Secondary Titles (1)
- Deloitte Foundation Accounting Faculty Fellow
Industry Expertise (3)
Areas of Expertise (6)
Teaching Award (professional)
Awarded by Kelley School of Business Trustees
Distinguished Teaching Award
Awarded by Doctoral Student Association Faculty, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University
Citations of Excellence Award (professional)
Awarded by Emerald Publishing
Tax Manuscript Award (professional)
Awarded by the American Taxation Association
University of Michigan: Ph.D., Accounting 1999
University of Michigan: M.A.E., Economics 1999
University of Illinois at Chicago: M.B.A., Accounting and International Business 1991
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: B.S., Finance 1989
We investigate the consequences of tax-related internal control material weaknesses (ICMWs) for financial reporting. We hypothesize that the presence of ineffective controls over the tax function makes earnings management through the income tax accrual (both income-increasing and income-decreasing) easier to implement relative to firms with effective controls. We also predict that the remediation of tax-related ICMWs has the effect of constraining earnings management through the tax accrual. The results provide support for our predictions. We also find that last chance ...
We examine whether the regulatory changes required by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. (FIN) 48 reduced the propensity for earnings management through the reserve for income taxes. Given prior evidence that firms use this reserve to manage earnings to beat the consensus analyst forecast, the regulatory changes implemented by both SOX and FIN 48 allow us to study the effects of accounting regulation on earnings management. We find that neither SOX nor FIN 48 reduced earnings ...
We examine whether variation in the separation of ownership and control influences the tax practices of private firms with different ownership structures. Fama and Jensen (1983) assert that when equity ownership and corporate decision-making are concentrated in just a small number of decision-makers, these owner-managers will likely be more risk averse and thus less willing to invest in risky projects. Because tax avoidance is a risky activity that can impose significant costs on a firm, we predict that firms with greater concentrations of ownership and control, and ...
This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that ...
We investigate the association between aggressive tax and financial reporting and find a strong, positive relation. Our results suggest that insufficient costs exist to offset financial and tax reporting incentives, such that nonconformity between financial accounting standards and tax law allows firms to manage book income upward and taxable income downward in the same reporting period. To examine the relation between these aggressive reporting behaviors, we develop a measure of tax reporting aggressiveness that statistically detects tax shelter activity at least as well as, and ...