Heather Battaly, Ph.D.

Professor of Philosophy University of Connecticut

  • Storrs CT

Professor Battaly works in epistemology and ethics, with a focus epistemic virtue.

Contact

University of Connecticut

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Biography

Heather Battaly specializes in epistemology, ethics, and virtue theory, is one of the leading researchers in the world on the concept of intellectual humility, and is a pioneer on the topic of epistemic vice. Her work influences research in philosophy, psychology and education on intellectual humility and the teaching of intellectual character traits. She has been co-Investigator for a Templeton grant and Principal Investigator for a Spencer grant, has received various awards from Cal State Fullerton for research and teaching, and is editor in chief of the Journal of Philosophical Research as well as an Associate Editor for the Journal of the American Philosophical Association.

Areas of Expertise

Procrastinators
Slackers
Closed-Mindedness
Human Characteristics
Dogmatism
Quitters

Education

Syracuse University

PhD

Philosophy

University of Vermont

BA

Philosophy and History

Media Appearances

Advice from three humanities journal editors on how to get your work published

The Daily Campus  print

2021-02-11

“The good submissions are not just saying something new; they’re saying something that’s new and important and potentially trendsetting,” Heather Battaly, a philosophy professor and editor in chief of the Journal of Philosophical Research, said.

Battaly also serves as the associate editor of the Journal of the American Philosophical Association, which was founded in 2015 and is a relatively new journal in the field of philosophy. She described both publications that she works for as general journals on philosophy and said that they are not overly ingrained with complicated wording or topics that are specific to specialists in the field, but instead “can be appreciated by philosophers who aren’t already steeped in the details of the topic at hand.”

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Was Dr House a good person at the end?

Stuff  online

Heather Battaly and Amy Coplan, in their essay "Diagnosing House" - part of the collection House & Philosophy, edited by Henry Jacoby - describe Dr Gregory House, circa 2009:

House is a spectacular misanthrope who repeatedly fails to do what a benevolent person would do. He is unnecessarily cruel to patients and their families, and to his colleagues and friends. He routinely issues gratuitous insults and is so consistently callous that we are shocked on the rare occasion when he manages to show compassion. Since House repeatedly fails to do what a benevolent person would do, he is not benevolent.

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Articles

Educating for intellectual pride and ameliorating servility in contexts of epistemic injustice

Educational Philosophy and Theory

2022-01-16

Some of the students in our classrooms doubt their intellectual strengths—their knowledge, abilities, and skills. They may be unaware of the intellectual strengths they have, or may ignore, lack confidence in, or under-estimate them. They may even incorrectly judge themselves to be intellectually inferior to their peers. Students who do such things consistently are deficient in the virtue of intellectual pride—in appropriately ‘owning’ their intellectual strengths—and are on their way to developing a form of intellectual servility. Can the ‘standard approach’ to intellectual character education help these students make progress toward intellectual pride? This article argues that there are two limitations in its ability to help. First, the standard approach isn’t likely to help unless it is combined with classroom strategies for ameliorating servility. Second, even when it is combined with ameliorative strategies, any progress it might make in the classroom is likely to be fleeting when a student’s servility is caused by systemic epistemic injustice. This article suggests that rather than prioritize the standard approach, we prioritize strategies that aim at systemic change and amelioration

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Vice epistemology has a responsibility problem

Philosophical Issues, Volume29, Issue1

2019-09-03

Vice epistemology is in the business of defining epistemic vice. One of the proposed requirements of epistemic vices is that they are reprehensible—blameworthy in a non-voluntarist way. Our problem, as vice epistemologists, is giving an analysis of non-voluntarist responsibility that will count just the right qualities, no more and no less, as epistemic vices. If our analysis of non-voluntarist responsibility ends up being too narrow, then it risks excluding some qualities that we want to count as epistemic vices, such as implicit biases. Whereas, if it ends up being too broad, it risks including qualities that we do not want to count as epistemic vices, such as impaired vision. I recommend a three-step program for vice epistemologists: 1. admit that we have a responsibility problem; 2. strive to define the responsibility problem; 3. work together with specialists in non-voluntarist responsibility to solve the responsibility problem.

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Can Closed-mindedness be an Intellectual Virtue?

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 84: Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice

2018-11-13

Is closed-mindedness always an intellectual vice? Are there conditions in which it might be an intellectual virtue? This paper adopts a working analysis of closed-mindedness as an unwillingness or inability to engage seriously with relevant intellectual options. In standard cases, closed-mindedness will be an intellectual vice. But, in epistemically hostile environments, closed-mindedness will be an intellectual virtue.

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