Steven Kreft
Clinical Professor of Business Economics | Indiana University, Kelley School of Business
Bloomington, IN, UNITED STATES
Steven Kreft is an expert in corporate social responsibility, sustainable business strategy and public policy.
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Biography
Steven Kreft is a Clinical Associate Professor of Business Economics at the Kelley School of Business. His areas of expertise include, corporate social responsibility, sustainable business strategy, non-market risks from activists and public policy.
Industry Expertise (1)
Education/Learning
Areas of Expertise (3)
Non-Market Risks from Activists & Public Policy
Corporate Social Responsibility
Sustainable Business Practices
Accomplishments (8)
IU Trustees Teaching Award, Kelley School of Business (professional)
2008, 2011, 2013, 2018
Alpha Kappa Psi “Teaching Excellence Award” (professional)
2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
Kelley School of Business, Outstanding Service Award (professional)
2017
Kelley School of Business, Panschar Teaching Excellence Award (professional)
2007, 2018
Kelley School of Business, Innovative Teaching Award (professional)
2015
Kelley Direct, Outstanding Faculty Teaching Award (professional)
2009
Memorable Faculty Award Kelley Undergraduate Seniors (professional)
2008, 2009
General Motors, TEP Outstanding Distance Learning Faculty Award (professional)
2007, 2008
Education (3)
West Virginia University,: Ph.D. 2003
West Virginia University,: M.A. 2002
Florida Southern College: B.S. 1999
Articles (6)
Why Ford, Chanel and other companies pitch in during a crisis – without the government ordering them to
The Conversation
2020 Severe shortages of critical medical supplies have prompted governments to compel private companies to fill the gap. In the U.S., President Donald Trump invoked rarely used powers to force General Motors to make ventilators, while the leaders of France, the U.K. and Japan have put pressure on companies to make more medical supplies.
Federal Grants, Earmarked Revenues, and Budget Crowd‐Out: State Highway Funding
Public Budgeting & Finance
2009 This paper examines the potential for budget crowd‐out in state highway financing. Highway projects are funded primarily through state earmarked tax revenues and federal highway grants. Theoretically, these two sources of revenues could crowd‐out state general funds, freeing up these funds for other uses. Previous studies of highway funding show little evidence of significant crowd‐out, providing support for the “flypaper effect.” The empirical model of this paper better controls for the endogeneity of federal highway grants and state earmarked highway revenues than previous studies and results suggest little to no crowd‐out. Also, our study concludes that state budgeting decisions in the post‐Intermodal Surface and Transporation Efficiency Act era still support the “flypaper effect.”
Do border crossings contribute to underage motor‐vehicle fatalities? An analysis of Michigan border crossings
Canadian Journal of Economics
2007 Currently, Michigan residents can avoid the national drinking age of 21 by crossing into Ontario, where the drinking age is 19. This paper explores the impact that border crossings, connecting areas with different minimum legal drinking ages (MLDA), have on motor‐vehicle fatalities. We analyse border crossings connecting Michigan to Ontario as well as to its surrounding states in the period in which Michigan's MLDA was raised to 21. Using a ‘differences‐in‐differences‐in‐differences’ approach, we find that the MLDA change did not contribute to increased underage fatalities in border‐crossing counties.
Public Policy, Entrepreneurship and Economic Freedom
Cato Journal
2005 The" entrepreneurial spirit" is something that has long been associated with the driving force behind economic progress and growth. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) stated that the key to the success of markets lies in the spirits of entrepreneurs who persist in developing new products and technologies, through a process he termed as" creative destruction." Kaiser (1990) modeled the entrepreneur on the basis of many historical characterizations, including the Schumpeterian innovator, and concluded that the major characteristics of the entrepreneur-innovator, risk taker, and resource allocator-are complementary and inseparable facets of entrepreneurship.
An Efficiency Comparison of City Managers and Elected Mayors
Kelley School of Business, University of Indiana
2003 Previous research has concluded that there are no efficiency differences between elected mayor-council (EMC) and council-manager (CM) city governments. What remains then, is a puzzle as to why so many cities are switching from an EMC form to a CM form. This paper provides an alternative method of testing the relative efficiency of the two forms of government. Relying on capitalization theory of local public services and taxes, I develop a hedonic price model for home sales occurring in the six largest Ohio metropolitan areas. Results show that houses within a CM city have a pricing premium that can be attributed to the greater efficiency of the CM form of government.
Essays on Political Constraints, Incentives, and Individual Economic Behavior
Kelley School of Business
2003 This dissertation is a collection of papers that features applications of public choice theory to the relationship between political constraints, incentives, and individual economic behavior. The first chapter introduces the two meanings of political constraints-(i) constraints self-imposed on the political process and (ii) constraints created by the political process; reviews the public choice literature on political constraints and incentives; and outlines the research agenda for the dissertation. Chapter 2 examines the possible inefficiencies that may be produced by politicians pursuing their own self interests by comparing two forms of city government. More specifically, comparisons are made between professionally trained city managers and popularly elected mayors, and results show that city managers have a relative efficiency advantage over elected mayors.