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Industry and researchers call for action to tackle climate impact of organic, carbon-based chemicals
Call led by members of Supergen Bioenergy Hub, based at Aston University They highlight that carbon-based chemicals cannot be decarbonised but can be defossilised They want a transition to renewable carbon sources such as biomass, recycled carbon, and carbon dioxide. Director of Supergen Bioenergy Hub, Professor Patricia Thornley Industry experts and university researchers have joined together to ask the government to address the climate impact of organic, carbon-based chemicals. While demand for fossil fuels as energy is expected to fall in the coming decades, the petrochemicals sector is set to grow significantly according to experts and is set out in a 2018 report by the International Energy Agency. Members of the Supergen Bioenergy Hub which is based at Aston University and the Biomass Biorefinery Network believe the issue has yet to receive proper attention and is calling for a strategy that addresses this key component of our greenhouse gas emissions. They want a move to a more circular economy, managing supply and demand levels and transitioning away from fossil feedstocks which are raw materials required for some industrial processes. In their paper Carbon for chemicals How can biomass contribute to the defossilisation of the chemicals sector? they highlight that carbon-based chemicals cannot be decarbonised but can be defossilised through a transition to renewable carbon sources such as biomass, recycled carbon and carbon dioxide. Many products in modern society contain carbon such as pharmaceuticals, plastics, textiles, food additives, cosmetics, and cleaning products. These chemicals are derived from fossil feedstocks, so they are classed as petrochemicals. As a result, they contribute to global greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Carbon is embedded in organic chemical products and released when they break down at end-of-life, for example through incineration. To address the emissions from carbon in chemicals and accelerate the development of bio-based chemicals, the group want a cross-party consensus to support a sustainable chemical system. Director of Supergen Bioenergy Hub, Professor Patricia Thornley, said: “We need to consider the UK’s future feedstock and chemicals production and use, and how it relates to net zero, agriculture, environment, economy, trade, and just transition policy objectives. There are opportunities here for the UK to lead the way on sustainable chemical production, but we need to carefully plan a roadmap for the transition, that delivers opportunities around jobs and the economy as well as sustainable greenhouse gas reductions. “There is a definite role for biomass here. But it is essential that any future use of biomass in the chemicals sector is underpinned by rigorous, trusted, and enforceable sustainability governance to build confidence, deliver sustainability benefits, and minimise negative impacts. That requires improvements in sustainability governance and regulation. “We think there are real economic and trade opportunities by the UK accelerating sustainable chemicals. At the moment bio-based chemicals, and chemicals derived from other renewable carbon sources, are not being expanded in the UK because there are no explicit incentives that prioritise them over fossil-based production.” The group argues that the UK has significant academic and industrial research expertise to underpin the development of sustainable bio-based products and could be a global leader in bio-based products and sustainability governance. They believe that to date little of this has manifested as UK-based scale-up and manufacturing, whilst there are numerous examples of UK-led research being scaled up elsewhere. The paper was delivered at a webinar on 7 August. Notes to Editors Carbon for chemicals How can biomass contribute to the defossilisation of the chemicals sector? https://www.supergen-bioenergy.net/output/carbon-for-chemicals-how-can-biomass-contribute-to-the-defossilisation-of-the-chemicals-sector-policy-briefing/ Author: Joanna Sparks (formerly Aston University) With contributions from: Cristiane Scaldaferri (formerly Aston University), Andrew Welfle (University of Manchester), Patricia Thornley (Aston University), Ashley Victoria (University of Leeds), Caspar Donnison (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), Jason Hallett (Imperial College London), Nilay Shah (Imperial College London), Mirjam Rӧder (Aston University), Paul Mines (Biome Bioplastics), David Bott (Society of Chemical Industry), Adrian Higson (NNFCC), Neil Bruce (University of York) 2018 International Energy Agency report https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-petrochemicals https://www.supergen-bioenergy.net/ The Supergen Bioenergy Hub works with academia, industry, government, and societal stakeholders to develop sustainable bioenergy systems that support the UK’s transition to an affordable, resilient, low-carbon energy future. The Hub is funded jointly by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) under grant EP/Y016300/1 and is part of the wider Supergen Programme. www.bbnet-nibb.co.uk The Biomass Biorefinery Network (BBNet), a phase II Network in Industrial Biotechnology & Bioenergy funded by the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC-NIBB) under grant BB/S009779/1. The aim of the Biomass Biorefinery