Areas of Expertise (5)
Guoming Lai is an associate professor in the Department of Information, Risk and Operations Management at the McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin. His research areas include supply chain management, and the problems in the interface of operations and finance and the interface of operations and marketing. Dr. Lai has several publications in the journals of Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management.
Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business: Ph.D., Management of Manufacturing and Automation 2009
Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business: M.S., Industrial Administration 2005
Tsinghua University, Department of Automation: M.S., Control Theory and Control Engineering 2003
Tsinghua University, Department of Automation: B.S., Automation 2000
Media Appearances (3)
McCombs Professor Receives Prestigious Early-Career Research Award
McCombs TODAY online
Guoming Lai, information, risk and operations management professor at the McCombs School of Business at The University of Texas at Austin has been awarded this year’s Wickham Skinner Early-Career Research Accomplishments Award, given by the Production and Operations Management Society (POMS).
Faculty Granted Endowment Appointments, Teaching and Research Awards
McCombs TODAY online
Research award winners included: Assistant Professor of IROM Guoming Lai (CBA Foundation Research Excellence Award for Assistant Professors)
McCombs Welcomes 12 New Scholars
McCombs TODAY online
Assistant Professor Guoming Lai comes to UT from Carnegie Mellon University, where he received his Ph.D. in management of manufacturing and automation and taught productivity and operations management to undergraduate students.
We study leader-based collective bargaining (LCB), under which a leading buyer (leader) and a following buyer (follower) form an alliance to jointly purchase a common component from a supplier. Although the leader and the follower cooperate in their component purchase, they compete in selling their end products.
This study investigates the value of inventory sharing in the presence of spot and forward markets. We consider a multi‐period setting where two firms process a common commodity to meet stochastic demands. They can buy and sell the commodity through both the spot and forward markets. They can also share the commodity if one has leftover inventory while the other has excess demand....We show that this method can substantially increase the value of inventory sharing.
With rational assumptions on the seller's belief structure, we characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the bargaining game. Interestingly, we find that both quantity distortion and information rent may be avoided depending on the firms' relative patience, and the seller may reach an agreement with either the high type or the low type first, or with both simultaneously.
We study the deferred payment and inspection mechanisms for mitigating supplier product adulteration, with endogenous procurement decision and general defect discovery process.
The objective of this study was to extend existing understanding of supplier encroachment to contexts in which there is information asymmetry and the supplier can use nonlinear pricing.
Prior literature has shown that, for a symmetric information setting, supplier encroachment into a reseller's market can mitigate double marginalization and benefit both the supplier and the reseller.
Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation.
The valuation of the real option to store liquefied natural gas (LNG) at the downstream
terminal of an LNG value chain is an important problem in practice. Because the exact
valuation of this real option is computationally intractable, we develop a novel and ...
We study how a manager's short-term interest in the firm's market value may motivate
channel stuffing: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing
allows a manager to report sales in excess of demand in order to influence investors' ...