This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. In democratic systems, the courts are a vital check on a leader’s power. They have the ability to overturn laws and, in Donald Trump’s case, the executive orders he has relied on to achieve his goals.
Since taking office, Trump has targeted the judiciary with a vengeance. He has attacked what he has called “radical left judges” and is accused of ignoring or evading court orders.
The Supreme Court has already handed the Trump administration some key wins in his second term. But several cases now before the court will be pivotal in determining how much power Trump is able to accrue – and what he’ll be able to do with it.
As Paul Collins, a Supreme Court expert from the University of Massachusetts Amherst, explains in episode 4 of The Making of an Autocrat:
It’s all about presidential power. And that’s really significant because it’s going to enable the president to basically inject a level of politics into the federal bureaucracy that we frankly haven’t really seen before in the US. Listen to the interview with Collins at The Making of an Autocrat podcast, available at Spotify, Apple, or wherever you get your podcasts.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. Former FBI Director James Comey pleaded not guilty to two criminal charges in a federal court in Alexandria, Virginia, on Oct. 8, 2025. The charges allege that Comey lied to Congress in September 2020 when he stood by earlier testimony that he did not authorize a leak of an FBI investigation involving Hillary Clinton. Numerous legal commentators on both the left and right have argued that Comey’s indictment is little more than the Trump administration seeking vengeance on one of the president’s perceived enemies. They allege that the president has it out for Comey, who investigated Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and was fired by Trump in 2017.
The president’s own words support the idea that the Trump administration is targeting Comey. In a social media post on Sept. 20, 2025, Trump directed Attorney General Pam Bondi to move forward with prosecutions against Comey, Democratic U.S. Sen. Adam Schiff and New York Attorney General Letitia James: “They’re all guilty as hell, but nothing is going to be done. …JUSTICE MUST BE SERVED, NOW!!!”
If the case against Comey is exceedingly weak – and little more than a political prosecution – then, in my view as a scholar of the U.S. legal system, it should result in the dismissal of charges by the judge or a not guilty verdict by the jury.
But even when an individual is not convicted, the process of defending against charges can itself be a form of punishment, as renowned legal scholar Malcolm Feeley pointed out almost 50 years ago.
Here’s how the criminal justice process punishes even innocent people.
The criminal justice process The criminal justice process is complex. After a grand jury returns an indictment at the request of a prosecutor, the accused appears in court for their arraignment. They are informed of the charges against them and typically enter a plea. During what’s called “discovery,” the prosecution and defense investigate the evidence the other side plans to rely on. There are also pretrial motions in which the parties ask judges to dismiss charges and accept or exclude evidence.
The defense and prosecution may also meet to discuss a plea bargain, wherein the accused may plead guilty in exchange for a lesser sentence or reduced charges.
If there is no plea bargain, then the case moves to trial, which is itself a complicated process. If a defendant is found guilty, they can mount an appeal to higher courts in an attempt to have their conviction overturned.
To help navigate this process, criminal defendants typically hire a lawyer.
And good lawyers don’t come cheap.
Money and time Indigent defendants, who do not have the financial resources to pay their own legal fees, can rely on public defenders paid for by the government.
But individuals who can afford to pay for their own lawyer face a substantial financial burden for attorney services and court fees. An experienced criminal defense lawyer can charge more than US$1,000 per hour, with fees quickly adding up. This means that mounting a legal defense can easily cost tens of thousands of dollars.
On top of this, it takes a great deal of time to prepare for a criminal case. While lawyers and their staff do much of the legwork for trial preparation, a client works with their attorneys to help formulate a defense.
As a result, criminal defendants lose one of the most precious commodities in the world: their time.
And this time can come at a tangible cost in the form of lost wages, which harms their day-to-day lives. Put simply, every hour spent preparing for trial is an hour defendants could spend working or enjoying their lives.
Stress and embarrassment It’s not pleasant being charged with a crime.
The criminal process, which typically lasts months, takes a toll on one’s mental health. This is largely driven by the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of a criminal trial and the possibility of losing one’s freedom if convicted.
In addition, there is a social stigma that comes with being accused of a crime. This can result in reputational damage, anxiety and embarrassment.
The Trump administration appears to recognize this reality.