Network is to act as a focal point to build and sustain a dynamic community of industrial and academic practitioners who work together to develop new and improved processes for the conversion of non-food biomass into sustainable fuels, chemicals and materials. About Aston University For over a century, Aston University’s enduring purpose has been to make our world a better place through education, research and innovation, by enabling our students to succeed in work and life, and by supporting our communities to thrive economically, socially and culturally. Aston University’s history has been intertwined with the history of Birmingham, a remarkable city that once was the heartland of the Industrial Revolution and the manufacturing powerhouse of the world. Born out of the First Industrial Revolution, Aston University has a proud and distinct heritage dating back to our formation as the School of Metallurgy in 1875, the first UK College of Technology in 1951, gaining university status by Royal Charter in 1966, and becoming the Guardian University of the Year in 2020. Building on our outstanding past, we are now defining our place and role in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (and beyond) within a rapidly changing world. For media inquiries in relation to this release, contact Nicola Jones, Press and Communications Manager, on (+44) 7825 342091 or email: n.jones6@aston.ac.uk
As the new school year kicks off, CAA South Central Ontario (CAA SCO) is reminding motorists to remain attentive when driving through school zones as more children are present in these areas. A recent survey conducted by CAA SCO found that 60 per cent of parents surveyed are concerned about the driving behaviours witnessed in their child’s school zone and consider their child’s school zone unsafe – a five per cent increase from last year. “It is no surprise that parents are concerned for the safety of their children; they have the right to get to and from school safely,” says Tracy Marshall, manager community relations CAA SCO, “speeding, double parking and stopping in school bus zones are all commonly reported unsafe driving behaviours parents see in their child’s school zones.” As a result, a majority of parents (85 per cent) support reducing speed limits in school zones, with over 77 per cent of these parents agreeing that 30km/h or less is the most appropriate speed limit. Of those surveyed, 68 per cent of parents strongly support the use of Automatic Speed Enforcement (ASE) in school zones, and 79 per cent believe its presence would deter speeding around schools. Additionally, 3 in 4 (73 per cent) consider that ASE should remain permanent in school zones. “Automated Speed Enforcement, along with the presence of police officers and speed bumps, continue to be identified as the primary measures to deter speeding in these zones,” adds Marshall, “through education, we hope to help motorists to make more responsible decisions behind the wheel to protect themselves and those around them.” Tips for responsible driving behaviours in school zone areas: • Help reduce traffic with active school travel: Encourage your kids to walk or wheel to school to ease traffic congestion. If your school is a further distance, CAA SCO encourages parents and guardians to park a block away and walk to school to reduce traffic and make school zones safer. • Put away distractions: Pedestrian safety begins with drivers. It’s important to put away distractions such as phones and be extra attentive in school zones, whether a parent is driving, or a child is walking to school. • Slow down: Know and respect the speed limit in your neighbourhood’s school zones. Give yourself plenty of time to drop off your kids at school to avoid rushing. • Choose a safe spot to drop off and pick up your children from school: Follow your school’s rules and avoid double parking or stopping on crosswalks, dropping off or picking up your kids on the opposite side of the street, and stopping in moving traffic as kids rush out. Instead, use the designated drop-off areas or consider a spot a bit farther away from school that is easily accessible and safe. • Make eye contact with pedestrians: With the excitement of going back to school, anticipate that children may not easily see or hear your moving vehicle, so ensure to make eye contact with pedestrians crossing the road. • Stop for school buses: Never pass a stopped school bus with an activated stop arm and flashing red lights as children get on and off the bus. Passing a school bus as it loads and unloads children – not only is this dangerous, but it’s also illegal. • Watch for CAA School Safety Patrollers: When travelling to and from school, watch for CAA School Safety Patrollers in their lime green safety vests, as they play an important role in ensuring the roadway is safe before kids cross on their own. CAA supports safety in school zones through the CAA School Safety Patrol® program, developed to protect and educate elementary school children on safe road-crossing practices. CAA’s Ontario Road Safety Resource is a toolkit with valuable lesson plans for teachers to help educate students about road safety. To learn more, please visit www.caasco.com/schoolzone. The online survey was conducted by DIG Insights in May 2024, with 1,520 Ontario parents/guardians with children attending school from kindergarten to grade 8. Based on the sample size of n=1,520 and with a confidence level of 95 per cent, the margin of error for this research is +/- 2%.)
