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How To Protect Yourself from Wildfire Smoke

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3 min

Richard Peltier

As historic wildfires threaten life, health and property in the West and spread smoke all the way to the East Coast, UMass Amherst environmental health scientist Richard Peltier can shed light on the hazards of wildfire smoke and some strategies to protect yourself.



Wildfire smoke is a mixture of carbon monoxide, volatile organic carbon and particles that usually contain polyaromatic hydrocarbon, a known cancer-causing agent.


"Short-term exposures to intense smoke can lead to lung and cardiovascular problems in some people, especially if they are already susceptible to these diseases," Peltier said in a Q&A with The Conversation during a wildfire outbreak in 2017. "Longer-term exposure over a few days or weeks increases the risk and the chance of health impacts as your cumulative dose increases."


Those who can't leave the wildfire area should close windows and door and apply weather sealing -- even masking tape. Portable HEPA filters can be effective at removing indoor air pollution, especially in smaller areas such as bedrooms. 


What not to do: Air fresheners that contain odorants such as oil vaporizers or scented candles can make indoor air quality worse, and products claiming to  "clean" the air using ozone can create a hazard by releasing ozone into your home.


Personal face mask respirators can also be effective, Peltier says, but there's still a shortage of the preferred N-95 masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and they need to be reserved for frontline workers.


Peltier has used his expertise with face mask research to address whether it’s safe for health care workers to reuse medical face masks, which are designed for one-time use. 


In a collaboration with New England Baptist Hospital in Boston, Peltier found that N95 masks continued to filter microscopic particles properly following a sterilization technique using hydrogen peroxide.



After the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authorized emergency use of several different sterilization techniques in light of the face mask shortage, Peltier took a close look at those processes in his lab. This urgent research, funded by a fast-track grant from the National Science Foundation, found that certain methods of decontaminating medical face masks for repeated use during the COVID-19 pandemic appear to damage the masks’ integrity and protective function.



Peltier’s laboratory usually studies air pollutants around cities or within homes. But previous work in his lab tested another type of mask that was found not to work as well as the N95 masks worn by doctors, nurses, technicians and other health care providers.


Peltier uses state-of-the-art pollution detection instruments and a mannequin head in his lab to measure whether microscopic particles can pass through the masks after they are sterilized.


“Respirators must be effective across a range of potential conditions to provide protection since droplets that contain virus particles immediately start to evaporate and shrink,” he says. (all quotes for media use)


In light of the COVID-19 epidemic, hospitals and other medical facilities around the world continue to face a critical shortage of N95 respirators, and sterilization of previously worn masks are helping to ease the insufficient supply. 


In his most recent research in July, published in the journal Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Peltier found that “some treatments for decontamination had no impact on respirator performance, while other treatments resulted in substantial damage to masks.”


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Richard Peltier

Richard Peltier

Professor of Environmental Health Sciences

Richard Peltier's research looks at how poor air quality affects human health.

Air Pollution and HealthEnvironmental HealthFace MasksAerosol filtrationAir Quality

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6 min

Israel’s attack in Doha Underscores a Stark Reality for Gulf States Looking for Stability and Growth: They Remain Hostage to Events

