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Covering the latest developments in Iran? Our experts are here to help with your coverage.
Iran’s nuclear program remains one of the most closely watched issues in international security, diplomacy, and nonproliferation. Originally launched in the 1950s with Western support, the program has since evolved into a focal point of global concern over nuclear weapons, regional stability, and international trust. As negotiations continue to stall and enrichment capabilities increase, understanding the historical context, scientific progress, and geopolitical consequences of Iran’s nuclear ambitions is critical for public awareness. This topic provides journalists with high-impact angles spanning diplomacy, science, and security. Key story angles include: Origins and Evolution of the Program: Tracing the nuclear program from its U.S.-backed beginnings under the Shah to its secret expansion after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The JCPOA (Iran Nuclear Deal): Examining the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, its successes, its unraveling after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018, and current attempts to revive it. Scientific Advances and Enrichment Capacity: Analyzing Iran’s current uranium enrichment levels, centrifuge technology, and what experts say about its "breakout time." Regional and Global Security Concerns: Investigating how Iran’s program affects Middle Eastern tensions, Israeli security policy, and broader nuclear proliferation risks. Diplomatic Stalemates and Sanctions: Reviewing the impact of international sanctions, diplomatic efforts by the EU, China, and Russia, and the political dynamics within Iran. The Risk of Escalation or Military Conflict: Exploring scenarios that could lead to open confrontation and what military analysts say about preemptive strikes or deterrence strategies. Iran’s nuclear program is not just a regional issue—it’s a global flashpoint at the intersection of science, diplomacy, and international law. Journalists covering this story have an opportunity to unpack a decades-long narrative with renewed urgency. Connect with our experts about Iran’s Nuclear Program: History, Progress, and Global Risks: Check out our experts here : www.expertfile.com
ExpertSpotlight: History of Yemen and the Houthi Rebels
The history of Yemen and the rise of the Houthi rebels is essential to understanding one of the world’s most complex humanitarian and geopolitical crises. Once considered a crossroads of ancient trade, Yemen has in recent decades become a focal point of conflict, regional power struggles, and human rights challenges. The conflict involving the Houthi movement has had global ramifications—from maritime security and oil trade routes to civilian displacement and famine. This topic matters to the public because it highlights the intersection of war, diplomacy, and humanitarian need, while prompting critical questions about international responsibility, peace-building, and regional stability. Key story angles that may interest a broad audience include: The roots and rise of the Houthi movement: Tracing the group’s origins, ideology, and evolution into a key political and military force in Yemen. Regional power dynamics: Analyzing the involvement of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other actors in fueling or resolving the conflict. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen: Investigating the scale of famine, disease outbreaks, displaced populations, and access to aid. The role of the international community: Exploring arms sales, ceasefire negotiations, and accountability in the context of international law. Maritime security and global trade: Understanding how conflict in Yemen affects Red Sea shipping routes and international energy markets. The future of peace and governance: Examining potential pathways to a political resolution and the reconstruction of a stable Yemeni state. Connect with an expert about Yemen and the Houthi rebels: To search our full list of experts visit www.expertfile.com
Expert Q&A - Craig Albert, PhD, talks election interference
Going into the final days of the 2024 election cycle there is a very real concern about election interference from both foreign and domestic actors, and it's something that will continue to be monitored even after the final votes are tallied. Craig Albert, PhD, graduate director of the PhD in Intelligence, Defense, and Cybersecurity Policy and Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies programs at Augusta University, is a leading expert on propaganda, information warfare and national security studies. Albert has answered key questions about who is trying to interfere in the U.S. elections and why it matters. Q: How and when should someone vote and does it protect you more to avoid interference? The access to instantaneous news or events could affect people and their understanding of whom they want to vote for all the way up until the day they vote. Because of this ease of access, this election cycle has especially shown us how cautious we need to be in regards to scams. It's also why I know there has been a big push for early voting and mail-in voting, and it's necessary in some cases, but I prefer to vote on Election Day because you never know what type of news might come out about one of the candidates or parties. If something comes out that proves to be true, it could affect how someone might vote, but if you voted before Election Day, it's too late. At the same time, a very serious deepfake could be released that could manipulate how people choose to vote and it could mislead people, as well. Q: What are the consequences of the optics of an 'unfair' election? What the U.S. needs to be cautious about is preserving and maintaining the legitimacy of the election cycle. After the election, no matter who wins, narratives of interference and how it impacted the election are going to be shared and that's just irresponsible. Unless there's damning information and very clear evidence, you shouldn't mess around with the idea that the election was interfered with, because that could threaten the very structure of the United States. Q: What's the potential for post-election meddling? We have domestic bad actors as well as foreign maligned actors that are going to say the election was delegitimized no matter who wins. They have social media campaigns ready to post no matter which side wins, they're going to circulate false videos of ballot boxes burning or news that not all the the votes were counted and things of that nature. They're going to do all kinds of things because anybody can fake a ballot box being burned or mail in votes not being counted properly on video or something like that. The problem is if it goes out there or becomes viral, so many people will believe it and that sows discord. So, that creates distrust in the public system on a pretty big swath of the American population. Q: Who benefits from post-election doubts and chaos? You have foreign actors that really build on the type of anger that the political candidates and their parties already use through their propaganda and rhetoric. We have already seen Russia amplifying the message that somebody cheated or elections were hacked, and you have China, Iran, Venezuela, ISIS and Al Qaeda doing that, as well. You also have regular cyber criminals that just want to sew discord and distress so they can manipulate people later on and get into our banking systems and things of that nature. You have potentially hundreds, if not thousands of attack vectors coming at the United States between election night and January 20 when the new President will be sworn in. And then afterwards, they will all still be trying to create chaos, rebellion, civil unrest, or in the case of Iran, China and Russia, open civil war in the United States. Looking to know more and covering the election, Augusta University can help. Albert is available to speak with media – simply click on his name to arrange an interview today.