Aston University expert explores sustainability in SME supply chains in new book
Professor Prasanta Kumar Dey is a co-author of Supply Chain Sustainability in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises The book provides a comprehensive roadmap for SMEs to achieve sustainable supply chains Using real world case studies, it offers practical guidance and expert insights for researchers and industry practitioners. An expert in sustainable supply chain operations and the circular economy at Aston University has co-authored a new book focused on the sustainability of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Dr Prasanta Kumar Dey, professor of operations management at Aston Business School, has written Supply Chain Sustainability in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises alongside Dr Soumyadeb Chowdhury of Toulouse Business School and Dr Chrisovalantis Malesios from the Agricultural University of Athens. This comprehensive book examines the sustainability of supply chains in SMEs across developed and emerging economies. It draws on contributions from experts and examines case studies from countries including Thailand, Bangladesh, France, Spain, Austria and Greece. The book offers practical guidance for researchers and industry practitioners. It explores the trade-offs between economic, environmental and social aspects of sustainability, the current state of sustainable supply chain practices and critical success factors across various industries. The book highlights the experience of SMEs on the decarbonisation journey, from the concept to the implementation of the energy efficiency measures. This experience helps not only to standardise the customers’ journey towards decarbonisation but it also facilitates the undertaking of cost-benefit analysis for decarbonisation measures. Professor Prasanta Dey said: “Small and medium-sized enterprises are the backbone of economies worldwide. “Through this book, we aim to provide a comprehensive roadmap for SMEs to achieve sustainable supply chains, balancing economic growth with environmental stewardship and social responsibility. “The selection of the most effective enablers across facilities, operational processes and logistics for decarbonisation is made easier through the case studies of the book. “By learning from real-world case studies and expert insights, businesses can navigate the complexities of sustainability and drive impactful change. These help to develop a comprehensive reporting template for communicating energy audit outcomes to specific company for their further actions. The book also helps SMEs to develop implementation plan for decarbonisation measures. “Adopting a carbon footprint tool and business modelling technique from the book helps a decarbonization project identify energy-efficient strategies that reduce emissions and enhance economic, environmental and social performance.” You can purchase a copy of the book here.
Aston Institute for Forensic Linguistics appoints new director
Dr Krzysztof Kredens, a reader in forensic linguistics at the University, took up the position on 1 August 2024 The move comes after founding director, Professor Tim Grant, announced he was stepping down Dr Nicci MacLeod, who completed her PhD at the university in 2006, has been promoted to deputy director. The Aston Institute for Forensic Linguistics (AIFL) has announced the appointment of Dr Krzysztof Kredens as its new director. Dr Kredens is a reader in forensic linguistics and was one of the three founding members of the Centre for Forensic Linguistics (CFL), the predecessor to AIFL, when he joined Aston University in 2007. He takes over the role vacated by fellow founding member of the Centre and latterly Institute, Professor Tim Grant, who steps down after five years as AIFL Director, and another six as CFL director prior to that. Dr Nicci MacLeod has been appointed as deputy director, with both commencing their new roles on 1 August 2024. Dr MacLeod is a senior lecturer in forensic linguistics and has been involved with the subject at the University since beginning her PhD in 2006. She has been programme director for the MA Forensic Linguistics since 2022. The mission of AIFL is to improve the delivery of justice through the analysis of language. Its experts study forensic texts and contexts producing academically rigorous, high impact research using insights and methods from diverse areas of linguistics to achieve this mission. Dr Kredens said: “I am delighted to be taking up the role of director at the Aston Institute for Forensic Linguistics. “On behalf of the Institute, I would like to thank Professor Tim Grant for his service as CFL/AIFL Director. His leadership over the years has been invaluable and his impact has been profound. “While he will be stepping down from his role, he will continue to share his expertise and experience and keep contributing to AIFL and the University in other capacities. Dr MacLeod said: “It has been a genuine privilege to work under Tim’s Directorship, and we look forward to his continuing involvement with AIFL for many years to come. Having been involved with forensic linguistics at Aston University for the past eighteen years, I am thrilled to take on this new role and excited to continue this important work. Professor Grant said: “Being Director of AIFL has been the highlight and privilege of my career so far, and deciding to step back one of the biggest decisions. I’m delighted with the appointment of Krzysztof and Nicci as director and deputy director, and excited to see where they take AIFL next.”
