the auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment. Two unique features of the Medicare auction are (1) winners are paid the median winning bid and (2) bids are nonbinding. We show that median pricing results in allocation inefficiencies as some high-cost firms potentially displace low-cost firms as winners. Further, the auction may leave demand unfulfilled as some winners refuse to supply because the price is set below their cost...
An empirical investigation of the social market for cigarettes
Health Economics
2007 A major characteristic of teenage smoking is the ability to ‘bum’ cigarettes from peers. To date, research into the determinants of teenage smoking has largely ignored the effects of this social market on the smoking decisions of teenagers. In this paper, we estimate the demand for cigarettes using data from the Youth Risk Behavior Survey which distinguishes teens who primarily buy cigarettes from those who primarily borrow cigarettes...
The consequences of information revealed in auctions
Applied Economics Research Bulletin
2008 This paper considers the ramifications of post-auction competition on bidding behavior under different bid announcement policies. In equilibrium, the auctioneer’s announcement policy has two distinct effects. First, announcement entices players to signal information to their post-auction competitors through their bids. Second, announcement can lead to greater bidder participation in certain instances while limiting participation in others. Specifically, the participation effect works against the signalling effect, thus reducing the impact of signalling found in other papers. Revenue, efficiency, and surplus implications of various announcement policies are examined...
The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option
Economic Theory
2006 An auction with a buyout option is modelled. Such an option allows a bidder to purchase the item being auctioned at a pre-specified buyout price, instead of attempting to obtain the item through the traditional auction procedure. This analysis is motivated by ...