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. The oil-rich states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a lot going for them: wealth, domestic stability and growing global influence. In recent months, these Gulf kingdoms also appear closer to something they have long sought: reliable U.S. support that has become stronger and more uncritical than ever, just as Iranian power in the region has significantly degraded. In Donald Trump, the nonelected Gulf Arab monarchs have an ally in Washington who has largely shed previous American concerns for democracy and human rights. That the American president made his first scheduled international trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE only underscores their international clout. Additionally, the popular overthrow of the Assad government in Syria and Israel’s war against Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Yemen have served to greatly weaken Tehran’s perceived threat to Gulf Arab interests. Yet, as an expert on Middle Eastern politics, I believe Gulf Arab countries must still navigate a regional political tightrope. And as the Israeli targeting of senior Hamas leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, shows, events by other Middle Eastern actors have a nasty habit of derailing Gulf leaders’ plans. How these countries manage four particular uncertainties will have a significant effect on their hopes for stability and growth. 1. Managing a post-civil war Syria In Syria, years of civil war that had exacerbated splits among ethnic and religious groups finally ended in December 2024. Since then, Arab Gulf countries, which once opposed the Iranian-allied government of Bashar Assad, have been pivotal in supporting new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. They successfully lobbied the U.S. to drop sanctions. In addition to sharing mutual regional interests with Sharaa, the leaders of Gulf Arab states want a Syrian state that is free from internal war and can absorb the millions of refugees that fled the conflict to other countries in the Middle East. Gulf states can support postwar Syria diplomatically and financially. However, they can’t wish away the legacy of long war and sectarian strife. Israeli attacks on Syrian soil since Assad’s fall, as well as recent outbreaks of fighting in the Sweida region of southern Syria, underscore the ongoing fragility of the Syrian government and concerns over its ability to contain violence and migration outside of its borders. 2. The challenge of regional politics Syria illustrates a broader policy challenge for Gulf states. As their wealth, military strength and influence have grown, these countries have become dominant in the Arab world. As a result, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of dollars in efforts to influence governments and groups across the world. This includes the mostly authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Egypt’s. But here, Gulf states are torn politically. If democratic systems form elsewhere in the Arab world, this could encourage Gulf citizens to push for elected government at home. Yet overly coercive Arab governments outside of the Gulf can be prone to popular unrest and even civil war. Propping up unpopular regional governments risks backfiring on Gulf Arab leaders in one of two ways. First, it can entice Gulf states into protracted and damaging wars, such as was the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failed military intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. Second, it can drive a wedge between Gulf states, as is seen with the current conflict in Sudan, in which the Saudis and Emiratis are backing rival factions. 3. Watching which way Iran will turn Always looming behind complicated Middle Eastern politics is Iran, the historically powerful, populous, non-Arab country whose governing Shiite Islam ideology has been the chief antagonist to the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Opposing Gulf Arab and American strategic interests, Iran has for years intervened aggressively in Middle Eastern politics by funding and encouraging militant Shiite groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere. An assertive Iran has been especially a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia, which strives to be the dominant Muslim majority power in the region. Dealing with Iran has required careful balancing from Qatar and the UAE, which are more directly exposed to Tehran geographically and have maintained relatively stronger relations. Given this, Gulf