The project is a collaboration between Aston University, the University of Sheffield and The Resolution Foundation The project aims to leverage new, big data to help understand regional economic disparities It is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Aston University, in collaboration with the University of Sheffield and The Resolution Foundation, has launched a significant research project to understand regional productivity and wage disparities in the UK. The project has received £300,000 in funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) to uncover the factors driving economic imbalances using recent, big data. The research will analyse how various factors such as workers' education, location choices, business types and sizes and regional infrastructure contribute to wage and productivity differences over the past 20 years. The aim is to understand these differences and suggest practical solutions for national and local governments. Researchers will explore potential drivers of regional productivity gaps, including the clustering of highly skilled workers, regional industrial structures, and local endowments like transport links and housing availability. The findings will help identify effective policy measures to reduce these imbalances. This project also aims to demonstrate how data analysis can help understand regional economic disparities. By reducing start-up costs for future research, it will build a community focused on tackling spatial economic imbalances. Dr Anastasios Kitsos, a senior lecturer in economics at Aston Business School and principal investigator (PI) on the project, said: “This project will analyse the relative importance of productivity drivers using novel, granular data from linked administrative datasets covering workers, firms and localities in England since the 2000s. “This analysis will shed light into how much spatial productivity gaps can be explained by the characteristics of people, firms and places over time, and identify intrinsically more productive locations. “Understanding and addressing the root causes of the UK's severe spatial disparities in economic performance is crucial for fostering inclusive, regionally balanced growth and enhancing national productivity. This project aims to provide actionable insights and build a foundation for future research and policy development in this critical area. “The results will be shared in a comprehensive report detailing these influences over the past 20 years and offering policy recommendations for governments on skills, innovation, infrastructure, and local development strategies.”
National Institutes of Health award $1.827 million for research on collective cell migration
Priscilla Hwang, Ph.D., assistant professor in the Department of Biomedical Engineering at Virginia Commonwealth University, has received a National Institutes of Health grant for $1.827 million over five years. The award from the National Institute of General Medical Sciences will support Hwang’s innovative research project “Dissecting mechanisms of collective migration” and provide mentorship for student researchers from the high school to graduate level. Collective migration, where groups of cells move together in a coordinated manner, is critical for the successful development of tissues and plays a vital role in wound healing, metastasis, and other biological processes. Dysregulation in collective migration is often linked to developmental abnormalities and disease progression. Despite its importance, the mechanics and mechanisms driving collective migration remain poorly understood. The project is organized around three primary goals: Investigate the effect of biomechanical cues to activate leader cells and directional collective migration: Understand how biomechanical signals activate leader cells to guide the migration of cell groups. Elucidate which and how leader cell mechanics are responsible for leader cell development: Identify the specific mechanical properties and behaviors that enable leader cells to emerge and lead the collective migration process. Examine the role of cell junctional forces in collective migration: Explore how the forces at cell contacts contribute to the overall migration and coordination among cells. Hwang will leverage her expertise in 3D microphysiological systems to study collective migration in dynamic, physiologically relevant environments. Her work aims to uncover the mechanisms by which leader cells sense and respond to mechanical forces in their environment, driving the collective migration of cells. “Our understanding of collective migration, especially the mechanics and mechanisms driving this phenomenon, is very limited,” Hwang said. “Our proposal will significantly accelerate our progress toward a comprehensive understanding of collective migration and lay the foundation for advancing treatment for developmental abnormalities or diseases.” The NIH grant will also expand student research and mentoring opportunities. “This Maximizing Investigators Research Award (MIRA) only goes to the most highly talented and promising investigators, and Dr. Hwang is most deserving,” said Rebecca L. Heise, Ph.D., Inez A. Caudill, Jr. Distinguished Professor and chair of the Department of Biomedical Engineering . “The award will provide support for undergraduate and predoctoral research opportunities in this important area of fundamental research that has an impact on neonatal development, cancer, and fibrotic disease.” To ensure diverse perspectives are considered throughout the project, Hwang said students from diverse populations will be recruited, including underrepresented minorities, women, and first-generation college students. “Further, we will continue to share our passion for science with the community through developing hands-on outreach activities based on our research findings,” she added.
