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Thomas Jeitschko - Michigan State University. East Lansing, MI, US

Thomas Jeitschko Thomas Jeitschko

Professor of Economics, Dean of The Graduate School and Associate Provost for Graduate Education | Michigan State University

East Lansing, MI, UNITED STATES

Thomas Jeitschko is engaged in research in antitrust and consumer protection across different markets and industries.

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Biography

Thomas D. Jeitschko supports the graduate students and postdocs of MSU and oversees and supports the Masters, Professional and Ph.D. programs across the 14 graduate-degree-granting colleges. Thomas previously served as the Associate Dean for Graduate Studies in the College of Social Science where he is a Professor of Economics and was the Director of the American Economic Association Summer Program - a two-month intensive pre-doctoral residential program that prepares talented undergraduate students from under-represented backgrounds for graduate work in economics and related fields.

Jeitschko first joined MSU in 2001 and has taught graduate courses and served on Ph.D. committees in the College of Social Science, the Business College, the College of Law, the College of Engineering, and the College of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

His research interests are in applied economic theory with concentrations in industrial organization, law and economics, and micro-economics more broadly. He has published in a wide variety of journals, including the American Economic Review, the European Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, and the Journal of Industrial Economics; and he is an associate editor of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and the International Journal of Industrial Organization, and an editorial board member of the Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, in addition to holding several other editorial appointments.

Jeitschko has also worked at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington D.C. as an Economist in the Antitrust Division where he was the lead economist on many investigations of mergers and potentially anticompetitive firm conduct.

Industry Expertise (2)

Writing and Editing

Education/Learning

Areas of Expertise (8)

Pricing Policies

Telecommunications

Financial Markets

Consumer Protection

Antitrust

Mergers

Securities

Price Gouging

Education (2)

University of Virginia: Ph.D., Economics 1995

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität: B.A.

Journal Articles (5)

What past agency actions say about complexity in merger remedies, with an application to generic drug divestitures Competition: The Journal of the Antitrust, UCL and Privacy Section of the California Lawyers Association

2017

We consider merger remedies of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission between 2008 and 2017. Traditionally one distinguishes between structural and behavioral remedies—and structural remedies are generally considered to be more effective and easier to implement. Our analysis suggests that over time this distinction has become somewhat blurred and a better gradation of remedies may be tied to the complexity of the proposed remedy. Divestitures in the market for generic drugs, in particular, are particularly complex, even though the remedies are of a structural, and so their efficacy is hard to ascertain.

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Soft Transactions Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

2017

This paper considers “soft debt” as a social convention that facilitates long-term reciprocal relationships. A player is said to follow a soft debt strategy if his decisions depend on the entire history with his counterpart only through their accrued soft debt balance. Under discrete benefits, there exist equilibria in which the players keep reciprocating as long as the debt balance does not exceed a certain limit.

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Bid and Time Truthful Online Auctions in Dynamic Spectrum Markets IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking

2017

The allocation of underutilized spectrum from primary users to secondary users in real time is likely the most promising avenue for advancing efficiency of spectrum use given the ever-increasing demand for transmission. Research in this area has focused on auctions to facilitate the distribution of spectrum, inducing truthful reporting by participants. However, most research has assumed a static or partially dynamic setting. These approaches are unable to capture that spectrum becomes available at random intervals as primary users' needs vary across time; and, similarly, secondary users' needs vary over time. Moreover, frequently there is flexibility regarding the time of transmission-with some transmissions being more urgent and time-sensitive than others. Therefore, existing research cannot be directly applied to such auction environments involving users with variable transmission deadlines, while preserving efficiency and truthfulness. In this paper, we present two truthful online auction mechanisms in dynamic spectrum markets that consider indefinite number of arrival of bidders with varying transmission deadlines and random availability of spectrum units over time. The first proposed mechanism SOADE assumes that the underlying distribution information of bidders and supplies is available. With that knowledge, the mechanism builds around a priority function that determines the rank of a bidder of winning spectrum at an auction considering its valuation, deadline, and uncertainty associated with dynamic arrival of bidders and spectrum availability. The second proposed mechanism xSOADE does not require any distribution knowledge. This mechanism applies bid monotonic spectrum allocation technique, determines the payment based on critical pricing, and enforces penalty rules to avoid manipulation. We prove that both the algorithms are truthful against bid and time-based cheating and individually rational through theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. Finally, we analyze the performance of these algorithms under different settings in terms of auction efficiency and auction revenue and demonstrate their effectiveness compared to prior work.

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Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality The Journal of Industrial Economics

2016

Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider entry in markets in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry lowers prices, which can trigger adverse selection. The anticipated price collapse limits entry so that high prices are sustained, resulting in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about quality may have above normal profits and less entry than would be expected even when there is low concentration.

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Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality* The Journal of Industrial Economics

2016

Markets for experience and credence goods can suffer from adverse selection. The negative implication for trading and welfare poses the question of how such markets originate. We consider entry in markets in which each seller's quality becomes private information. Entry lowers prices, which can trigger adverse selection. The anticipated price collapse limits entry so that high prices are sustained, resulting in above normal profits. The analysis suggests that rather than observing the canonical market collapse, markets with asymmetric information about quality may have above normal profits and less entry than would be expected even when there is low concentration.

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