Hezbollah, a powerful political and militant group based in Lebanon, has played a significant role in Middle Eastern politics since its formation in the early 1980s. Understanding the group’s origins, its political evolution, and its regional and global implications is critical in analyzing ongoing conflicts and power dynamics in the region. Hezbollah’s influence extends beyond its militant activities, affecting everything from political governance in Lebanon to its role in broader geopolitical struggles. As global attention often focuses on Middle Eastern stability, the history of Hezbollah provides rich context for journalists to explore various angles on its lasting impact. Here are several story angles that highlight Hezbollah's far-reaching influence: Origins and ideological foundations: Investigate Hezbollah's roots during the Lebanese Civil War, its ideological ties to the Iranian Revolution, and its early activities in resistance movements against Israel. Hezbollah’s role in Lebanese politics: Explore how Hezbollah transformed from a militant group into a major political player, examining its impact on Lebanon's government, elections, and power structure. Regional and international influence: Analyze Hezbollah’s relationships with Iran and Syria, its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, and its role in shaping regional alliances and rivalries in the Middle East. Hezbollah’s military evolution and conflicts with Israel: Provide an in-depth look at the group’s military capabilities, its tactics, and its key confrontations with Israel, including the 2006 Lebanon War. Terrorism designations and global reactions: Investigate Hezbollah’s designation as a terrorist organization by various countries, the group's response, and the wider international community's stance on its activities. Connect with an expert about the the History of Hezbollah: To search our full list of experts visit www.expertfile.com Photo Credit: Council on Foreign Relations
West Sanctions Russian Aviation, But Moscow Decides to Keep Planes Flying Despite Risks When the U.S. and its allies slapped sanctions on Russia for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, severing aviation links was at the top of the list. Direct flights vanished and Russian airlines lost access to spare parts for their foreign airplanes. In retaliation, Vladimir Putin’s regime impounded foreign aircraft and shut off the world’s largest air space to countries imposing sanctions. Not since the early 1980s—when the U.S. suspended routes to the USSR over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, repression in Poland and downing of a Korean Air Lines plane—have aviation ties between the two countries dipped so low. Aviation sanctions today are having an impact but come with a major risk. If the fatal crash of a jetliner killing hundreds is linked to the lack of spare parts, Putin will blame sanctions and the West. The stakes are high as Russia seeks to use any issue from cluster bombs to soccer to widen cracks in Western unity over Ukraine. To get ahead of this, U.S. policymakers and their allies need to better explain the effects of sanctions, why they’re worth the risk and why the Russian state, not the West, is ultimately responsible for any fatal crash. U.S. government assessments place Russian aviation among sectors negatively impacted by sanctions. A closer look shows widening success in degrading this increasingly weak link in Russia’s political economy. By late 2021, foreign aircraft comprised 70% of Russia’s fleet of 801 passenger airplanes, which included 298 Airbuses, 236 Boeings, and 23 other foreign aircraft such as Embraers. In addition, 95% of Russian airline flights were on foreign-made aircraft. Consequently, sanctions aimed at depriving spare parts for foreign airplanes have caused many disruptions such as fare increases to cover higher costs of repairs. Some of Russia’s 53 airlines have periodically suspended or stopped flying some of their foreign planes. Reports of Russian airlines’ cannibalization of foreign aircraft similarly underscore a dire situation. Less well known is how sanctions hurt Russian manufacturing since Western technology is critical to aircraft such as the Sukhoi Superjet 100, which uses a French-Russian engine (though Russians are working on a substitution). Production of the Yakovlev design bureau’s MC-21 passenger airplane faces significant delays due to sanctions that force substitution of its Western-made parts. Sanctions even helped push Russia out of a joint venture with China to produce the CR929 widebody aircraft. While China is happy to help Russia thwart sanctions, this plane needs Western systems that sanctions complicate. In response, Russia has adapted to and thwarted some aviation sanctions, which I predicted would happen because Putin’s regime is reproducing a state-centered aviation sector rooted in the Soviet past. The war has accelerated the state’s growing control over this vital economic sector, which began before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Examples include the state’s 51% ownership of Aeroflot since 1994, the merger of two smaller, state-run airlines in 2003 and the consolidation of aircraft manufacturing in the state-owned United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which was created in 2006. More recently, the Russian state has helped the country’s airlines weather sanctions by facilitating the illegal confiscation of foreign aircraft. Russian airlines have also proven resourceful by purchasing spare parts through brokers in the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. Better known for supplying Russia with drones, Iran also agreed to provide Russian airlines with spare