Susan Elkinawy is a finance professor with a focus on international and corporate finance. She also serves as chair of the Department of Finance. Prior to joining LMU's College of Business Administration faculty in 2003, she taught at the University of Oregon and worked for The Capital Group Companies, Inc. and Executive Life Insurance Company. Elkinawy was awarded the 2003 Roger Best/Donald Watson Teaching Award from the University of Oregon. She is an ad hoc reviewer for several journals and is a member of Beta Gamma Sigma.
University of Oregon: Ph.D. 2003
University of Oregon: M.S. 2001
LMU: MBA 1998
UCLA: B.A. 1992
Areas of Expertise (7)
Industry Expertise (3)
CFA Charterholder Certification (professional)
Achieved the highest distinction in the investment management profession — the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation.
- Beta Gamma Sigma
We estimate a hazard model of the probability of top corporate executives exiting their firms over the period 1996–2010. Our main findings are that: (1) female executives have greater likelihoods of exit than males, (2) the likelihood of exit increases with the independence of the board and decreases with the fraction of the board that is female and the average age of board members, and (3) a higher percentage of independent directors on the board lowers the probability of exit more for females than for males. Further, controlling for exit risk reduces the well-documented compensation differential between men and women.
This paper examines (i) whether the level of firms’ cash holdings differ depending on the strength of investor protection, (ii) whether excess cash holdings are valued more with better investor protection, and (iii) whether cross-listed firms that improve investor protection through “bonding” hold relatively more cash than non-cross-listed firms. We analyze 1405 ADR firms and their corresponding matched firms from 39 different countries and document that ADR firms have significantly higher cash holdings relative to their non-cross-listed peers, especially in recent years. The increase in cash holdings is much higher for emerging market firms because of their transition from particularly poor home country investor protection and accounting standards before cross-listing to much higher standards after cross-listing. In addition, firms with level III ADR listing, which represents the strongest investor protection, have higher cash holdings relative to other types of ADR firms.
We study the impact of accelerated vesting of equity awards on takeovers, whereby the restricted stock and/or stock options of the target CEO immediately vest and become unrestricted upon the close of the acquisition. We find that takeover premiums are significantly larger when the target CEO receives the benefit of accelerated vesting as compared to target firms with CEO’s that continue to vest in their awards after the deal closes.
This paper uses EXECUCOMP, COMPUSTAT and Investor's Responsibility Resource Center data to examine gender differences in executive salaries and total compensation from 1996 to 2004. We find that the salaries of female executives are about 5 percent lower than those of male executives, controlling for executive, firm, and board characteristics, and that the gap exists primarily in the lower officer ranks, where women are relatively highly concentrated.
We examine the frequency and conditions of executive departure from S&P 1500 firms. Based upon published news reports, we find that female executives are more likely than male executives to depart their positions voluntarily and involuntarily in the presence of controls for firm performance, firm governance, and human capital.
Although big business (e.g. the chaebol groups) is generally seen as the base of the 'Korean miracle of economic development, small and medium enterprises (SMs) have played an instrumental role in the growth of the South Korean economy.
Using data on dedicated Latin American mutual funds and nearly 1000 Latin American stocks during the Asian and Russian currency crises, I find that the effects of certain firm characteristics on mutual fund stock ownership are different than in non-crisis years. In response to crises, fund managers increase their holdings of cross-listed firms.