Grace Pownall is Professor of Accounting, Accounting Area Coordinator, and Accounting Doctoral Coordinator. She holds a BS in Accounting from the University of Illinois, an MBA from the University of Chicago, and a PhD in Accounting and Economics also from the University of Chicago. She joined the GBS faculty in 1993, served as Accounting Area Coordinator from 1993-1998, and as Associate Dean and Director of Doctoral Studies from 2004-2011. Her research interests include corporate disclosure incentives and practices, and information in global capital markets. Her research has been published in Journal of Accounting Research, The Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, and Management Science, among other journals. She served as Associate Editor (1999-2002) and on the editorial board (2005-2008) of The Accounting Review, and as associate editor, on the editorial board, and/or as ad hoc reviewer for over a dozen other journals.
Professor Pownall served as Vice-President of the American Accounting Association (1999-2001), and Director of the AAA 1999 Doctoral Consortium. She served in several roles in the AAA Doctoral Consortium and in the AAA New Faculty Consortium, and on several committees of the American Accounting Association, the International Accounting Section, the Financial Accounting and Reporting Section, and the Accounting Programs Leadership Group.
Areas of Expertise (3)
Information and Global Capital Markets
Voluntary Disclosure Incentives and Practices
University of Chicago: PhD, Accounting and Economics
University of Chicago: Master's, Business Administration
University of Illinois at Chicago: Bachelor's Science, Accounting
Media Appearances (1)
Dichev, Pownall receive awards from American Accounting Association
Grace Pownall received the Outstanding International Accounting Educator Award. Her research interests include corporate disclosure incentives and practices, and information in global capital markets. Pownall served as Vice-President of the AAA from 1999-2001, and as Director of the AAA 1999 Doctoral Consortium.
2014 This paper examines the effects on equity home bias of two mechanisms adopted by Euronext when it was formed by the merger of four European countries' stock exchanges in 2002. The two structural mechanisms are the integration of trading platforms across the four predecessor exchanges and the creation of named segments of the integrated exchange on which firms could voluntarily list by precommitting to enhanced disclosure and transparency. Employing a difference-in-differences research design using other European Union companies as a control group, we document that the integration of the Euronext market was associated with a reduction in home bias for firms listed on the named segments of the Euronext exchange, but not for the nonsegment Euronext firms. Our results suggest that the reduction in transaction costs from the integration of the trading platforms did not make the nonsegment Euronext firms more attractive to the specific investors for whom the transaction costs were reduced. On the other hand, the decrease in information costs due to the precommitments to enhanced transparency made the segment firms more attractive to all categories of foreign investors, consistent with the information costs hypothesis.
2010 We investigate the changes in earnings information content and earnings attributes, for non-U.S. firms listed in U.S. equity markets, following the 2007 relaxation of the SEC requirement to reconcile IFRS earnings and stockholders’ equity to U.S. GAAP in annual regulatory filings. We analyze a sample of non-U.S. firms listed on U.S. exchanges that use IFRS, domestic GAAP, or U.S. GAAP from 2005 to 2008. Prior literature finds no changes in informativeness following the regulation for IFRS-using firms. However, when we partition the IFRS-using firms into two groups based on managers’ incentives to provide informative disclosures, we find that those firms with incentives to be more informative had significant increases in the information content of their earnings. Furthermore, we do not find any decrease in information content of earnings for firms without such incentives. We also document that this change in earnings informativeness was contemporaneous with a change in earnings attributes.
2009 We examine the incidence of new listings and delistings on U.S. stock exchanges and firms’ propensity to delist, as a function of general market conditions, firm fundamentals, and the costs of compliance with the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX). We find that both general market conditions and firm fundamentals explain the delisting incidence and firms’ delisting decisions; while SOX variables are positively associated with firms’ delisting likelihood only when general market conditions are not included in the analyses. Further analyses on the population partitioned into size quintiles suggest that the passage of SOX was not associated with an increase in the likelihood of delisting for any size quintile of firms and that the implementation of SOX section 404 is positively associated with the delisting likelihood for midsized and larger firms. Our empirical evidence is useful to regulators as they consider changes in the imposition and implementation of SOX section 404.