The research of Christian Lundblad spans asset pricing and international finance, with a specialization in emerging market development.
His research has been published in top academic journals such as the Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies and the Journal of Financial Economics. He is an associate editor for the Journal of Finance.
Dr. Lundblad served as a financial economist at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C., where he advised the Board of Governors on international financial market developments.
Industry Expertise (3)
International Trade and Development
Areas of Expertise (7)
Finance and Economics
Emerging Brics Economies
Center for Excellence in Investment Management: Director (professional)
The Center for Excellence in Investment Management provides resources that facilitate knowledge creation and dissemination throughout the ever-expanding frontiers of finance. CIM helps students, researchers and practitioners keep pace with the rapidly evolving financial services industry through a variety of programs, publications and outreach.
MBA for Executives Teaching Excellence Award (professional)
Executive MBA students chose Christian Lundblad for this excellence in teaching award.
Duke University: Ph.D., Financial Economics 2000
Duke University: M.A., Economics 1996
Washington University in St. Louis: B.A., Economics & English literature 1994
- Journal of Finance: Associate Editor
- Journal of Banking and Finance: Associate Editor
- Financial Management: Associate Editor
Media Appearances (2)
Hong Kong Protests Signal Various Risks For Business
The Wall Street Journal online
Chris Lundblad comments on China's shifting economic model in light of demonstrations in Hong Kong.
U.S. companies feel a chill in China, even as many still rake in profits
The Washington Post online
A slowdown in China’s breakneck economic growth, stiffer competition from Chinese companies and rising labor costs have combined to cut into the profit margins of U.S. companies operating here.
Professors Christian Lundblad and Chotibhak (Pab) Jotikasthira contradict the idea that financial crises can be prevented by simply changing accounting rules.
Finance professor Christian Lundblad and his colleagues discovered that an emerging country’s economy grows even more rapidly than expected from the amount of foreign investment.
Measuring the impact of political risk on investment projects is one of the most vexing issues in international business. One popular approach is to assume that the sovereign yield spread captures political risk and to augment the project discount rate by this spread. This paper shows that this approach is flawed. While the sovereign spread is influenced by political risk, it also reflects other risks that are likely included in the valuation analysis - leading to the double counting of risks. The authors propose using "political risk spreads" to undo the double counting in the evaluation of international investment projects.
The authors provide evidence concerning the use of historical cost (HCA) versus mark-to-market (MTM) accounting in regulating financial institutions. Accounting rules, through their interactions with capital regulations, alter financial institutions’ trading behavior. The insurance industry provides a laboratory to explore these interactions: life insurers have greater flexibility to hold speculative-grade assets at HCA than P&C insurers, and the degree to which life insurers recognize market values differs across U.S. states. During the financial crisis, we show that insurers facing HCA are less likely to sell significantly downgraded asset-backed securities than those facing MTM. To improve their capital positions, the insurers facing HCA disproportionately resort to gains trading, selectively selling otherwise unrelated bonds with the highest unrealized gains, thereby transmitting shocks across markets.
The authors caution against focusing on the accounting rule in isolation, and instead emphasize the interaction between accounting and the regulatory framework. Rather than promoting a shift away from market-based information, their results indicate that regulatory simplicity may be preferred to the complexity of risk-weighted capital ratios that gives rise, through interactions with accounting rules, to distorted risk-taking incentives and potential build-up of systemic risk.