Areas of Expertise (8)
Global Economic Development
Kishore S. Gawande is a professor in the Department of Business, Government and Society at the McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin.
Gawande specializes in empirical political economy and trade policy in which he has published extensively. His current research interests focus on the politics of free trade areas, globalization and regime quality, and determinants of conflict. His work has been published in top economics journals around the world.
University of California Los Angeles: Ph.D., Economics 1991
University of California Los Angeles: M.A., Mathematics 1988
Indian Institute of Management: M.B.A., Business Administration 1981
St. Stephen's College: B.A., Economics 1979
Media Appearances (3)
The Export-Import Bank: What the Scholarship Says
The Heritage Foundation online
Trade theory also assumes that corporations do not spend money lobbying for higher subsidies and that government is impervious to such entreaties. That would be nice. But as Kishore Gawande and Usree Bandyopadhyay found, trade policy is responsive to lobbying and more closely linked to maximizing profits than to maximizing national income...
Beyond Chhattisgarh: Are the Maoist rebels without a cause?
First Post online
In a paper published last year, economists Devesh Kapur, Kishore Gawande, and Shanker Satyanath suggested a variant explanation. The declining availability of minor forest produce, or MFP, to adivasi communities, could have generated a crisis-inducing shock...
The Time is Right for a Carbon Tax
The Houston Chronicle online
The case for a carbon tax is a compelling one, given our current macroeconomic quandary and our apparent inability to deal with climate change, says Professor Kishore Gawande.
Theory and extensive evidence connect poverty and underdevelopment to civil conflict yet evidence on the impact of development programs on violence is surprisingly mixed. To break this impasse, we exploit a within-country policy experiment to examine the conditions under which antipoverty programs reduce violence. ...The results demonstrate the potential for anti-poverty programs to mitigate violent civil conflict by improving livelihoods, but also highlight the crucial role of state capacity in shaping these effects.
In this article, we seek to advance civil conflict literature by drawing out the implications of a well-known formal model of the renewable resources–conflict relationship and then conducting rigorous statistical tests of its implications in the case of a serious ongoing civil conflict in India. We find that a one standard deviation decrease in our measure of renewable resources increases killings by nearly 60 percent over the long run.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.
We use evidence from a quasi-experiment – the shipping of radioactive spent nuclear fuel by train through South Carolina – to assess whether many years of incident-free transport of nuclear waste no longer negatively affects market valuation of properties along the route.
Field survey experiments often measure amorphous concepts in discretely ordered categories, with postsurvey analytics that fail to account for the discrete attributes of the data. This article demonstrates the use of discrete distribution tests, specifically the chi-square test and the discrete Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test, as simple devices for comparing and analyzing ordered responses typically found in surveys.
Olson hypothesized that a latent group’s ability to organize and contribute toward providing a public good might be jeopardized by free riding. The politics of trade protection feature the collective action problem, since protection benefits all firms in the industry including those who contributed nothing to attaining it. This paper examines the extent of free riding in lobbying over tariffs in the context of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) protection-for-sale model in which industry lobbies seek to bend government policy in their favor.
Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers.
The hypothesis of inequality as the source of violent conflict is investigated empirically in the context of killings by Nepalese Maoists in their People's War against their government during 1996–2003.