countries may silently welcome the decrease in Iran’s military power in the wake of Israel’s recent war against Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, while also fearing further Iranian-Israeli conflict. At the same time, a less powerful Iran runs two types of new potential dangers for Gulf states. Should Iran become more unstable, the resulting turmoil could be felt across the region. In addition, should Iran’s military, policy and economic turmoil lead to a new political system, it could disturb Gulf countries. Neither a Muslim majority democratic government nor a more hard-line nationalist variant in Iran would sit well with nearby Gulf monarchs. Conversely, concerns that the Israeli and U.S. bombing of Iran may actually lead to increased Iranian determination to pursue a nuclear program also worry Gulf leaders. 4. Living with Israel’s military assertiveness Israel, the unquestioned military power and sole nuclear weapons state in the region, has long posed particularly deep political dilemmas to Gulf Arab states. The current challenge is how to balance the immense global unpopularity of the Israeli government’s war in Gaza – including among Gulf Arab citizens – with common strategic interests the Gulf states hold with Israel. Gulf Arab leaders face domestic and regional pressure to show solidarity for Palestinians and their aspirations for statehood. Yet Gulf rulers also share strategic goals with Israel. Along with opposition to Iranian influence, Gulf states maintain strong military links to the U.S, like Israel. They also appreciate the economic and other security value of Israel’s high-tech products, including software used for espionage and cybersecurity. This helps explain the UAE’s 2019 decision to join the short list of Arab states with full diplomatic relations with Israel. Hamas attacked Israel in 2023 in part to stop Saudi Arabia from following suit – something that might have further sidelined Palestinians’ bargaining power. Indeed, moves toward open Saudi diplomatic recognition of Israel were stopped by Hamas’ attack and the global backlash that followed Israel’s ongoing devastation of Gaza. Gulf leaders may still believe that normalized ties with Israel would be good for the long-term economic prospects of the region. And Bahrain and the UAE – the two Gulf Arab states with diplomatic relations with Israel – have not backed away from their official relationship. Yet expanding open relations with Israel further, and taking in other Gulf states, is unlikely without a real reversal in Israel’s policy toward Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. All this is more true in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s attack in Qatar – the first time Israel has launched a direct strike within a Gulf Arab state. That action, even if ostensibly directed at Hamas, is likely to exacerbate tensions not only with Qatar but place increasing stress on the calculus allied Gulf Arab countries make in their dealings with Israel. Tricky way forward for Gulf Arab states These challenges underscore an inescapable truth for Gulf leaders: They are hostage to events beyond their control. Insulating them from that reality takes regional unity. The Gulf Cooperation Council, nearly 45 years old, was established precisely for this purpose. While it remains the most successful regional organization in the Middle East, the GCC has not always prevented major rifts, such as in 2017 when a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia cut ties with and blockaded Qatar. The conflict was resolved in 2021. Since then, the six members of the GCC have worked together more closely. No doubt, rivalries and disagreements still exist. Yet Arab Gulf leaders have learned that cooperation is useful in the face of major challenges. This can be seen in the recent collaborative diplomatic approaches toward Syria and the U.S. A second lesson comes from the broader Middle East. Key issues are often interdependent, particularly the status of Palestinians. Hamas’ attack on Israel, and the resulting destruction of much of Gaza, resurfaced the deep popularity across the region of addressing Palestinian needs and rights. The monarchs of the Arab Gulf would like to maintain their unchallenged domestic political status while expanding their influence in the Middle East and beyond. However, even when Gulf leaders wish to be done with the region’s challenges, those challenges are not always done with them. Isabella Ishanyan, a UMass Amherst undergraduate, provided research assistance for this article.