parts and has been fixing an Aeroflot Airbus for months. Many foreign airlines continue to fly to Russia, and Putin’s regime rewards friendly countries with overflight rights. But the longer sanctions remain, the harder it’s getting for Russia. To regain profitable foreign routes, its airlines are receiving government assistance to legitimately purchase the Western aircraft they illegally seized, although recent holdups in allocating such funds are causing doubts. In a throwback to the Soviet era, Putin’s regime boasts that Russia doesn’t need the West’s airplanes anyway since its one manufacturer, the UAC, will pick up the slack. Such import substitution is unlikely to succeed, as multiple delays suggest. More likely, Russia’s aviation sector will grow more reliant on the state, if not actually part of it like the UAC. This will make Russian aviation less efficient, less innovative and more expensive. Iranian airlines, which have long suffered under foreign sanctions despite some success circumventing them, present their Russian counterparts with a grim vision of the future such as being shut out of lucrative air travel markets and falling behind in emerging aviation technology. How does this shape safety in Russia’s skies? The short answer is that it’s not as bad as headlines suggest and the impact of sanctions is ambiguous at best. Click bait stories paint a dire picture but often conflate commercial, military and general aviation into alarming numbers that do not accurately capture what ordinary passengers face. Some accounts, such as one claiming 120 accidents occurred in 2023, provide few details or sources. Annual safety reports from Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) allow for comparison over time but often obscure Russia’s situation by combining data from each post-Soviet state it monitors. Its 2019 report is mysteriously missing and its decision not to investigate the fatal crash of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Embraer Legacy 600 plane suggests meddling from above. That said, the IAC source base is the most systematic we have. Keeping in mind the potential for the politicization of its conclusions, what does a critical reading of its data alongside other sources suggest? First, fatal crashes in commercial and general aviation actually decreased in Russia from 18 in 2021 to 13 in 2022, and related deaths decreased from 70 to 24. Data for the first half of 2023 points in the same direction, with six fatal crashes and nine deaths. This trend was likely helped by the 14% decline in traffic after February 2022. While so many fatal crashes sound substantial, all but three in 2021 and all but one in 2022 involved small aircraft under 5,700 kilograms, not the jetliners we associate with most commercial flying. Absolute figures on crashes and deaths capture headlines but they don’t say much about safety without considering their relation to passengers flown or departures. According to the IAC, the rate of aviation accidents and the rate of fatal crashes per one million departures both increased from 2020 to 2021 but then decreased in 2022. The IAC does not single out Russia from other post-Soviet states for this metric. But since Russia has the largest aviation sector among those countries, these data suggest that its aviation safety has not dramatically worsened since early 2022. Indeed, even critics who argue that Russian airlines are less safe partly because of sanctions conclude that “2022 and 2023 were also good years for airline safety [in Russia] compared to 2021.” Comparisons with the U.S. similarly suggest that passenger aviation is not as disastrous as some headlines suggest. The IAC data indicates that Russia and other post-Soviet states are usually but not always behind the U.S. in passenger aviation safety. In 2018, for example, IAC countries reported a 0.8 rate of fatal crashes per 1 million departures of passenger aircraft above 5,700 kilograms. Comparable statistics from the National Transportation Safety Board showed a 0.11 rate for that year for scheduled U.S. carrier flights. In 2019, the rates were 2.3 (IAC) and 0.10 (U.S.), but in 2020, both IAC countries and the U.S. enjoyed a 0.0 rate of fatal crashes. The following year, however, IAC countries reported a 1.9 rate of fatal crashes, whereas the NTSB reported a 0.0 rate.1 Against this background of Russian airline safety, let’s now turn to the impact of sanctions. While some commentators emphasize that no fatal crashes have been tied to sanctions, others claim they make Russian airlines unsafe and that it’s only a matter of time before such a fatal crash happens. Some even argue that life-threatening dangers prove aviation sanctions are effective and could help turn Russians against Putin. To reassure the public, Russian aviation officials insist the country’s airlines are safe despite sanctions, as do Russian business media and aviation journalists. This plays to Putin’s claims to legitimacy based in part on withstanding anything the West throws at him. In sharp contrast, Ukrainian media tells Russians their airlines are a disaster waiting to happen precisely because of sanctions. Independent Russian journalists banished by Putin concur, raising alarms about efforts to cover up the impact of sanctions and about the many ways Russian airlines cut corners on safety. In short, an information war exists around the morbid question of whether a Russian jetliner will crash and the role sanctions could play. Fears of a fatal crash were validated by the emergency landing of a Ural Airlines A320 in September, apparently caused by malfunctioning hydraulics tied to sanctions. But a closer examination by a Russian aviation journalist suggests the pilots played a more