W. David Stahlman

Associate Professor University of Mary Washington

  • Fredericksburg VA

Dr. Stahlman specializes in animal behavior.

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Biography

Dr. Stahlman’s expertise centers around animal learning, behavior, comparative cognition, creativity and problem solving, and the questions of freedom and determinism. In particular he has conducted research on behavioral variability, problem solving and creativity in animals such as rats, and the study of simple learning and anti-predator behavior in hermit crabs.

He is an author of a chapter, “There is room for conditioning in the creative process,” published in The Neuroscience of Creativity. In addition, his articles have appeared in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, Learning & Behavior, the International Journal of Comparative Psychology, Behavioural Processes, Animal Behaviour, and Learning & Motivation. He has presented his research at national symposiums, including the Conference on Comparative Cognition and the annual meetings of the Psychonomics Society and the American Psychological Association.

Areas of Expertise

Psychology
Comparative Cognition
Experimental Psychology
Animal Behavior

Education

University of California at Los Angeles

Ph.D.

Psychology

2009

University of California at Los Angeles

M.A.

Psychology

2006

Franklin & Marshall College

B.A.

Neuroscience

2004

Articles

Devaluation of a conditioned reinforcer requires its reexposure

Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology

W. David Stahlman, Kenneth J. Leising

A change in motivational state does not guarantee a change in operant behaviour. Only after an organism has had contact with an outcome while in a relevant motivational state does behaviour change, a phenomenon called incentive learning. While ample evidence indicates that this is true for primary reinforcers, it has not been established for conditioned reinforcers. We performed an experiment with rats where lever-presses were reinforced by presentations of an audiovisual stimulus that had previously preceded food delivery; in the critical experimental groups, the audiovisual stimulus was then paired a single time with a strong electric shock. Some animals were reexposed to the audiovisual stimulus. Lever-presses yielding no outcomes were recorded in a subsequent test. Animals that had been reexposed to the audiovisual stimulus after the aversive training responded less than did those that had not received reexposure. Indeed, those animals that were not reexposed did not differ from a control group that received no aversive conditioning of the audiovisual stimulus. Moreover, these results were not mediated by a change in the food’s reinforcement value, but instead reflect a change in behaviour with respect to the conditioned reinforcer itself. These are the first data to indicate that the affective value of conditioned stimuli, like that of unconditioned ones, is established when the organism comes into contact with them.

First instances in phylogenic and ontogenic selection as captured by the verbal behavior of scientists and philosophers of science.

Behavior & Philosophy

W. David Stahlman, A. Charles Catania

Selectionist sciences such as evolutionary biology and behavior analysis depend on variations. Variations must emerge before environments can act upon them. Yet if first instances in ontogeny are not products of ontogenic selection they are prerequisites for, but not instances of, selection. They count as behavior but not as operant behavior. When Smith (2019) examines how Skinner treats these issues, he relies on snapshots of Skinner's writings over decades, during which Skinner's approach evolved from one anchored in physics as a model science to one increasingly aligned with biology. Skinner's early treatments of the problems of ontogeny and phylogeny differed from his later formulations. Accounts of scientific behavior based only on verbal samples from an evolving scientific corpus typically omit both their antecedents in the laboratory and the research consequences that follow. Furthermore, behavior analytic research has a long history of exploring the sources of novel behavior. Thus, we need not defer to cognitivist views regarding the Problem of the First Instance.

Evolutionary biology and the natural selection of behavior

Encyclopedia of Child and Adolescent Development

W. David Stahlman, A. Charles Catania

Evolution happens. It is not a theory. It is a name for how biological populations have changed over the history of our planet. Theories about why those populations changed, such as Lamarckism and orthogenesis, have come and gone. One remains with us: the theory of evolution by natural selection, introduced by Charles Darwin and his contem- porary, Alfred Russel Wallace, and developed in greatest detail by Darwin (1859). Accounts of evolution tend to emphasize anatomical and physiological properties, ❦ such as the brain and its organization. But evolutionary contingencies select organisms based on what they can do, so it is crucial to recall that brains and other structures evolved in the service of behavior. In that sense, behavior always comes first (Catania, 2013; Skinner, 1953). This entry highlights selection by the environment as a causal mode, in contrast with traditional push–pull causalities, which range from those of the ancient Greeks to those of Newton and beyond.

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