How vulnerable are US energy facilities
Earlier this month, alarm bells were ringing at the Justice Department after a Jordanian citizen was arrested for targeting and breaking into solar power facility farm in Florida. During that same time period, energy facilities in New Jersey and Idaho also came under attack. The attacks were politically motivated and have led national media outlets like USA Today to contact experts from Carnegie Mellon University to help explain the situation and break if all down. The Department of Homeland Security has issued warnings that domestic extremists have been developing "credible, specific plans" since at least 2020 and would continue to "encourage physical attacks against electrical infrastructure." Industry experts, federal officials, and others have warned in one report after another since at least 1990 that the power grid was at risk, said Granger Morgan, an engineering professor at Carnegie Mellon University. One challenge is that there's no single entity whose responsibilities span the entire system, Morgan said. And the risks are only increasing as the grid expands to include renewable energy sources such as solar and wind, he said. August 15, 2024 - USA TODAY Professor Granger's comments are startling as America's vulnerabilities to important infrastructure seem to be more exposed than ever. And if you're a journalist looking to cover this emerging topic - then let us help with your questions and stories. Morgan Granger is available to speak with media - simply click on his icon below to arrange an interview today. Photo Credit: Zbynek Burival
West Sanctions Russian Aviation, But Moscow Decides to Keep Planes Flying Despite Risks When the U.S. and its allies slapped sanctions on Russia for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, severing aviation links was at the top of the list. Direct flights vanished and Russian airlines lost access to spare parts for their foreign airplanes. In retaliation, Vladimir Putin’s regime impounded foreign aircraft and shut off the world’s largest air space to countries imposing sanctions. Not since the early 1980s—when the U.S. suspended routes to the USSR over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, repression in Poland and downing of a Korean Air Lines plane—have aviation ties between the two countries dipped so low. Aviation sanctions today are having an impact but come with a major risk. If the fatal crash of a jetliner killing hundreds is linked to the lack of spare parts, Putin will blame sanctions and the West. The stakes are high as Russia seeks to use any issue from cluster bombs to soccer to widen cracks in Western unity over Ukraine. To get ahead of this, U.S. policymakers and their allies need to better explain the effects of sanctions, why they’re worth the risk and why the Russian state, not the West, is ultimately responsible for any fatal crash. U.S. government assessments place Russian aviation among sectors negatively impacted by sanctions. A closer look shows widening success in degrading this increasingly weak link in Russia’s political economy. By late 2021, foreign aircraft comprised 70% of Russia’s fleet of 801 passenger airplanes, which included 298 Airbuses, 236 Boeings, and 23 other foreign aircraft such as Embraers. In addition, 95% of Russian airline flights were on foreign-made aircraft. Consequently, sanctions aimed at depriving spare parts for foreign airplanes have caused many disruptions such as fare increases to cover higher costs of repairs. Some of Russia’s 53 airlines have periodically suspended or stopped flying some of their foreign planes. Reports of Russian airlines’ cannibalization of foreign aircraft similarly underscore a dire situation. Less well known is how sanctions hurt Russian manufacturing since Western technology is critical to aircraft such as the Sukhoi Superjet 100, which uses a French-Russian engine (though Russians are working on a substitution). Production of the Yakovlev design bureau’s MC-21 passenger airplane faces significant delays due to sanctions that force substitution of its Western-made parts. Sanctions even helped push Russia out of a joint venture with China to produce the CR929 widebody aircraft. While China is happy to help Russia thwart sanctions, this plane needs Western systems that sanctions complicate. In response, Russia has adapted to and thwarted some aviation sanctions, which I predicted would happen because Putin’s regime is reproducing a state-centered aviation sector rooted in the Soviet past. The war has accelerated the state’s growing control over this vital economic sector, which began before Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Examples include the state’s 51% ownership of Aeroflot since 1994, the merger of two smaller, state-run airlines in 2003 and the consolidation of aircraft manufacturing in the state-owned United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), which was created in 2006. More recently, the Russian state has helped the country’s airlines weather sanctions by facilitating the illegal confiscation of foreign aircraft. Russian airlines have also proven resourceful by purchasing spare parts through brokers in the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. Better known for supplying Russia with drones, Iran also agreed to provide Russian airlines with spare parts and has been fixing an Aeroflot Airbus for months. Many foreign airlines continue to fly to Russia, and Putin’s regime rewards