Sonja Rego
Professor of Accounting | Indiana University, Kelley School of Business
Bloomington, IN, UNITED STATES
Professor Rego specializes in taxes and business strategy.
Secondary Titles (1)
- Deloitte Foundation Accounting Faculty Fellow
Industry Expertise (3)
Accounting
Education/Learning
Research
Areas of Expertise (6)
Taxes and Business Strategy
Tax Avoidance
Accounting for Income Taxes
Earnings Management
Agency Theory
Corporate Finance
Accomplishments (4)
Teaching Award (professional)
2015 Awarded by Kelley School of Business Trustees
Distinguished Teaching Award (professional)
2014 Awarded by Doctoral Student Association Faculty, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University
Citations of Excellence Award (professional)
2013 Awarded by Emerald Publishing
Tax Manuscript Award (professional)
2011 Awarded by the American Taxation Association
Education (4)
University of Michigan: Ph.D., Accounting 1999
University of Michigan: M.A.E., Economics 1999
University of Illinois at Chicago: M.B.A., Accounting and International Business 1991
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: B.S., Finance 1989
Articles (5)
Material Weaknesses in Tax-Related Internal Controls and Last Chance Earnings Management
The Journal of the American Taxation Association
2016 We investigate the consequences of tax-related internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) for financial reporting. We hypothesize that the presence of ineffective controls over the tax function makes earnings management through the income tax accrual (both income-increasing and income-decreasing) easier to implement relative to firms with effective controls. We also predict that the remediation of tax-related ICMWs has the effect of constraining earnings management through the tax accrual. The results provide support for our predictions. We also find that last chance ...
The Impact of Increased Disclosure Requirements and the Standardization of Accounting Practices on Earnings Management Through the Reserve for Income Taxes
Review of Accounting Studies
2015 We examine whether the regulatory changes required by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. (FIN) 48 reduced the propensity for earnings management through the reserve for income taxes. Given prior evidence that firms use this reserve to manage earnings to beat the consensus analyst forecast, the regulatory changes implemented by both SOX and FIN 48 allow us to study the effects of accounting regulation on earnings management. We find that neither SOX nor FIN 48 reduced earnings ...
The Separation of Ownership and Control and Corporate Tax Avoidance
Journal of Accounting and Economics
2013 We examine whether variation in the separation of ownership and control influences the tax practices of private firms with different ownership structures. Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that when equity ownership and corporate decision-making are concentrated in just a small number of decision-makers, these owner-managers will likely be more risk averse and thus less willing to invest in risky projects. Because tax avoidance is a risky activity that can impose significant costs on a firm, we predict that firms with greater concentrations of ownership and control, and ...
Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
Journal of Accounting Research
2012 This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that ...
Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting
The Accounting Review
2009 We investigate the association between aggressive tax and financial reporting and find a strong, positive relation. Our results suggest that insufficient costs exist to offset financial and tax reporting incentives, such that nonconformity between financial accounting standards and tax law allows firms to manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same reporting period. To examine the relation between these aggressive reporting behaviors, we develop a measure of tax reporting aggressiveness that statistically detects tax shelter activity at least as well as, and ...
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