important role by pressing on to an airport for which there wasn’t enough fuel. Recent Russian state assessments of aviation safety similarly point to pilot error and poor training as the chief causes of aviation incidents. More generally, airplane disasters are usually caused by a convergence of factors—bad weather, a manageable mechanical failure and pilot error—not just one problem. In public discussions, however, pinpointing sanctions’ role tracks more with the politics of the war than technical expertise. At the end of the day, Russian airlines and aviation authorities are solely responsible for putting planes in the sky and Russians’ lives at risk. They continue to claim that everything is fine. But if a fatal crash of a Boeing or Airbus flown by a Russian airline kills hundreds, I predict this narrative will quickly change. Putin will blame the West as he does for everything else affecting his legitimacy, from Russia’s economic problems and his diplomatic failures to protests against his regime and even the war he started in Ukraine. Such a scenario will be a serious test for policymakers who argue that punishing Russia with sanctions is still worth it. To prepare for this, they need to take a page from the Biden administration’s release of intelligence on Russia’s military buildup before the full-scale invasion: publicize as much intelligence as possible on sanctions and their impact, as well as Russia’s aviation sector and what it does or doesn’t do to ensure safety. As Putin’s regime falls back on Soviet-era secrecy about airline safety, sharing such intelligence will be a powerful tool. This will also contribute to broader Western efforts at combatting Russia’s better known disinformation campaigns such as those denying its human rights abuses in Ukraine.
Leap Years and the Connection Between Astronomy and Our Lives
Most of us know February 29 as a whimsical anomaly—nothing more than a chance to tease our friends or colleagues born on this day as technically being a quarter of their purported age. But how often do we think about the origins of the day as we now know it? Or about the near-universal implementation of this specific way to keep track of time? Do we ever consider the impact a leap year could have on everyday life? Frank Maloney, PhD, an associate professor of astronomy and astrophysics at Villanova University, has been teaching for nearly 12 leap years (47 years). He is an expert in timekeeping and calendaring, calling them a “fundamental connection to our lives, ruled by the motion of objects in the sky,” because “everyone has to agree what day and time it is.” Dr. Maloney currently teaches a course called “Earth: Our Habitable World,” where he discusses this and other connections between astronomy and people’s lives. In the case of leap years, the astronomical phenomenon from which they originate—the Earth’s time to orbit the sun—is a very important one to accurately track. “You want your calendar to keep pace with the seasons,” Dr. Maloney explained. “There are all sorts of ways of measuring the pace of the Earth around the sun, but the way that [also] keeps pace with seasons is called the tropical year, and unfortunately, there’s not an integer number of days in that year. We can’t ignore it, because after the first year you’re off by a quarter of a day and after four years off by a full day, and so on.” Ancient civilizations were aware there were slightly more than 365 days in a solar year but didn’t know exactly how much more. Gradually, the seasons would become unsynchronized with the calendar, and those various civilizations added days back in at random times to realign. “In those days, it might be possible to leave one area in April, and arrive [somewhere else] the previous December,” Dr. Maloney joked. The concept of a leap year began with the Roman Empire’s implementation of Julius Caesar’s namesake calendar on January 1, 45 B.C.E., at his behest. The Julian calendar was a solar calendar, which consisted of a 365-day year, and a 366-day leap year every four years, without exception. It was often added as a duplicate day in the middle of February. “But a year is not exactly 365 and a quarter days. It’s a little bit less,” Dr. Maloney explained. “By the Middle Ages, it was 10 or so days out of whack with the tropical year. Astronomers would have seen that very easily... but the reason to change it was not there.” Not until the late 16th century, that is. And the reason it did change was because Easter had moved out of line with the vernal equinox. “Nearly all calendars have a mystical, religious or theological component,” Dr. Maloney said. “In the Roman Church, Easter is reckoned as the first Sunday after the first full moon on or after the vernal equinox, or first day of spring.” In order to have Easter fall back in line with the equinox, Pope Gregory XIII issued a papal bull in 1582, which declared a year to be a more accurate 365 days, 5 hours and 49 minutes in length (roughly). What that meant for leap years was that, instead of every four years without exception, they would now occur every four years except on century marks, unless that century mark was divisible by 400. For example, 1900 was not a leap year, but 2000 was. The years 2100, 2200 and 2300 will not be leap years. The global switch to a new calendar was not easy or done in haste. To enact the initial calendar change, 1582 went from October 4 to October 15 to eliminate extra accumulated days. Catholic countries mostly followed suit soon after, but many others resisted, as citizens feared it was a political trick. It took centuries to get to the near-universal use of the Gregorian calendar we have today. Great Britain and other Commonwealth nations did not adopt the Gregorian