David Lewis

Rebecca Webb Wilson University Professor and University Distinguished Professor of Political Science Vanderbilt University

  • Nashville TN

Expert in federal bureaucracy, including agency performance, agency oversight and the political appointment process.

Contact

Vanderbilt University

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Biography

David E. Lewis is the Rebecca Webb Wilson University Distinguished Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Department of Leadership, Policy, and Organizations (Peabody College) at Vanderbilt University. His research interests include the presidency, executive branch politics and public administration. He is the author of two books, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design (Stanford University Press, 2003) and The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (Princeton University Press, 2008). He has also published numerous articles on American politics, public administration, and management in journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, the British Journal of Political Science, Presidential Studies Quarterly, and Public Administration Review. His work has been featured in outlets such as the Harvard Business Review, New York Times, and Washington Post.

In 2022, he was appointed to a two-year term as a public member of the Administrative Conference of the United States. He is a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and he is a past president of the Southern Political Science Association and Midwest Public Administration Caucus. He has earned numerous research and teaching awards, including the Herbert Simon Award for contributions to the scientific study of the bureaucracy and the Madison Sarratt, Jeffrey Nordhaus, and Robert Birkby awards for excellence in undergraduate teaching.

Before joining Vanderbilt’s Department of Political Science, he was an assistant professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University. He began his academic career at the College of William and Mary, where he was an assistant professor in the Department of Government. He serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration Review, and Presidential Studies Quarterly. PhD. Stanford University.

Areas of Expertise

Congressional Oversight
Presidential Appointments
Public Administration
American Politics
Government Agencies
Bureaucracy
Presidency
Federal Agencies
Confirmation Hearings

Accomplishments

Kenneth J. Meier Award

2016, Presented by the Midwest Political Science Association for the best paper in bureaucratic politics, public administration, or public policy at the annual meeting, 2015. “Controlling Agency Choke Points: Presidents and Regulatory Personnel Turnover,” (with Kathleen Doherty and Scott Limbocker)

Herbert Kaufman Best Paper Award

2017, Presented by the American Political Science
Association (APSA) Section on Public Administration for the best paper presented on a panel sponsored by the Public Administration Section at the APSA annual meeting.

Robert Birkby Award for Teaching Excellence in Political Science

2014

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Education

Stanford University

Ph.D.

Political Science

2000

Stanford University

M.A.

Political Science

2000

University of Colorado at Boulder

M.A.

Political Science

1996

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Affiliations

  • Public Administration : Editorial board
  • Presidential Studies Quarterly : Editorial board
  • American Political Science Association : Member
  • Midwest Political Science Association : Member
  • Presidency Research Group : Member

Selected Media Appearances

Elon Musk's time machine

Business Insider  online

2025-04-21

Perhaps that techno-libertarian vision — of a digitized world without government — is the entire point of DOGE. "You strip government down to remove all the parts of it that are resisting you," says David Lewis, a political scientist at Vanderbilt University, "and rebuild it in a way that makes it, in your view, more efficient and responsive to you." That's actually more authoritarian than libertarian. But it does make government smaller — and weaker. And the weaker government is, the more the powerful can call the shots.

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The history of civil service and the impact of Trump’s slashing of the workforce

PBS NewsHour  tv

2025-03-14

When Roosevelt takes office, the national government's probably about 500,000 employees. By the time he leaves office, it's well over three million.

In response to the Great Depression, he dramatically expands the role of the national government. These government employees are doing lots of new things. So the federal government's taking new responsibilities in regulating markets and providing social welfare, so we get Social Security and these kinds of things. And it created a conservative backlash.

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Breaking down the first month of Trump 2.0

KERA  radio

2025-02-21

President Trump signed more than 50 executive orders on his first day in office —the contents of which are already fundamentally changing the federal government. David E. Lewis is the Rebecca Webb Wilson University Distinguished Professor in the Department of Political Science at Vanderbilt University. He joins host Krys Boyd to discuss Trump’s first month in office, from tariffs to foreign policy, domestic actions to DOGE, and what it all means to the American people so far.

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Selected Articles

Government Reform, Political Ideology, and Administrative Burden: The Case of Performance Management in the Bush Administration

Public Administration Review

Stéphane Lavertu David E. Lewis Donald P. Moynihan

2013

This article examines how ideological differences between political officials and agencies may have affected the implementation of an ostensibly nonpartisan, government‐wide administrative initiative: the George W. Bush administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) review of federal programs. The analysis reveals that managers in agencies associated with liberal programs and employees (“liberal agencies”) agreed to a greater extent than those in agencies associated with conservative programs and employees (“conservative agencies”) that PART required significant agency time and effort and that it imposed a burden on management resources.

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Influencing the Bureaucracy: The Irony of Congressional Oversight

American Journal of Political Science

Joshua D. Clinton David E. Lewis Jennifer L. Selin

2013

Does the president or Congress have more influence over policymaking by the bureaucracy? Despite a wealth of theoretical guidance, progress on this important question has proven elusive due to competing theoretical predictions and severe difficulties in measuring agency influence and oversight. We use a survey of federal executives to assess political influence, congressional oversight, and the policy preferences of agencies, committees, and the president on a comparable scale.

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Presidents and Patronage

American Journal of Political Science

Gary E. Hollibaugh Jr. Gabriel Horton David E. Lewis

2014

To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees.

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