Several media outlets have reported that FBI leadership had planned a public perp walk for Comey.
According to a CBS News report, this was to have included “‘large, beefy’ agents … ‘in full kit,’ including Kevlar vests and exterior wear emblazoned with the FBI logo.” Apparently, the plan was aborted after several FBI supervisors refused to cooperate, viewing it as inappropriate. One agent was disciplined for insubordination after refusing to go along with the plan to embarrass Comey in this way.
Not all criminal defendants suffer the same The extent to which criminal defendants experience the criminal justice process as a form of punishment varies from person to person.
For high-status people like Comey, lost wages and attorneys’ and court fees may not be that big of a deal.
But these costs may be incredibly significant for other people who have been, or are likely to be, targeted by the Trump administration.
The high costs of lawyers’ fees are well known to the president. For instance, his political action committee spent millions of dollars on attorneys’ fees in an unsuccessful effort to defend Trump from criminal charges in New York.
In addition, people no doubt experience the psychological stress and stigma of a possible criminal conviction differently. But regardless of one’s wealth, the lost time spent preparing a criminal defense is something that cannot be replaced.
The recognition that the criminal process is itself a form of punishment is one of the reasons that the Department of Justice has maintained independence from the president. By violating the tradition of staying out of politics, the Justice Department in the Trump administration has opened the door for the president to seek retribution on his perceived political enemies.
The mere act of putting them through the criminal process ensures that they suffer, regardless of their guilt or innocence.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. The oil-rich states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a lot going for them: wealth, domestic stability and growing global influence. In recent months, these Gulf kingdoms also appear closer to something they have long sought: reliable U.S. support that has become stronger and more uncritical than ever, just as Iranian power in the region has significantly degraded. In Donald Trump, the nonelected Gulf Arab monarchs have an ally in Washington who has largely shed previous American concerns for democracy and human rights. That the American president made his first scheduled international trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE only underscores their international clout.
Additionally, the popular overthrow of the Assad government in Syria and Israel’s war against Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Yemen have served to greatly weaken Tehran’s perceived threat to Gulf Arab interests.
Yet, as an expert on Middle Eastern politics, I believe Gulf Arab countries must still navigate a regional political tightrope. And as the Israeli targeting of senior Hamas leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, shows, events by other Middle Eastern actors have a nasty habit of derailing Gulf leaders’ plans.
How these countries manage four particular uncertainties will have a significant effect on their hopes for stability and growth.
1. Managing a post-civil war Syria In Syria, years of civil war that had exacerbated splits among ethnic and religious groups finally ended in December 2024. Since then, Arab Gulf countries, which once opposed the Iranian-allied government of Bashar Assad, have been pivotal in supporting new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. They successfully lobbied the U.S. to drop sanctions. In addition to sharing mutual regional interests with Sharaa, the leaders of Gulf Arab states want a Syrian state that is free from internal war and can absorb the millions of refugees that fled the conflict to other countries in the Middle East.
Gulf states can support postwar Syria diplomatically and financially. However, they can’t wish away the legacy of long war and sectarian strife. Israeli attacks on Syrian soil since Assad’s fall, as well as recent outbreaks of fighting in the Sweida region of southern Syria, underscore the ongoing fragility of the Syrian government and concerns over its ability to contain violence and migration outside of its borders.
2. The challenge of regional politics Syria illustrates a broader policy challenge for Gulf states. As their wealth, military strength and influence have grown, these countries have become dominant in the Arab world. As a result, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of dollars in efforts to influence governments and groups across the world. This includes the mostly authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Egypt’s. But here, Gulf states are torn politically. If democratic systems form elsewhere in the Arab world, this could encourage Gulf citizens to push for elected government at home. Yet overly coercive Arab governments outside of the Gulf can be prone to popular unrest and even civil war.
Propping up unpopular regional governments risks backfiring on Gulf Arab leaders in one of two ways.
First, it can entice Gulf states into protracted and damaging wars, such as was the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failed military intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. Second, it can drive a wedge between Gulf states, as is seen with the current conflict in Sudan, in which the Saudis and Emiratis are backing rival factions. 3. Watching which way Iran will turn Always looming behind complicated Middle Eastern politics is Iran, the historically powerful, populous, non-Arab country whose governing Shiite Islam ideology has been the chief antagonist to the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Opposing Gulf Arab and American strategic interests, Iran has for years intervened aggressively in Middle Eastern politics by funding and encouraging militant Shiite groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.