calendar until 1752. An individual such as George Washington could have been considered to be born on one day in the Julian calendar and have a different birthday in the Gregorian calendar. In the American colonies, September 1752 skipped to the 14th day of the month from the second. The most recent country to switch from the Julian to Gregorian calendar was Greece in 1923. By then, the calendar was roughly two weeks off from the tropical year. In the early 1900s, when globalization was commencing, this was a big deal. “You could get in an airplane and fly someplace, and not even know what day you’d be landing. According to the calendar, it’d be time travel,” Dr. Maloney said. Saudi Arabia still used a few elements of the Islamic calendar for fiscal purposes until 2016, and Afghanistan, Iran, Nepal and Ethiopia are the only countries in the world that do not officially use the Gregorian calendar currently. So, what does all this mean for people today? For starters, historians and genealogists must be careful when studying historical dates and events. For example, a country may have still been using the Julian calendar during a particular time period, or perhaps an event might have occurred during the time days were skipped to make the switch from the Julian to the Gregorian calendars. “If an infant were born [in the American colonies] on the second of September 1752, for example, and died on the 14th, they were not really 12 days old,” Dr. Maloney said. “Or if a war began in a country one day but started on a different day in a different country, it causes confusion.” Leap years and other adjustments to timekeeping can also cause a plethora of computing and software issues, impacting multiple industries. This is especially true in the digital age where time-stamping is so ubiquitous. Case in point, on occasion, we actually have to add a leap second to time to account for the slowing of Earth’s rotation. These leap seconds are added after 11:59:59 on either December 31 or June 30, when needed. “There’s a great deal of controversy about this particular practice,” Dr. Maloney said. “It really confounds software. A jet airplane, for example, can travel a fairly long distance in one second. Time has to be kept now to fractions of seconds, [even for things like] lawsuits and insurance policies. Timekeeping is a very important task for astronomers.” It seems those astronomers have it figured out... for now. Even the Gregorian calendar will eventually need an adjustment, as its margin of error is about 27 seconds per year. That means every 3,236 years—so sometime in the early 4800s—an additional extra day will need to be added somewhere to correct it. Luckily, we have some time to plan ahead.
Expert Q & A: What led to the Hamas attack on Israel and what role will the United States play?
The conflict between Israel and Palestine dates back many years, but the recent escalation can be attributed to issues centering around Palestinian rights and access to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, according to Craig Albert, PhD, program director of the Master of Arts in Intelligence and Security Studies at Pamplin College of Arts Humanities, and Social Sciences at Augusta University. Albert, who is a leading expert on relations in the Middle East and American interests in the region, also notes that Hamas has been fighting against what it believes is unwarranted and illegal Israeli settlements being extended into Palestinian territory, while Israel has had a serious blockade on the Gaza Strip for over a decade. Hamas views this as state-oppression and thus, when combined, led to this horrific attack. Q: Now that Israel is declaring war, what should we expect to see in the upcoming days/weeks? A: We should expect more attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as Hezbollah from Lebanon. This means that there is a serious possibility of a two front war for Israel as it strikes towards the Gaza Strip near the sea, and more north into Lebanon. Concerning the State of Israel, look for a massive air bombardment over the next few days until the conditions on the ground are satisfactory, according to Israeli intelligence, to send in massive ground forces. One can expect a full infantry onslaught with all that entails within the Gaza Strip and perhaps other areas as well. We could also seem so strikes against Iran, especially cyber in nature, but perhaps, much more kinetic than we can imagine given the emotions being felt by the Israeli security council. Unfortunately, we can expect massive civilian casualties on both sides as this continues especially when Israel invades with its heavy ground forces. Q: What role does the U.S. play in all of this? A: The United States is already sending in a carrier fleet to show support for Israel; but one can imagine a scenario where Israel and Iran get into a serious confrontation, resulting in direct action by the U.S. on the side of Israel. The U.S. is also already supplying munitions and intelligence to the Israelis, and we should expect to see more in this area over the coming weeks and months. Note that the U.S. might have to take drastic actions itself as its war materials are being dramatically reduced because of arming the Ukrainians against Russia, and now, looking to arm heavily Israel. It is quite possible that the U.S. could be pulled into this in a direct way but currently, it just does not have the war material to conduct massive military operations if called to do so. This is quite a dramatic situation for the U.S., and of course for Israel. Looking to know more or connect with Dr. Albert for an interview? Dr. Albert is available to speak with media – simply click on his name to arrange an interview today.