friendly countries with overflight rights. But the longer sanctions remain, the harder it’s getting for Russia. To regain profitable foreign routes, its airlines are receiving government assistance to legitimately purchase the Western aircraft they illegally seized, although recent holdups in allocating such funds are causing doubts. In a throwback to the Soviet era, Putin’s regime boasts that Russia doesn’t need the West’s airplanes anyway since its one manufacturer, the UAC, will pick up the slack. Such import substitution is unlikely to succeed, as multiple delays suggest. More likely, Russia’s aviation sector will grow more reliant on the state, if not actually part of it like the UAC. This will make Russian aviation less efficient, less innovative and more expensive. Iranian airlines, which have long suffered under foreign sanctions despite some success circumventing them, present their Russian counterparts with a grim vision of the future such as being shut out of lucrative air travel markets and falling behind in emerging aviation technology. How does this shape safety in Russia’s skies? The short answer is that it’s not as bad as headlines suggest and the impact of sanctions is ambiguous at best. Click bait stories paint a dire picture but often conflate commercial, military and general aviation into alarming numbers that do not accurately capture what ordinary passengers face. Some accounts, such as one claiming 120 accidents occurred in 2023, provide few details or sources. Annual safety reports from Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) allow for comparison over time but often obscure Russia’s situation by combining data from each post-Soviet state it monitors. Its 2019 report is mysteriously missing and its decision not to investigate the fatal crash of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Embraer Legacy 600 plane suggests meddling from above. That said, the IAC source base is the most systematic we have. Keeping in mind the potential for the politicization of its conclusions, what does a critical reading of its data alongside other sources suggest? First, fatal crashes in commercial and general aviation actually decreased in Russia from 18 in 2021 to 13 in 2022, and related deaths decreased from 70 to 24. Data for the first half of 2023 points in the same direction, with six fatal crashes and nine deaths. This trend was likely helped by the 14% decline in traffic after February 2022. While so many fatal crashes sound substantial, all but three in 2021 and all but one in 2022 involved small aircraft under 5,700 kilograms, not the jetliners we associate with most commercial flying. Absolute figures on crashes and deaths capture headlines but they don’t say much about safety without considering their relation to passengers flown or departures. According to the IAC, the rate of aviation accidents and the rate of fatal crashes per one million departures both increased from 2020 to 2021 but then decreased in 2022. The IAC does not single out Russia from other post-Soviet states for this metric. But since Russia has the largest aviation sector among those countries, these data suggest that its aviation safety has not dramatically worsened since early 2022. Indeed, even critics who argue that Russian airlines are less safe partly because of sanctions conclude that “2022 and 2023 were also good years for airline safety [in Russia] compared to 2021.” Comparisons with the U.S. similarly suggest that passenger aviation is not as disastrous as some headlines suggest. The IAC data indicates that Russia and other post-Soviet states are usually but not always behind the U.S. in passenger aviation safety. In 2018, for example, IAC countries reported a 0.8 rate of fatal crashes per 1 million departures of passenger aircraft above 5,700 kilograms. Comparable statistics from the National Transportation Safety Board showed a 0.11 rate for that year for scheduled U.S. carrier flights. In 2019, the rates were 2.3 (IAC) and 0.10 (U.S.), but in 2020, both IAC countries and the U.S. enjoyed a 0.0 rate of fatal crashes. The following year, however, IAC countries reported a 1.9 rate of fatal crashes, whereas the NTSB reported a 0.0 rate.1 Against this background of Russian airline safety, let’s now turn to the impact of sanctions. While some commentators emphasize that no fatal crashes have been tied to sanctions, others claim they make Russian airlines unsafe and that it’s only a matter of time before such a fatal crash happens. Some even argue that life-threatening dangers prove aviation sanctions are effective and could help turn Russians against Putin. To reassure the public, Russian aviation officials insist the country’s airlines are safe despite sanctions, as do Russian business media and aviation journalists. This plays to Putin’s claims to legitimacy based in part on withstanding anything the West throws at him. In sharp contrast, Ukrainian media tells Russians their airlines are a disaster waiting to happen precisely because of sanctions. Independent Russian journalists banished by Putin concur, raising alarms about efforts to cover up the impact of sanctions and about the many ways Russian airlines cut corners on safety. In short, an information war exists around the morbid question of whether a Russian jetliner will crash and the role sanctions could play. Fears of a fatal crash were validated by the emergency landing of a Ural Airlines A320 in September, apparently caused by malfunctioning