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Defending space for free discussion, empathy and tolerance on campus is a challenge during Israel-Hamas war

As contentious judicial ‘reform’ becomes law in Israel, Netanyahu cements his political legacy

The World Cup puts the spotlight on Qatar, but also brings attention to its human rights record and politics – 4 things to know

How the JDA can and cannot advance Palestinian rights

Making peace between Israelis and Palestinians – is now the time for a different approach?

The US-Iran conflict and the consequences of international law-breaking

David Mednicoff's research deals with broad connections between legal and political ideas and institutions at the national and transnational levels, particularly as these relate to current issues in the Middle East. His articles and book chapters analyze the rule of law, human rights issues, Western legal aid, US policy, migrant worker law and policy, political liberalization and constitutionalism in the Middle East, especially Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia and the UAE. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the meanings and politics of the rule of law in five Arab societies.

Middle Eastern, Comparative, and International Law and Politics

U.S. Foreign Policy

Human Rights

Refugee Politics

UMass Amherst Faculty Profile

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ResearchGate Citations

The Conversation Profile and Artic;es

Economists Warning over Trump's Federal Grant Freeze: 'Catastrophic Shock'

‘Very worrying': Iran launches missiles at Israel, uncertainty over how conflict will unfold

israel supreme court

Israel’s highest court protects its power to curb government extremism − 3 essential reads

American universities in the spotlight over reaction to Israel-Gaza war – podcast

Judicial Changes and Politics in Israel

Israel: Passage of Netanyahu's judicial coup law Ignites mass protests

israels-attack-in-doha-underscores-a-stark-reality-for-gulf-states-looking-for-stability-and-growth-they-remain-hostage-to-events

by David Mednicoff, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy, UMass Amherst

Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Public Policy

 This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article here. The oil-rich states of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have a lot going for them: wealth, domestic stability and growing global influence. In recent months, these Gulf kingdoms also appear closer to something they have long sought: reliable U.S. support that has become stronger and more uncritical than ever, just as Iranian power in the region has significantly degraded. In Donald Trump, the nonelected Gulf Arab monarchs have an ally in Washington who has largely shed previous American concerns for democracy and human rights. That the American president made his first scheduled international trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE only underscores their international clout.

Additionally, the popular overthrow of the Assad government in Syria and Israel’s war against Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Yemen have served to greatly weaken Tehran’s perceived threat to Gulf Arab interests.

Yet, as an expert on Middle Eastern politics, I believe Gulf Arab countries must still navigate a regional political tightrope. And as the Israeli targeting of senior Hamas leaders in Qatar on Sept. 9, 2025, shows, events by other Middle Eastern actors have a nasty habit of derailing Gulf leaders’ plans.

How these countries manage four particular uncertainties will have a significant effect on their hopes for stability and growth.

1. Managing a post-civil war Syria  In Syria, years of civil war that had exacerbated splits among ethnic and religious groups finally ended in December 2024. Since then, Arab Gulf countries, which once opposed the Iranian-allied government of Bashar Assad, have been pivotal in supporting new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. They successfully lobbied the U.S. to drop sanctions. In addition to sharing mutual regional interests with Sharaa, the leaders of Gulf Arab states want a Syrian state that is free from internal war and can absorb the millions of refugees that fled the conflict to other countries in the Middle East.

Gulf states can support postwar Syria diplomatically and financially. However, they can’t wish away the legacy of long war and sectarian strife. Israeli attacks on Syrian soil since Assad’s fall, as well as recent outbreaks of fighting in the Sweida region of southern Syria, underscore the ongoing fragility of the Syrian government and concerns over its ability to contain violence and migration outside of its borders.

2. The challenge of regional politics  Syria illustrates a broader policy challenge for Gulf states. As their wealth, military strength and influence have grown, these countries have become dominant in the Arab world. As a result, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested billions of dollars in efforts to influence governments and groups across the world. This includes the mostly authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa, such as Egypt’s. But here, Gulf states are torn politically. If democratic systems form elsewhere in the Arab world, this could encourage Gulf citizens to push for elected government at home. Yet overly coercive Arab governments outside of the Gulf can be prone to popular unrest and even civil war.