Despite months of tension, weeks of pleas and diplomatic efforts – a full scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces has occurred. The situation is developing by the minute and media are scrambling to explain what has happened, why it happened, and tell stories of how this invasion is impacting people not just in Ukraine, but in America too. It’s why experts like Florida Atlantic University’s Robert Rabil is front and center to explain what’s going on to reporters. According to Robert Rabil, a political science professor at Florida Atlantic University, the crisis between Russia and Ukraine has been building since the 1990s. "This is on the account of two factors. The first factor is the expansion of NATO to the border of Russia, merely, especially to the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia," Rabil said. "The second factor is from a Russian perspective they believe that they treated Russia like a bygone power." Rabil said with increased sanctions underway and formal diplomatic channels not working, the west could be pushing Russia to deepen its ties to other regimes globally. "It might go to Iran and it will support Iran in acquiring or hastening the acquisition of nuclear weapons," he added. "It will deepen its embrace with China." February 23 – WPTV NewsChannel 5 The invasion of Ukraine is historic and could lead to escalations of violence in other parts of Europe and further. And, if you are a reporter looking to cover this ongoing story – then let our experts help. Robert Rabil, Ph.D., is an expert in political Islam, terrorism, U.S. foreign policy, and U.S.-Arab relations. He is available to speak with media about the current situation in Ukraine, simply click on his icon now to arrange an interview today.
Much like the cherry blossoms that are reaching peak in DC and are just starting to bloom here in NYC, U.S.-Japan relations seem set to hit their peak with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga set to become the first world leader to meet with President Biden at the White House this week. This marks the first time a Japanese leader—or any Asian leader—is the first to meet with a U.S. president, since traditionally this honor has been reserved for a neighboring country like Canada or Mexico, or a European ally such as the UK. What does this mean for geopolitics? How does this shift our relationship with Japan and other allies? What does this mean for the balance of global power in a world of ever-shifting alliances? According to Joshua Walker, President & CEO of Japan Society, this historic visit indicates the following: This visit highlights the shift from a Western Transatlantic to an Eastern Transpacific Asian century, where Japan plays a critical role as a frontline security ally of the United States against China as this competition dominates geopolitics. It emphasizes the importance of democratic allies like Japan, specifically the Quad formation of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. as a new multilateral framing of America’s engagement in Asia. Japanese leadership inaugurated this concept in the last decade, which has now been embraced by the Biden administration. Brings into focus the 70 years of security treaty alliance between the United States and Japan, where Biden and Suga have been key players for the last half century—since the opening to China that changed the character of U.S.-Japan relations. Represents a key bilateral opportunity for both new administrations to get to know each other on the world stage in advance of the G7 summit in England this summer, and a time to coordinate strategies between the first and third largest economies, from domestic COVID responses and infrastructure investment to global responses to climate change and authoritarian regimes from North Korea and Myanmar to Iran. As host of the Summer Olympics in Tokyo, Japan elevates global aspirations and hopes for a successful, albeit different, competition of the human spirit that, through its resiliency, can overcome COVID. America represents the largest Olympic delegation and TV market, while Japan is the only Asian country to host two Summer Olympics even as China plans for its own Winter Games in 2022.
