Charles Knapp

Lifetime Achievement Award

2010-01-01

Awarded for Contracts Teaching at the Sixth International Contracts Conference at UNLV Law School.

Legal Teaching Award

1995-01-01

Awarded by the New York University Law School Alumni Association.

Order of the Coif

1970-01-01

Member of the honor society for United States law school graduates.

New York University School of Law

J.D.

Law

Denison University

B.A.

Undergraduate Studies

Keynote Speaker

Ninth International Contracts Conference  St. Thomas University School of Law

2014-01-01

Keynote Speaker and Panel Moderator

Eighth International Contracts Conference  Wesleyan University School of Law, TX

2013-01-01

Speaker

Conference on Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Mccaulay  University of Wisconsin School of Law

2011-01-01

Cases and Controversies: Some Things to Do with Contracts Cases

2013-01-01

In this article, written as part of a symposium on “Contracts in the Real World,” Professor Knapp draws on his 40-plus years of experience teaching the Contracts course, to suggest some of the various ways in which the reports of decided cases can be employed in the teaching of that subject, beyond the basic task of communicating doctrine to students entering law study. He cites and discusses dozens of cases, ranging over more than a century and a half of American and English jurisprudence. Although most of the cases he analyzes can be found in present or past editions of the Knapp, Crystal & Prince casebook, Problems in Contract Law, a majority will probably be familiar to any teacher of the subject.

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Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First Century Survey

2013-01-01

The notion that a court tasked with enforcing a private agreement should be allowed – or even, in some cases, required – to withhold enforcement because of the unfairness of the agreement is not a new one; scholars have traced it back well beyond the earliest days of the Anglo-American legal system. In the United States, the current formulation of that idea can be found principally in the doctrine of unconscionability, which has enjoyed since its incorporation into the Uniform Commercial Code a place in the menu of contract law doctrines, even if a somewhat insecure and sometimes disputed one. This Chapter summarizes with a few broad strokes the earlier story of modern unconscionability law in the U.S. It then focuses on the history of that doctrine in American courts over the last two decades, identifying those situations in which it has been most frequently advanced, and those where it has been most likely to succeed. This also entails exploring the interaction of that doctrine with the federal law favoring enforcement of private contractual agreements to submit future disputes to arbitration. Finally, the Chapter considers generally the possible future development of unconscionability law, with particular regard to the continued utility of the “procedural/substantive” dichotomy, and the employment of unconscionability as a tool for policing contracts of adhesion.

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Is There a 'Duty to Read'?

2013-01-01

The notion that there is in general contract law a “duty to read” persists in the decisions of American courts. This chapter explores the question of what it may mean today to say that there is a “duty to read,” and concludes by suggesting what role (if any) that doctrine should play in our present-day law of contract. The chapter begins by examining various ways in which the “duty to read” is commonly articulated, and compares it to other contract law concepts: the “duty to bargain in good faith” and the “duty to mitigate damages.” It points out that, like the “duty to mitigate,” the “duty to read” (DTR) is not technically a “duty” but rather a limitation on a party’s ability to assert what would otherwise be available claims or defenses under the rules of contract law. Sometimes described as a “conclusive presumption,” the DTR is in practice more of a rebuttable presumption – a “presumption of knowing assent” – permitting the adhering/signing party to overcome in some situations the legal fiction that she has in fact read and understood whatever written agreement she has signed onto. The chapter next considers a variety of ways in which the DTR may be countered or overcome. These include: interpretation (often “against the drafter”); lack of “true assent” for some reason (such as forgery, lack of authority, or duress); mistake, either mutual or unilateral; fraudulent misrepresentation (or wrongful nondisclosure) of either the nature or contents of the writing, or fraud in the inducement; and other doctrines such as reasonable expectations or unconscionability. The chapter also notes and evaluates policy arguments for the DTR rule, such as the law’s desire to insulate a written agreement from later challenge (similar to the justification for the parol evidence rule); application of the estoppel principle to protect a drafter who has relied on the other party’s representations of knowing assent; and the view that adherence to an agreement can properly be seen as a sort of “blanket assent” to its contents. Having sketched the legal background of the DTR, the chapter then proceeds to examine a selection of some two dozen cases, all later than 2005, which discuss and in some cases rely on the DTR rule. In many of these cases the adhering party was indeed prevented by the DTR from defending against enforcement. In some, however, one of the defenses described above proved successful.

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