Propping up unpopular regional governments risks backfiring on Gulf Arab leaders in one of two ways.

First, it can entice Gulf states into protracted and damaging wars, such as was the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s failed military intervention in Yemen against the Houthis. Second, it can drive a wedge between Gulf states, as is seen with the current conflict in Sudan, in which the Saudis and Emiratis are backing rival factions. 3. Watching which way Iran will turn  Always looming behind complicated Middle Eastern politics is Iran, the historically powerful, populous, non-Arab country whose governing Shiite Islam ideology has been the chief antagonist to the Sunni-led Gulf Arab states since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Opposing Gulf Arab and American strategic interests, Iran has for years intervened aggressively in Middle Eastern politics by funding and encouraging militant Shiite groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere.

An assertive Iran has been especially a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia, which strives to be the dominant Muslim majority power in the region. Dealing with Iran has required careful balancing from Qatar and the UAE, which are more directly exposed to Tehran geographically and have maintained relatively stronger relations.

Given this, Gulf countries may silently welcome the decrease in Iran’s military power in the wake of Israel’s recent war against Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, while also fearing further Iranian-Israeli conflict. At the same time, a less powerful Iran runs two types of new potential dangers for Gulf states. Should Iran become more unstable, the resulting turmoil could be felt across the region.

In addition, should Iran’s military, policy and economic turmoil lead to a new political system, it could disturb Gulf countries. Neither a Muslim majority democratic government nor a more hard-line nationalist variant in Iran would sit well with nearby Gulf monarchs.

Conversely, concerns that the Israeli and U.S. bombing of Iran may actually lead to increased Iranian determination to pursue a nuclear program also worry Gulf leaders.

4. Living with Israel’s military assertiveness  Israel, the unquestioned military power and sole nuclear weapons state in the region, has long posed particularly deep political dilemmas to Gulf Arab states. The current challenge is how to balance the immense global unpopularity of the Israeli government’s war in Gaza – including among Gulf Arab citizens – with common strategic interests the Gulf states hold with Israel.

Gulf Arab leaders face domestic and regional pressure to show solidarity for Palestinians and their aspirations for statehood.

Yet Gulf rulers also share strategic goals with Israel. Along with opposition to Iranian influence, Gulf states maintain strong military links to the U.S, like Israel. They also appreciate the economic and other security value of Israel’s high-tech products, including software used for espionage and cybersecurity. This helps explain the UAE’s 2019 decision to join the short list of Arab states with full diplomatic relations with Israel. Hamas attacked Israel in 2023 in part to stop Saudi Arabia from following suit – something that might have further sidelined Palestinians’ bargaining power.

Indeed, moves toward open Saudi diplomatic recognition of Israel were stopped by Hamas’ attack and the global backlash that followed Israel’s ongoing devastation of Gaza.

Gulf leaders may still believe that normalized ties with Israel would be good for the long-term economic prospects of the region. And Bahrain and the UAE – the two Gulf Arab states with diplomatic relations with Israel – have not backed away from their official relationship.

Yet expanding open relations with Israel further, and taking in other Gulf states, is unlikely without a real reversal in Israel’s policy toward Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank. All this is more true in the immediate aftermath of Israel’s attack in Qatar – the first time Israel has launched a direct strike within a Gulf Arab state. That action, even if ostensibly directed at Hamas, is likely to exacerbate tensions not only with Qatar but place increasing stress on the calculus allied Gulf Arab countries make in their dealings with Israel.

Tricky way forward for Gulf Arab states  These challenges underscore an inescapable truth for Gulf leaders: They are hostage to events beyond their control.

Insulating them from that reality takes regional unity.

The Gulf Cooperation Council, nearly 45 years old, was established precisely for this purpose. While it remains the most successful regional organization in the Middle East, the GCC has not always prevented major rifts, such as in 2017 when a coalition of Arab states led by Saudi Arabia cut ties with and blockaded Qatar. The conflict was resolved in 2021. Since then, the six members of the GCC have worked together more closely. No doubt, rivalries and disagreements still exist. Yet Arab Gulf leaders have learned that cooperation is useful in the face of major challenges. This can be seen in the recent collaborative diplomatic approaches toward Syria and the U.S.