U.S.-Iran Crisis: Outlook and Implications
Executive Summary: The immediate crisis following the death of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. airstrike and Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes against two U.S. airbases appears to have settled down. However, the conditions for a future flare-up remain in place because the underlying conditions have not changed. Going forward, each side is likely to double down on its stated strategic objective, with Iran pushing for an end to U.S. presence in the region and the U.S. pushing for an end to the Iranian nuclear program. Further, the norms that had previously prevented an open exchange of fire between the two sides have been eroded. Why It Matters: The events of January 3rd and 8th represent the first time since the skirmishes of the “Tanker Wars” of 1987-88 that the military forces of the United States and Iran have directly and openly exchanged fire with each other. For the last three decades, the contest between the two states has been a shadow war of proxy conflicts, plausible deniability, and non-military measures. The American decision to strike Soleimani and the Iranian decision to fire missiles in response removed many of the guardrails that have set limits on previous escalations of tensions. The Iranian decision to renounce cooperation with the 2015 nuclear agreement places back into contention an issue that had previously brought the U.S. and Israel to the point of war with Iran in 2012-13. Business Impact: Markets have been largely taking a wait-and-see approach in order to determine the form of Iranian response to Soleimani’s death, and they responded with relief when President Trump signaled that the U.S. would not retaliate. To an extent, uncertainty in the Middle East had already been priced into the markets due to tensions in the second half of 2019. A significant or prolonged conflict would have an obvious negative impact on energy markets and regional economies. In addition, American and Western companies operating internationally or their employees could suffer collateral damage from any future Iranian proxy attacks against visible symbols of U.S. presence overseas. Looking Forward: In the immediate term, the resolution of the crisis represented one of the best possible outcomes: Iran has publicly signaled that the missile launches conducted on January 8th constituted the extent of their military retaliation to Soleimani’s death and President Trump’s White House address acknowledged Iran’s desire to de-escalate and spoke of finding mutually beneficial outcomes with no further mention of military action. Going forward, both Iran and the United States are likely to double down on their desired strategic outcomes. Iran will seek to use all of the levers of its influence to drive the United States from the region, beginning with Iraq but also including indirect pressure on the Gulf states that host U.S. forces. Offensive cyber operations and deniable proxy attacks against civilian infrastructure in the Gulf could be part of that campaign, returning to tactics observed in the past. For its part, the United States will continue its maximum pressure campaign over the Iranian nuclear program, with President Trump promising additional economic sanctions even as he stepped back from military action. Therefore, although both sides appear to be committed to non-military means, the points of tension that caused the most recent crisis are all still present and have arguably increased based on Iran’s increased non-compliance with JCPOA. It remains to be seen whether coming close to the brink of open conflict will have changed the risk tolerance of either side or whether the first acknowledged exchange of fires between the U.S. and Iran for 32 years will usher in a new period of low-level conflict. The View from Tehran: Iran has played Soleimani’s death for maximum strategic benefit. The messaging of the past 96 hours was aimed at various audiences within the country, the region, and around the world. Having been caught on the backfoot by the U.S.’s strike on Soleimani, the Supreme Leader allowed the IRGC to retaliate against U.S. forces in Iraq in a calibrated manner, likely calculating that a strike with limited casualties would satisfy demands for vengeance while not prompting a response. Khamenei’s Decision: Ayatollah Khamenei is an inherently conservative figure and one who is above all else motivated by the priority of regime survival. Given their long-standing personal relationship, there is ample reason to believe that his displays of emotion of Soleimani’s death, including weeping over his coffin during the funeral on January 6th, were genuine and heart-felt. However, his expressed desire for revenge has been tempered by the overarching imperative to avoid a conflict that would have threatened the regime’s hold on power, either from within or without. Rally Around the Flag: Within Iran, the regime is seeking to use Soleimani’s death and their subsequent retaliation to build national unity following a period of significant domestic unrest. This has been emphasized by the extended period of mourning for Soleimani, days-long funeral spectacle, and the invocation of religious and cultural symbols associated with Shi’a martyrs. The death of Soleimani comes on the heels of a series of mass protests in Iran that originally began on November 15th in response to proposed increase in the price of gas, but which have since expanded to a wider challenge to the regime. Media reporting from late December suggested as many as 1,500 Iranian civilians have been killed as part of a regime crackdown on the protests, which have been characterized as the most serious challenge to the regime since the Green Movement of 2009. JCPOA as a Wedge Between U.S. and Europe: Iran announced on January 5th that it would cease compliance with the remaining provisions of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action but would be willing to return to compliance if sanctions are removed. The nuance in Iran’s position highlights the fact that it is continuing to attempt to use the nuclear issue to drive a wedge between European signatories to the agreement and the United States, which unilaterally walked away from the treaty in May 2018. Regime Dynamics: Soleimani was a high-profile figure within Iran, but his outsized influence on Iranian foreign policy also created friction with other stakeholders in the regime, including leaders of the conventional military forces, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the intelligence services. He was one of few genuinely strategic thinkers in the Iranian national security apparatus and the one with the most extensive and deepest connections within the Arab-speaking world. His replacement as commander of the Quds Force is his long-time deputy who will be familiar with the day-to-day operations of the IRGC’s external operations arm but will not have the stature or the