hero image
Matt Billett - Indiana University, Kelley School of Business. Bloomington, IN, US

Matt Billett Matt Billett

Professor of Finance | Indiana University, Kelley School of Business

Bloomington, IN, UNITED STATES

Matthew T. Billett holds the Richard E. Jacobs Chair in Finance at the Kelley School of Business.

Secondary Titles (1)

  • Richard E. Jacobs Chair in Finance





loading image





Matthew T. Billett holds the Richard E. Jacobs Chair in Finance at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Previously, Professor Billett spent thirteen years in the Tippie College of Business, University of Lowa. He received a Ph.D. in Finance from the University of Florida in 1993. Professor Billett has articles published in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Finance, Financial Management, the Journal of Financial Economics, and the Review of Financial Studies, among others. Professor Billett is also an associate editor of the Journal of Financial Research.

Industry Expertise (2)


Financial Services

Areas of Expertise (5)

Financial Modeling



Corporate Finance


Accomplishments (3)

MBA Teaching Excellence Award (professional)

2014 Kelley School of Business.

Collegiate Teaching Award (professional)

2008 Tippie College of Business.

Chester A. Phillips Research Fellow (professional)

2004 University of Iowa Tippie College of Business.

Education (2)

University of Florida: Ph.D., Finance 1993

Colgate University: B.A., Mathematical Economics 1989

Media Appearances (3)

Tracking stock gives Dell financing to buy EMC

Boston Globe  online


“This is a very unique deal,” said Matthew T. Billett, a finance professor at Indiana University ...

view more

Matthew Billett is the new Richard E. Jacobs Chair at IU's Kelley School of Business

IU News Room  online


Matthew T. Billett, a leading expert on corporate finance and banking, has been appointed the Richard E. Jacobs Chair in Finance at Indiana University's Kelley School of Business...

view more

Researcher Finds Good Management, Open Market Stock Buy-backs Deter Takeover Attempts

Newswise  online


"Firms that buy their stock back on the open market are seen as more efficient and more sensitive to shareholder interests," said Matt Billett, professor of finance in the Tippie College of Business. "It's a sign of shareholder-friendly management." Billett recently studied more than 23,000 U.S. companies to determine whether open market share repurchases deter takeovers. What he and his co-author found was evidence that, for the first time, verified the conventional wisdom that, indeed, they do. "While tender offers have been shown to act as an effective defense in the midst of takeover battles, open market repurchases may deter unwanted bids, pre-empting would-be acquirers from bidding in the first place," Billett said...

view more

Articles (5)

Glamour Brands and Glamour Stocks

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

2014 We explore the influence of customer perceptions from the product market on firms’ return characteristics in the stock market. Using customers’ opinions on over 1200 brands, we find that stocks of companies with prestigious brands have high market-to-book ratios and large negative loadings on the Fama-French HML factor.

view more

Bank Skin in the Game and Loan Contract Design: Evidence from Covenant-Lite Loans

Financial and Quantitative Analysis

2013 In a model of dual agency problems where borrower-lenders and bank-nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness.

view more

Frequent Issuers’ Influence on Long-Run Post-Issuance Returns

Journal of Financial Economics

2011 Prior studies conclude that firms’ equity underperforms following many individual sorts of external financing. These conclusions naturally raise significant questions about market efficiency and/or about the techniques used to measure long-run “abnormal returns.”

view more

The Influence of Governance on Investment: Evidence from a Hazard Model

Journal of Financial Economics

2011 Does corporate governance affect the timing of large investment projects? Hazard model estimates suggest strong shareholder governance may deter managers from pursuing large investments. Controlling for investment opportunities, firms with good governance experience longer spells between large investments.

view more

The Effect of Change-in-Control Covenants on Takeovers: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts

Journal of Corporate Finance

2010 Change-in-control covenants first became commonplace towards the end of the takeover wave in the 1980s. We examine merger and acquisition activity from 1991 to 2006 to see how such covenant protection influences the wealth effects and probability of takeovers.

view more