Secondary Titles (1)
- Richard E. Jacobs Chair in Finance
Matthew T. Billett holds the Richard E. Jacobs Chair in Finance at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Previously, Professor Billett spent thirteen years in the Tippie College of Business, University of Lowa. He received a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of Florida in 1993. Professor Billett has articles published in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Finance, Financial Management, the Journal of Financial Economics, and the Review of Financial Studies, among others. Professor Billett is also an associate editor of the Journal of Financial Research.
Industry Expertise (2)
Areas of Expertise (5)
MBA Teaching Excellence Award (professional)
Kelley School of Business.
Collegiate Teaching Award (professional)
Tippie College of Business.
Chester A. Phillips Research Fellow (professional)
University of Iowa Tippie College of Business.
University of Florida: Ph.D., Finance 1993
Colgate University: B.A., Mathematical Economics 1989
Media Appearances (3)
Tracking stock gives Dell financing to buy EMC
“This is a very unique deal,” said Matthew T. Billett, a finance professor at Indiana University ...
Matthew Billett is the new Richard E. Jacobs Chair at IU's Kelley School of Business
IU News Room online
Matthew T. Billett, a leading expert on corporate finance and banking, has been appointed the Richard E. Jacobs Chair in Finance at Indiana University's Kelley School of Business...
Researcher Finds Good Management, Open Market Stock Buy-backs Deter Takeover Attempts
"Firms that buy their stock back on the open market are seen as more efficient and more sensitive to shareholder interests," said Matt Billett, professor of finance in the Tippie College of Business. "It's a sign of shareholder-friendly management."
Billett recently studied more than 23,000 U.S. companies to determine whether open market share repurchases deter takeovers. What he and his co-author found was evidence that, for the first time, verified the conventional wisdom that, indeed, they do.
"While tender offers have been shown to act as an effective defense in the midst of takeover battles, open market repurchases may deter unwanted bids, pre-empting would-be acquirers from bidding in the first place," Billett said...
We explore the influence of customer perceptions from the product market on firms’ return characteristics in the stock market. Using customers’ opinions on over 1200 brands, we find that stocks of companies with prestigious brands have high market-to-book ratios and large negative loadings on the Fama-French HML factor.
In a model of dual agency problems where borrower-lenders and bank-nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness.
Prior studies conclude that firms’ equity underperforms following many individual sorts of external financing. These conclusions naturally raise significant questions about market efficiency and/or about the techniques used to measure long-run “abnormal returns.”
Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments.
Change-in-control covenants first became commonplace towards the end of the takeover wave in the 1980s. We examine merger and acquisition activity from 1991 to 2006 to see how such covenant protection influences the wealth effects and probability of takeovers.