Sehoon Kim

Assistant Professor University of Florida

  • Gainesville FL

Sehoon Kim researches corporate finance and financial markets.

Contact

University of Florida

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Biography

Sehoon Kim is an assistant professor of finance in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Department. Sehoon conducts research broadly in the areas of corporate finance and financial markets, focusing on issues related to corporate governance, sustainability, competition, and the impact of policies and regulations on corporations.

Areas of Expertise

Competition
Corporate Finance
Corporate Governance
Financial Markets
Public Policy
Sustainability

Media Appearances

Companies are buying up cheap carbon offsets − data suggest it’s more about greenwashing than helping the climate

The Conversation  online

2024-11-11

Carbon offsets have become big business as more companies make promises to protect the climate but can’t meet the goals on their own.

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Business school sustainability research: What is read most?

Financial Times  online

2023-07-05

Research papers on ESG themes — positive and sceptical — dominate recent downloads from the Social Science Research Network website. In the most widely read research into sustainability from business school academics, three letters dominate: ESG.

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Investors are all for ESG. Except, that is, when times are tough.

The Wall Street Journal  print

2023-02-04

Individual-investor demand for socially responsible investing “is highly sensitive to income shocks” and economic stress, concluded the study’s authors, Robin Döttling, an assistant professor of finance in the Rotterdam School of Management at Erasmus University in the Netherlands, and Sehoon Kim, assistant professor at the University of Florida’s Warrington College of Business.

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Social

Articles

Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying

Management Science

Ahn, et al.

2025-02-01

We show that public charities with corporate directors on their boards are more likely to lobby on behalf of connected corporate interests. We document this result using granular fixed effects and alternative measures, excluding donor firms, focusing on specific legislation bills, and shocks to board connections. The effects of connections are stronger when firms face more competition, have better corporate governance, and are more exposed to political risks.

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Sustainability Preferences Under Stress: Evidence from COVID-19

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

Dottling and Kim

2024-03-01

We document fragile demand for socially responsible investments (SRIs) by retail mutual fund investors. Using COVID-19 as an economic shock, we show funds with higher sustainability ratings experienced sharper declines in retail flows during the pandemic, controlling for fund characteristics. The decline in retail SRI fund flows is sharper than that of institutional flows, more pronounced when economies are hit harder by COVID-19, and unlikely to be driven by fund performance, past flows and size, or shifting investor attention.

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Real effects of climate policy: Financial constraints and spillovers

Journal of Financial Economics

Bartram, et al.

2022-02-01

We document that localized policies aimed at mitigating climate risk can have unintended consequences due to regulatory arbitrage by firms. Using a difference-in-differences framework to study the impact of the California cap-and-trade program with U.S. plant-level data, we show that financially constrained firms shift emissions and output from California to other states where they have similar plants that are underutilized.

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Media

Spotlight

3 min

Charities spend big to defend their board’s corporate agendas, new study reveals

Charities with corporate leaders on their boards spend an average of $130,000 a year lobbying on behalf of their connected companies. That’s according to a first-of-its-kind study that shows how companies benefit from their charitable work — and how charities may be all-too-happy to support their powerful board members in return for lucrative connections. The researchers behind the study say the findings could help policymakers and charity stakeholders keep tabs on a previously hidden form of political influence, but that such arrangements are perfectly legal for now. “Charities stand to gain something by behaving in this way. It doesn’t always have to be corporations pushing charities to behave in a way they don’t want to,” said Sehoon Kim, Ph.D., a professor of finance at the University of Florida and senior author of the new study. “It’s a natural quid pro quo arrangement that arises from the incentives corporations and charities have.” The American Medical Association shows one example of these incentives in action. In the 2010s, they actively lobbied against efforts by federal agencies to curb opioid prescriptions. This benefited companies like Purdue Pharma, the maker of OxyContin widely blamed for exacerbating the opioid epidemic in the U.S. It turned out that Richard Sackler, the former president of the company, sat on the board of AMA Foundation, a relationship viewed by many as controversial at the time. But Sackler had arranged for millions in donations to the foundation, and other charities are likely looking to corporate board members to help engineer large donations for their charitable work by connecting charities to other companies and leaders with deep pockets. Lobbying on behalf of their new friends, then, may simply be the most efficient way to ensure those donations keep flowing. Kim collaborated with UF Professor Joel Houston, Ph.D., and Changhyun Ahn, Ph.D., of the Chinese University of Hong Kong to conduct the analysis, which is forthcoming in the journal Management Science. They painstakingly hand collected data covering more than 400 charities and over 1,000 corporations that identified board connections, donations and lobbying activities that fell both within and outside of the charities’ typical political activity. The researchers focused on larger charities that already engage in some lobbying on their own behalf. These lobbying charities are three times larger than smaller nonprofits that never lobby. After a new corporate board member joined, these charities changed their behavior. They were far more likely to lobby outside of their own interests and to even work to support or defeat legislation that affected their new board member’s company, even when that legislation had nothing to do with their charitable mission. It worked out to about a 14% increase in the charity’s lobbying expenditures. “These were the smoking guns that there’s something going on that’s not supposed to be happening,” Kim said. Because lobbying is such an efficient use of resources, and because charities may lend their friendly brand to these lobbying efforts, this help from charities could significantly benefit these connected corporations. “These are previously unrecognized channels at play in terms of corporate political influence that policymakers need to be mindful of when assessing how influential corporations are likely to be,” Kim said.

Sehoon Kim