6 min

4 out of 5 US Troops Surveyed Understand the Duty to Disobey Illegal Orders

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. With his Aug. 11, 2025, announcement that he was sending the National Guard – along with federal law enforcement – into Washington, D.C. to fight crime, President Donald Trump edged U.S. troops closer to the kind of military-civilian confrontations that can cross ethical and legal lines. Indeed, since Trump returned to office, many of his actions have alarmed international human rights observers. His administration has deported immigrants without due process, held detainees in inhumane conditions, threatened the forcible removal of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and deployed both the National Guard and federal military troops to Los Angeles to quell largely peaceful protests. When a sitting commander in chief authorizes acts like these, which many assert are clear violations of the law, men and women in uniform face an ethical dilemma: How should they respond to an order they believe is illegal? The question may already be affecting troop morale. “The moral injuries of this operation, I think, will be enduring,” a National Guard member who had been deployed to quell public unrest over immigration arrests in Los Angeles told The New York Times. “This is not what the military of our country was designed to do, at all.” Troops who are ordered to do something illegal are put in a bind – so much so that some argue that troops themselves are harmed when given such orders. They are not trained in legal nuances, and they are conditioned to obey. Yet if they obey “manifestly unlawful” orders, they can be prosecuted. Some analysts fear that U.S. troops are ill-equipped to recognize this threshold. We are scholars of international relations and international law. We conducted survey research at the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Human Security Lab and discovered that many service members do understand the distinction between legal and illegal orders, the duty to disobey certain orders, and when they should do so. Compelled to disobey U.S. service members take an oath to uphold the Constitution. In addition, under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial, service members must obey lawful orders and disobey unlawful orders. Unlawful orders are those that clearly violate the U.S. Constitution, international human rights standards or the Geneva Conventions. Service members who follow an illegal order can be held liable and court-martialed or subject to prosecution by international tribunals. Following orders from a superior is no defense. Our poll, fielded between June 13 and June 30, 2025, shows that service members understand these rules. Of the 818 active-duty troops we surveyed, just 9% stated that they would “obey any order.” Only 9% “didn’t know,” and only 2% had “no comment.” When asked to describe unlawful orders in their own words, about 25% of respondents wrote about their duty to disobey orders that were “obviously wrong,” “obviously criminal” or “obviously unconstitutional.” Another 8% spoke of immoral orders. One respondent wrote that “orders that clearly break international law, such as targeting non-combatants, are not just illegal — they’re immoral. As military personnel, we have a duty to uphold the law and refuse commands that betray that duty.” Just over 40% of respondents listed specific examples of orders they would feel compelled to disobey. The most common unprompted response, cited by 26% of those surveyed, was “harming civilians,” while another 15% of respondents gave a variety of other examples of violations of duty and law, such as “torturing prisoners” and “harming U.S. troops.” One wrote that “an order would be obviously unlawful if it involved harming civilians, using torture, targeting people based on identity, or punishing others without legal process.” Soldiers, not lawyers But the open-ended answers pointed to another struggle troops face: Some no longer trust U.S. law as useful guidance. Writing in their own words about how they would know an illegal order when they saw it, more troops emphasized international law as a standard of illegality than emphasized U.S. law. Others implied that acts that are illegal under international law might become legal in the U.S. “Trump will issue illegal orders,” wrote one respondent. “The new laws will allow it,” wrote another. A third wrote, “We are not required to obey such laws.” Several emphasized the U.S. political situation directly in their remarks, stating they’d disobey “oppression or harming U.S. civilians that clearly goes against the Constitution” or an order for “use of the military to carry out deportations.” Still, the percentage of respondents who said they would disobey specific orders – such as torture – is lower than the percentage of respondents who recognized the responsibility to disobey in general. This is not surprising: Troops are trained to obey and face numerous social, psychological and institutional pressures to do so. By contrast, most troops receive relatively little training in the laws of war or human rights law. Political scientists have found, however, that having information on international law affects attitudes about the use of force among the general public. It can also affect decision-making by military personnel. This finding was also borne out in our survey. When we explicitly reminded troops that shooting civilians was a violation of international law, their willingness to disobey increased 8 percentage points. Drawing the line As my research with another scholar showed in 2020, even thinking about law and morality can make a difference in opposition to certain war crimes. The preliminary results from our survey led to a similar conclusion. Troops who answered questions on “manifestly unlawful orders” before they were asked questions on specific scenarios were much more likely to say they would refuse those specific illegal orders. When asked if they would follow an order to drop a nuclear bomb on a civilian city, for example, 69% of troops who received that question first said they would obey the order. But when the respondents were asked to think about and comment on the duty to disobey unlawful orders before being asked if they would follow the order to bomb, the percentage who would obey the order dropped 13 points to 56%. While many troops said they might obey questionable orders, the large number who would not is remarkable. Military culture makes disobedience difficult: Soldiers can be court-martialed for obeying an unlawful order, or for disobeying a lawful one. Yet between one-third to half of the U.S. troops we surveyed would be willing to disobey if ordered to shoot or starve civilians, torture prisoners or drop a nuclear bomb on a city. The service members described the methods they would use. Some would confront their superiors directly. Others imagined indirect methods: asking questions, creating diversions, going AWOL, “becoming violently ill.” Criminologist Eva Whitehead researched actual cases of troop disobedience of illegal orders and found that when some troops disobey – even indirectly – others can more easily find the courage to do the same. Whitehead’s research showed that those who refuse to follow illegal or immoral orders are most effective when they stand up for their actions openly. The initial results of our survey – coupled with a recent spike in calls to the GI Rights Hotline – suggest American men and women in uniform don’t want to obey unlawful orders. Some are standing up loudly. Many are thinking ahead to what they might do if confronted with unlawful orders. And those we surveyed are looking for guidance from the Constitution and international law to determine where they may have to draw that line. Zahra Marashi, an undergraduate research assistant at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, contributed to the research for this article.

5 min

Teen Drivers Face Unique Challenges During ‘100 Deadliest Days’ of Summer, but Safety Measures can Make a Difference

