Lance Hunter 
Assistant Professor of Political Science | Augusta University
Augusta, GA, UNITED STATES
Dr. Lance Hunter studies the connection between terrorism and political stability in democracies.
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Biography
Hunter is an assistant professor of political science with a background in international relations. His research focuses on how terrorist attacks influence politics in democratic countries and how political decisions within countries affect conflicts worldwide. His work has appeared in journals such as: Journal of Peace Research, Terrorism and Political Violence, Party Politics, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Armed Forces and Society, Conflict, Security and Development, and the International Journal of Data Analysis Techniques and Strategies. Hunter teaches courses in international relations, security studies, and research methods. He received his PhD in Political Science from Texas Tech University in 2011.
Areas of Expertise (5)
Affiliations (4)
- Augusta University Political Science Club : Co-Advisor
- Augusta University ONE Organization : Advisor
- Augusta University Cyber Institute: Advisory Committee Member
- Augusta University Honors Program: Committee Member
Links (2)
Articles (3)
2016
In this work, we surmise that terrorist attacks have important implications for two commonly used measures of party system stability. The results of a pooled, cross-sectional time series analysis confirm our hypothesis: deadly attacks proximate to elections destabilize party systems; in addition, the level of democratic consolidation within states also influences the degree that fatal terrorist attacks affect party system stability.
2016
In this study we contend that legislators are more accountable individually in candidate-centred electoral systems which impacts a state’s decision to initiate interstate conflict.
2016
We present a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis of military spending and electoral institutions and we find that party-based electoral systems, rather than majoritarian ones, foment higher military spending levels—which we attribute to these systems’ predilection for public goods spending.
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