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Robert Parrino - The University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business. Austin, TX, US

Robert Parrino Robert Parrino

Professor, Chair of Department of Finance | The University of Texas at Austin, McCombs School of Business


Corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, IPOs, Executive Compensation


Areas of Expertise (12)

Agency Theory Capital Structure Corporate Governance Executive Compensation Finance - Corporate Financial Statement Analysis Corporate Valuation Mergers & Acquisitions Venture Capital Initial Public Offerings Ceo Turnover Insider Trading


Robert Parrino is a finance professor and expert on corporate finance, private equity markets, CEO turnover, mergers and acquisitions, and IPOs.

Parrino chairs the department Finance (ranked 5th among top-tier finance programs by U.S. News in 2015), and has been named the Lamar Savings Centennial Professor of Finance at The University of Texas Austin. He is also the founding director of the Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst Center for Private Equity Finance at UT Austin.

Parrino has won many academic research and teaching awards. He is considered a leader in the field of finance. Parrino has published research in a number of journals including the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Portfolio Management and Financial Management.

As a Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) charter-holder he is very active with the CFA Institute. He has been a member of the candidate curriculum committee, and also served as a regular speaker at the annual Financial Analysts Seminar and spoken at over 20 Financial Analyst Society meeting.

In addition to McCombs, Parrino taught at the University of Chicago, University of Rochester, and IMADEC University in Vienna.



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2015 Economic Forecast Dallas Sept. 23, 2014


Education (4)

University of Rochester: Ph.D., Finance 1992

University of Rochester: M.Sc., Applied Economics 1991

The College of William and Mary: MBA., Finance 1980

Lehigh University: B.Sc., Chemical Engineering 1978

Media Appearances (1)

William (BIlly) Charlton Joins Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst Center as Associate Director

The University of Texas at Austin News  online


"Billy is an exceptional teacher who also has strong contacts in the private equity community and the ability to help us develop stronger relationships within that community," said Professor Robert Parrino, director of the HTMF Center. "The addition of Billy to the HMTF Center provides not only an experienced industry professional with extensive contacts but also increased capacity for fulfilling the center's mission of teaching, research and service in private equity," said James Nolen, distinguished senior lecturer in finance and associate director of the HMTF Center...

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Articles (9)

Robert Parrino citations Google Scholar

Listing of top scholarly works by Robert Parrino.

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Public Market Staging: The Timing of Capital Infusions in Newly Public Firms Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 106


Initial public offering (IPO) proceeds, relative to external financing requirements, are smaller for firms with more intangible assets and more research and development (R&D)-intensive firms. Asset intangibility and R&D intensity are also both negatively related to the length of time from a firm's IPO to its first post-IPO capital infusion.

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Explicit vs. Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements Journal of Finance Vol. 64


We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements. Consistent with contracting theory, explicit agreements are more likely to be observed, and are likely to have a longer duration, where the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and where the expected loss to the CEO is greater if the firm fails to honor the agreement.

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Managerial succession and firm performance Journal of Financial Economics


We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance. Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, ...

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Voting with their feet: Institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover Journal of Financial Economics


We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover.

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Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A long‐term perspective The Journal of Finance


We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms.

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Measuring investment distortions arising from stockholder–bondholder conflicts Journal of Financial Economics


We examine the importance of stockholder–bondholder conflicts in capital-structure choice.

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Outside directors and CEO selection Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis


This paper documents a strong positive relation between the percentage of outside directors and the frequency of outside CEO succession. The likelihood that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO increases monotonically with the percentage of outside directors.

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CEO Turnover and Outside Succession: A Cross-Sectional Analysis Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 46


This study examines chief executive officer (CEO) turnover.The evidence is consistent with arguments that poor CEOs are easier to identify and less costly to replace in industries that consist of similar firms than in heterogeneous industries. The likelihoods of forced turnover and of an intra-industry appointment increase with industry homogeneity.

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