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. The last few weeks of summer, heading into Labor Day weekend, can sometimes mean vacations and driving more miles on the road for all people, including teens. Traffic crashes are the No. 1 cause of death for teens, and the crash rate for teen drivers is disproportionately higher than the share of licensed teen drivers. In addition to this grim statistic, summer is the riskiest time for teen drivers. The 100 deadliest days represent the period from Memorial Day to Labor Day when the number of fatal crashes involving teen drivers dramatically increases. A third of each year’s teen driver crashes occur during the summer. We are scholars who research transportation safety and teen driver behavior. Our expertise helps us understand that these 100 days are not just a statistical fluke – they reflect a dangerous intersection of factors such as inexperience and a propensity to take risks. What makes summer different? Regardless of the season, some teen drivers engage in risky behaviors that increase their likelihood of a fatal crash, such as getting distracted, driving with friends in the vehicle, driving under the influence, not wearing seat belts and a lack of hazard awareness. Teens also have more free time in the summer, since most aren’t in school. Combined with the longer days and better weather, teens drive more over the summer. More time on the road means more risk, especially for inexperienced drivers. Teens may also be more likely to drive after dark during the summer, in comparison to more experienced drivers. But nighttime driving is also when visibility is reduced and crash risks are higher, particularly for teens who haven’t fully developed the skills necessary for night driving. This increased exposure, in addition to teens’ general risky driving tendencies, contributes to the 100 deadliest days for teen drivers. The increased crash risk for teens over the summer isn’t equally distributed either. Crashes with teen drivers that lead to serious injuries are more likely to occur with male drivers, in rural areas, for those of lower socioeconomic status and for those with disorders, such as attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder. Teaching young drivers Driver’s education programs are the formal method to teach teen drivers the rules of the road. In driver’s education programs, teens receive information about driver and road safety though classroom and behind-the-wheel instruction in preparation for the licensing exam. Some states require teens to complete a driver’s education course if they want to receive a license under the age of 18. Of teens who have a license, nearly 80% of them have gone through some form of driver’s education. Though driver’s education programs can be helpful, their effects are not equally felt. In some states, teens and their guardians must pay out of pocket for driver’s education courses to obtain a license. This makes driver’s education and, as a consequence, obtaining a driver’s license inequitable. There are also driving school deserts – areas where the poverty rate is 20% or above and there are no behind-the-wheel driver education courses within a 10- to 15-minute drive. This makes driver education courses inaccessible. Many of these driving school deserts happen to be in areas with high populations of minorities. Over 20 years ago, graduated driver licensing was introduced to reduce teen crash rates. This is a phased licensing system wherein teen drivers are restricted in terms of when, where and with whom they can drive until they turn 18. Such a system allows teens to gradually learn and gain experience with driving over time. Graduated driver licensing has been implemented in all 50 states, and it has been shown to reduce teen driver crash rates. However, its effectiveness is limited to those who participate in the system. A large number of teens are unlicensed and are of low socioeconomic status. Many of these unlicensed teens forgo the entire process and remain unlicensed but still drive, well into their 20s when the graduated driver licensing restrictions are lifted. Making summer safer There are two things people can do to turn the 100 deadliest days into the 100 safest days. First, it is important that communities offer free supplementary training programs for teen drivers, because becoming a safe and responsible teen driver shouldn’t be limited to those with resources. As one example, in collaboration with industry partners, we have developed a program called Risk-ATTEND. It is a free, online, evidence-based program that teaches teen drivers how to anticipate risks while driving. Our research has shown that programs such as these can improve teen driving skills and may be especially effective for teen drivers in high-poverty areas. Second, our research has shown that parents and guardians still play an important role in influencing teen driver behavior. Studies show that teens mirror the behaviors they observe: If they see adults text and drive, they’re more likely to do the same. Once teenagers become old enough to drive, it is also important to establish rules and guidelines about expectations to establish clarity and accountability. Written agreements or checklists can address high-risk conditions such as nighttime driving, driving with other young passengers, phone use and adherence to speed limits. Systems to help monitor and enforce rules have been shown to be effective in improving teen driver behavior. One such program is Checkpoints, which is a Connecticut-based program in which families agree to limit teen driving during high-risk conditions. Teens face consequences for violating these limits, such as a temporary loss of driving privileges. However, the limits are gradually lifted as they gain driving experience. More than rules matter Ultimately, preventing crashes in the summer and beyond extends beyond mere adherence to regulations. Avoiding them fundamentally hinges on cultivating a robust safety culture that emphasizes a collective commitment to risk reduction and continuous improvement in driving practices. For teens, the summer months present unique challenges and opportunities. Drawing on best practices, such as training programs, teens can build essential skills in varied conditions before gaining full, unsupervised privileges.

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