A second lesson comes from the broader Middle East. Key issues are often interdependent, particularly the status of Palestinians. Hamas’ attack on Israel, and the resulting destruction of much of Gaza, resurfaced the deep popularity across the region of addressing Palestinian needs and rights.

The monarchs of the Arab Gulf would like to maintain their unchallenged domestic political status while expanding their influence in the Middle East and beyond. However, even when Gulf leaders wish to be done with the region’s challenges, those challenges are not always done with them.

Isabella Ishanyan, a UMass Amherst undergraduate, provided research assistance for this article. 

Israel’s attack in Doha Underscores a Stark Reality for Gulf States Looking for Stability and Growth: They Remain Hostage to Events

On Tuesday, President Trump said the United States will withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Deal and re-impose sanctions on Iran. President Trump first floated the idea of withdrawing from the agreement reached by former President Barack Obama as a presidential candidate.  

What will this action by the President mean, and what will from the fallout be? David Mednicoff, Director of Middle Eastern Studies at UMass Amherst, sat down with Carrie Saldo to analyze the situation.

Iran Nuclear Deal Withdrawal with UMass Amherst's David Mednicoff | Connecting Point | May 9, 2018

[Busan Updates] 
부산 오페라하우스 공사 과정서 위법 사항 무더기 적발
부산서 교사가 중학생에 폭행 당해…경찰 수사
지난해 부산 인구 320만 명대로 추락 / 인천과 격차 불과 30만 명대 
낙동강 삼락생태공원, 부산 제1호 지방정원 된다


[News Digest]
전북 장수군 3.5지진, 4년 새 3번째 지진
장수군이 전남? 중대본, 재난문자 잘못 표기했다 정정
전국 교사 3만명 서울 집결, 아동학대 처벌법 개정 요구 
내년 '기준 중위소득' 최대 6.09% 인상 / 4인 가구 540만원→573만 원
유엔 사무총장 "지구 온난화 끝나고 '끓는' 시대 도래"


[HOT CLIP OF THE DAY]
Heat exhaustion & heat stroke. Do you know the difference?


[ISSUE 와글와글]
현직 판사가 대낮에 강남서 성매매 적발
이메일 주소 'i' 빠뜨려…영 국방부, 러 동맹국에 기밀 발송
일 정부판 ‘남편 환심 사는 법’에 여성들 일제히 반발
부산 야산서 유기 고양이 잇따라 발견 /  안 팔리자 번식업자가 내다버린 듯“


[Special Interview]
Israel's Controversial Judicial Reform
David Mednicoff,  Associate Professor, the University of Massachusetts-Amherst


◆ MWB 홈페이지 https://befm.or.kr/program/main.php?p...
◆ 문자: #9050 (100원)
◆ 카카오톡 플러스친구: https://pf.kakao.com/_ZEyQV


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David Mednicoff Interviewed on South Korean Radio about Judicial Overhaul in Israel

David Mednicoff Interviewed on South Korean Radio about Situation in Israel

Thousands of protesters gathered outside the Israeli parliament, or Knesset, desperate to make a last-ditch attempt to push the parliamentarians inside to stop the government’s controversial legislation to overhaul the judiciary.
Instead, it was the opposition members of the Knesset who boycotted the final vote on Monday afternoon, as it became clear that the far-right government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in no mood to compromise, and last-minute negotiations collapsed.
Far-right members of Netanyahu’s government were reported to have threatened to bring down the government if the legislation was not passed on Monday, having already been forced to delay the vote in March.
The White House has deemed it “unfortunate” that Israel’s legislature passed a bill that aims to curb the powers of the country’s top court, stressing that the administration of US President Joe Biden believes major changes should be decided by “consensus”.
Hours after the government approved the first step in its efforts to weaken the judiciary, at least three petitions asking the Supreme Court to nullify it were filed. Will the top court override the ‘reasonableness bill’? Experts are divided

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#Israel #IsraelProtests #IsraelPoliticalCrisis #JudicialReform #IsraelSupremeCourt #BenjaminNetanyahu #IsraelJudicialOverhaul

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