An assertive Iran has been especially a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia, which strives to be the dominant Muslim majority power in the region. Dealing with Iran has required careful balancing from Qatar and the UAE, which are more directly exposed to Tehran geographically and have maintained relatively stronger relations.
Given this, Gulf countries may silently welcome the decrease in Iran’s military power in the wake of Israel’s recent war against Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, while also fearing further Iranian-Israeli conflict. At the same time, a less powerful Iran runs two types of new potential dangers for Gulf states. Should Iran become more unstable, the resulting turmoil could be felt across the region.
In addition, should Iran’s military, policy and economic turmoil lead to a new political system, it could disturb Gulf countries. Neither a Muslim majority democratic government nor a more hard-line nationalist variant in Iran would sit well with nearby Gulf monarchs.
Conversely, concerns that the Israeli and U.S. bombing of Iran may actually lead to increased Iranian determination to pursue a nuclear program also worry Gulf leaders.
4. Living with Israel’s military assertiveness Israel, the unquestioned military power and sole nuclear weapons state in the region, has long posed particularly deep political dilemmas to Gulf Arab states. The current challenge is how to balance the immense global unpopularity of the Israeli government’s war in Gaza – including among Gulf Arab citizens – with common strategic interests the Gulf states hold with Israel.
Gulf Arab leaders face domestic and regional pressure to show solidarity for Palestinians and their aspirations for statehood.
Yet Gulf rulers also share strategic goals with Israel. Along with opposition to Iranian influence, Gulf states maintain strong military links to the U.S, like Israel. They also appreciate the economic and other security value of Israel’s high-tech products, including software used for espionage and cybersecurity. This helps explain the UAE’s 2019 decision to join the short list of Arab states with full diplomatic relations with Israel. Hamas attacked Israel in 2023 in part to stop Saudi Arabia from following suit – something that might have further sidelined Palestinians’ bargaining power.
Indeed, moves toward open Saudi diplomatic recognition of Israel were stopped by Hamas’ attack and the global backlash that followed Israel’s ongoing devastation of Gaza.
Gulf leaders may still believe that normalized ties with Israel would be good for the long-term economic prospects of the region. And Bahrain and the UAE – the two Gulf Arab states with diplomatic relations with Israel – have not backed away from their official relationship.
Yet expanding open relations with Israel further, and taking in other Gulf states, is unlikely without a real reversal in Israel’s policy toward Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. All this is more true in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s attack in Qatar – the first time Israel has launched a direct strike within a Gulf Arab state. That action, even if ostensibly directed at Hamas, is likely to exacerbate tensions not only with Qatar but place increasing stress on the calculus allied Gulf Arab countries make in their dealings with Israel.
Tricky way forward for Gulf Arab states These challenges underscore an inescapable truth for Gulf leaders: They are hostage to events beyond their control.
Insulating them from that reality takes regional unity.
The Gulf Cooperation Council, nearly 45 years old, was established precisely for this purpose. While it remains the most successful regional organization in the Middle East, the GCC has not always prevented major rifts, such as in 2017 when a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia cut ties with and blockaded Qatar. The conflict was resolved in 2021. Since then, the six members of the GCC have worked together more closely. No doubt, rivalries and disagreements still exist. Yet Arab Gulf leaders have learned that cooperation is useful in the face of major challenges. This can be seen in the recent collaborative diplomatic approaches toward Syria and the U.S.
A second lesson comes from the broader Middle East. Key issues are often interdependent, particularly the status of Palestinians. Hamas’ attack on Israel, and the resulting destruction of much of Gaza, resurfaced the deep popularity across the region of addressing Palestinian needs and rights.
The monarchs of the Arab Gulf would like to maintain their unchallenged domestic political status while expanding their influence in the Middle East and beyond. However, even when Gulf leaders wish to be done with the region’s challenges, those challenges are not always done with them.
Isabella Ishanyan, a UMass Amherst undergraduate, provided research assistance for this article.