network of Soleimani. As a result, other stakeholders may jockey to move into the vacuum created by his death. The View from Washington: The present challenge for the U.S. is how to maintain both a deterrent posture and establishing the means to avoid further escalation. The policy on Iraq going forward will have to balance President Trump’s desire to disengage from the conflict while not creating the appearance of having been pushed out by Iran. Escalate to Deter: President Trump’s decision to kill Soleimani reflected an “escalate to deter” strategy, using a sudden and unexpected escalation of force during a crisis in order to reestablish deterrence after previous provocations in 2019 had gone largely unanswered. However, deterrence is only as good as the last demonstration of a willingness to respond. The decision to not respond to Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes reflected a pragmatic decision to de-escalate. National Security Decision-Making: Nearly three years into his presidency, Donald Trump feels increasingly confident making national security decisions based on his own instincts. The original coterie of experienced national security establishment members such as Jim Mattis and H.R. McMaster who had populated the Situation Room during the early days of the administration have largely resigned or been fired and replaced with individuals of lower profile and/or proven loyalty. Although the mechanisms of the formal interagency process continue to function, President Trump increasingly makes decisions based on a network of informal advisors and media sources. Domestic U.S. Considerations: The decision to launch the strike on Soleimani came during a period of high political tension in Washington, as it had been expected this month that the U.S. Senate would begin a trial in response to articles of impeachment passed by the House of Representatives in December. The Soleimani strike is being taken up by both Trump’s supporters and opponents as evidence of either his credentials as a decisive commander-in-chief or his unsuitability for office, depending on their perspective. Congress has proposed votes to limit President Trump’s independent authority to initiate hostilities with Iran, but this is unlikely to gain traction in the Senate. Separately, the first voting in the Democratic primary is less than one month away, and a sudden shift in focus to national security issues could have results that are difficult to predict, either boosting those with national security credentials (such as former vice president Joe Biden and military veteran Pete Buttigieg), or rallying support among primary voters for anti-war (such as Bernie Sanders). Third-Party Perspectives and Responses: Iraq: The strike at Baghdad International Airport that killed Soleimani also killed the deputy commander of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Front, a coalition of militias that forms a part of Iraq’s official security apparatus. Iraq’s new Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi has condemned the attack as a “massive breach of sovereignty” and an “aggression on Iraq”. Iraq’s parliament passed a draft law on January 5th calling for the removal of all foreign troops from Iraqi soil, but the law was non-binding and the session had been boycotted by most of the Sunni and Kurdish members of the legislature. Iranian presence has also been the recent target of Iraqi ire, such as in November when a crowd of Iraqis burned down the Iranian consulate in the Shi’a holy city of Najaf, and the Iraqi government will likely try to play both sides against each other to maximize its leverage for military and financial support. Withdrawal from Iraq would mean that the remaining American forces in Syria could no longer be supplied or supported through the western desert of Iraq and would therefore also have to be withdrawn. Iran will likely seek to use all its considerable levers of influence in Iraq to convince the government to see through the expulsion of American forces. The United States leaving Iraq and Syria due to Soleimani’s death would be a fitting legacy from the Iranian perspective and a perverse one from the American perspective given that Soleimani was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American servicemembers in Iraq (and thousands of Iraqi civilians) through his support for Shi’a militias in the mid-to-late 2000s. Europe: Statements from European capitals emphasized the need for restraint and de-escalation. French President Macron is likely to view this event as further justification for his proposals that the EU develop a defense and security apparatus independent of NATO in order to avoid being entangled by potentially reckless American actions. Iran will likely continue to use this event as an opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe on the nuclear program and other issues, and their chosen retaliation was likely calibrated at least in part to allow them to continue positioning themselves as a responsible actor. For his part, Trump is urging the European signatories to join him in walking away from the JCPOA in order to increase Iran’s international isolation. United Kingdom: The British government has tried to tread a fine line in its responses to the strike, with Prime Minister Johnson calling for de-escalation while also stating that he “will not lament” the fact that Soleimani is dead. The U.K. is likely trying to balance its desire to remain aligned with France and Germany in trying to keep the JCPOA together with its traditional close alliance with the United States and Johnson’s personal relationship with President Trump. Russia: Unsurprisingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the American strike, which removed a valuable interlocutor for Russian forces in Syria. Russian troops and Iranian-backed militias in Syria had periodically found themselves with diverging interests in their campaign to support the Assad regime, and Soleimani performed a critical function in directing the activities of those militias to ensure that both Russia and Iran achieved their strategic objectives in Syria. A potential American withdrawal from Iraq and Syria would advance Russia’s interest in establishing itself as the indispensable foreign power in resolving the crisis in Syria and within the region more broadly. China: In line with their long-standing principle of non-intervention and their own interest, China condemned the strike, but the response was muted overall. Chinese interests are primarily economic and tied to ensuring a steady supply of petroleum. One of China’s newest and most capable naval destroyers recently participated in trilateral naval exercises with Iran and Russia in the Gulf of Oman. Although such exercises primarily serve a strategic messaging and diplomatic function, they do signal an emerging alignment of interests between the three states that would be significant for the response to any future crises.
