Jared Wilson is an assistant professor of finance at the Kelley School of Business in Indianapolis. He received his PhD in finance from Drexel University in Philadelphia. Wilson received his undergraduate degrees in economics and finance from the University of Pittsburgh.
Wilson's research focuses on corporate finance, corporate governance, mergers & acquisitions, and executive turnover.
Industry Expertise (2)
Areas of Expertise (3)
Research Excellence Award (professional)
Outstanding Doctoral Student Paper Award (professional)
Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting
LeBow PhD Award for Outstanding Student Research Paper (professional)
Drexel University: Ph.D. 2016
University of Pittsburgh: BSBA 2011
University of Pittsburgh: BS 2011
David A Becher, Ralph A Walkling, Jared I Wilson
We provide benchmarks for board changes over time and in response to the evolution of firm structure. Boards are more stable in the modern era. At the same time, shifts made around mergers are substantial and significantly different than those at non-merging firms. Changes to acquiring boards reflect firm needs, increased demand for executive and merger experience, and bargaining between targets and acquirers, rather than agency motives. Conversely, director selection at non-merging firms is driven by general skills and diversity. Our analyses provide insight into the dynamic nature of board structure and characteristics demanded in the director labor market.
Thomas W Bates, David A Becher, Jared I Wilson
We document an economically significant relation between director turnover and prior firm performance. This relation manifests in idiosyncratic stock returns consistent with relative performance evaluation and the monitoring of actions attributable to directors. The director turnover-performance sensitivity increases substantially throughout the 2000s, and varies with a number of governance characteristics, most notably with the presence of an active external blockholder. Directors who exit firms following poor performance are significantly less likely to obtain new directorships in the future. In sum, the threat of replacement for poor firm performance is an increasingly significant incentive for the directors of public corporations.
Jared I. Wilson
In response to the increased threat of shareholder litigation filed in multiple states, firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to a single venue of the board’s choice. It is unclear whether these provisions impose increased costs on shareholders’ ability to discipline managers and directors or provide benefits to shareholders by eliminating multi-forum and duplicative lawsuits. I use the Delaware Chancery Court’s announcement upholding the adoption of these provisions as a natural experiment to evaluate their wealth implications. Overall, my findings suggest that exclusive forum provisions create value for shareholders by specifying a required venue for corporate litigation.