Areas of Expertise (6)
Dr. Tina Yang specializes in corporate finance, corporate governance and shareholder activism. She is a good source for issues relating to corporate board structure, style and performance; corporate/shareholder relationships, and the intricacies of corporate investments and finance.
University of Georgia - Terry College of Business: PhD
University of Miami - School of Business: MBA
University of Miami - School of Business: MS
University of International Business and Economics: BEc
Select Accomplishments (5)
2013 Hoeber Outstanding Article Award (professional)
American Business Law Journal
Research Excellence Awards (professional)
Villanova University ( 2010)
The Center for Global Leadership Research Excellence Award (professional)
Villanova University, (highest award of
excellence (2014); substantial/honorable mention (2010, 2013, 2015, 2016).
Award for Faculty Excellence (professional)
Clemson University, 2008.
Financial Services Exchange Research Award (professional)
- Shanghai M&A Financial Research Institute
Research Grants (7)
The Shanghai M&A Financial Research Institute and East China Normal University
The National Natural Science Foundation of China
University Research Grant
St. Joseph's University
Award for Faculty Excellence
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Oxford-Yale Research Grant
Oxford and Yale Universities
Select Academic Articles (5)
Vishal Gupta, Sandra C. Mortal, Tina Yang
Considerable interest exists in understanding the extent to which entrepreneurial orientation (EO) generates value in the capital markets. Drawing on insights from the discretion literature, we focus on three distinct loci of managerial discretion—organizational, industrial, and national—to examine their contingent influence on the EO-value relation. Predictions were tested on a panel dataset of firms from five advanced economies listed in the Forbes 2000 ranking. Data were analyzed using ordinary least squares to reveal that the contribution of EO to firm valuation is statistically significant and economically meaningful when organizational and/or industrial discretion are high: each unit increase in EO boosts value generation by 7.4 % when organizational discretion is high and 5.6 % when industrial discretion is high. EO therefore creates value for the firm in capital markets when the appropriate discretionary conditions are present. These findings suggest that the relation between EO and capital market value is more complex than generally believed.
Miller, Steve, Yang, Tina
CEO duality is a contentious issue driving much debate amongst regulators and business leaders. It is also an aspect of corporate governance, to which insurance companies have made significant changes in recent years. Despite its significance, we know little about the determinants of CEO duality in the insurance industry and its impact on firm performance. This paper addresses these research questions. We find strong evidence that CEO duality is a complex decision, which insurance firms fine-tune in response to their individual circumstances. Compared to other industries, the insurance industry is unique in that the costs and benefits of CEO duality vary more with firm size. We find no evidence that CEO duality is detrimental to firm performance. If anything, the valuation impact of CEO duality appears to be positive for large insurers. Our results have important policy implications. Evidence suggests that regulatory initiatives targeting CEO duality of insurance firms should pay close attention to the role of firm size. It may also be desirable to promote regulations that can provide insurance companies decision flexibility in adjusting their leadership structures to competitive environments.
Tina Yang, et al.
We provide the first comprehensive and robust evidence on the relationship between board independence and firm performance in China. We find that independent directors have an overall positive effect on firm operating performance in China. Our findings are robust to a battery of tests, including endogeneity checks using instrumental variables, the dynamic generalized method of moments estimator, and the difference-in-differences method. The positive relationship between board independence and firm performance is stronger in government-controlled firms and in firms with lower information acquisition costs. We also document that Chinese independent directors play an important role in constraining insider self-dealing and improving investment efficiency.
Tina Yang and Shan Zhao
Regulators and governance activists are pressuring firms to abolish CEO duality (the Chief Executive Officer is also the Chairman of the Board). However, the literature provides mixed evidence on the relation between CEO duality and firm performance. Using the exogenous shock of the 1989 Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement, we find that duality firms outperform non-duality firms by 3–4% when their competitive environments change. Further, the performance difference is larger for firms with higher information costs and better corporate governance. Our results underscore the benefits of CEO duality in saving information costs and making speedy decisions.
Bonnie G. Buchanan, Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen, Tina Yang
We thank Christian Andres, Bernard Black, Jie Cai, Brandon Cline, Stephen Davis, Arif Khurshed, April Klein, Richard Nolan, Kristian Rydqvist, Laura Spira, Jun Yang, and seminar participants at the 2007 Oxford-Yale Corporate Governance Conference, the 2008 Financial Management meetings, the 2009 Mid-Atlantic Research Conference, the 2009 European Financial Management Symposium on Corporate Governance and Control at the University of Cambridge, the 2009 Eastern Finance Association, the 2010 8th International Conference on Corporate Governance at the University of Birmingham, the 2011 Northern Finance Association meetings, and Seattle University. We gratefully acknowledge a research grant from the Millstein Center of Corporate Governance at Yale University and research support from the Center for Global Leadership at Villanova University. We also acknowledge data provided by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). We wish to thank several anonymous referees and the editors of the American Business Law Journal for valuable comments and Jennifer N. Nix and Christopher R. Graving for excellent editing assistance. This paper previously circulated under the title of “Proxy Rules and Proxy Practices: An Empirical Study of US and UK Shareholder Proposals.”