hydraulics tied to sanctions. But a closer examination by a Russian aviation journalist suggests the pilots played a more important role by pressing on to an airport for which there wasn’t enough fuel. Recent Russian state assessments of aviation safety similarly point to pilot error and poor training as the chief causes of aviation incidents. More generally, airplane disasters are usually caused by a convergence of factors—bad weather, a manageable mechanical failure and pilot error—not just one problem. In public discussions, however, pinpointing sanctions’ role tracks more with the politics of the war than technical expertise. At the end of the day, Russian airlines and aviation authorities are solely responsible for putting planes in the sky and Russians’ lives at risk. They continue to claim that everything is fine. But if a fatal crash of a Boeing or Airbus flown by a Russian airline kills hundreds, I predict this narrative will quickly change. Putin will blame the West as he does for everything else affecting his legitimacy, from Russia’s economic problems and his diplomatic failures to protests against his regime and even the war he started in Ukraine. Such a scenario will be a serious test for policymakers who argue that punishing Russia with sanctions is still worth it. To prepare for this, they need to take a page from the Biden administration’s release of intelligence on Russia’s military buildup before the full-scale invasion: publicize as much intelligence as possible on sanctions and their impact, as well as Russia’s aviation sector and what it does or doesn’t do to ensure safety. As Putin’s regime falls back on Soviet-era secrecy about airline safety, sharing such intelligence will be a powerful tool. This will also contribute to broader Western efforts at combatting Russia’s better known disinformation campaigns such as those denying its human rights abuses in Ukraine.
Expert Perspective: UMW's Steven E. Harris lends his opinion to The Russia File
The following piece was written by Steven E. Harris published by the Wilson Center in April 2024 Sanctions Are Spoiling Russia’s Plans to Make Its Own Airplanes Putin’s regime is feeling confident these days. Advances on the battlefield in Ukraine, expansions in armaments production, and the dithering of Republicans in the U.S. Congress show the war has turned in Russia’s favor. A well-orchestrated presidential election and some real public support buoy the regime. Political opponents are either dead, in prison, or in exile. Putin’s regime has also declared victory in blunting Western sanctions and now plans to permanently thwart them with programs of import substitution. Nowhere is this better seen than in aviation, where the state proclaims it will produce over a thousand new airplanes to replace the foreign aircraft its airlines have long flown. But this bold vision for aviation autarky has little chance of succeeding. Russia’s Short-Term Success in Blunting Aviation Sanctions Thus far, Putin’s regime has weathered aviation sanctions through a two-pronged strategy. First, Russian airlines illegally kept about 400 foreign airplanes—primarily Airbuses and Boeings—owned by foreign leasing companies. Second, the state bankrolled settlement claims in order to purchase some of these airplanes so that airlines could fly them abroad without risk of repossession and reduce their foreign debt. To date, approximately 170 foreign airplanes have been legally acquired in this fashion, and the Ministry of Transportation recently asked for more cash to continue settling claims on the remaining 230 foreign planes. The next question is how long Russian airlines, from the state-owned flag carrier Aeroflot to private companies such as S7 and Ural Air Lines, can continue flying their foreign planes. As I wrote in late October, safety has been degraded far less than predicted. But in the absence of spare parts, software updates, and thorough maintenance by foreign providers, Russian airlines have about two years before they will have to ground Boeings and Airbuses for major repairs performed using third-party spare parts. Anticipating the eventual retirement of foreign planes, Putin’s regime has embarked on a massive program to make all-Russian airplanes. This program promises independence from Western technology and leasing companies but reveals the success of sanctions and fundamental weaknesses in state capacity. The 2030 Aviation Manufacturing Plan Announced in June 2022, the program calls for the state-owned industrial conglomerate Rostec to manufacture 1,036 airplanes with only Russian parts by 2030. In January 2024, the state allocated 283 billion rubles (U.S. $3.1 billion) to help finance the production of 609 airplanes and prioritize medium-haul aircraft in the overall manufacturing plan. Before sanctions, Russian manufacturers produced a small number of narrow body, medium-haul airplanes such as the MC-21 and the Superjet-100 (SSJ-100) with Western components. Twelve SSJ-100s were manufactured in 2021 and ten the following year. Among the aircraft slated to replace Boeings and Airbuses, the plan called for production in 2023 of three medium-haul Tupolev-214 (Tu-214) airplanes and two Superjet-NEW planes (Superjet-100s with all-Russian parts). None of these were built. In fact, the state-owned United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) failed to manufacture a single passenger airplane in 2023. More recently, the UAC conceded further delays of up to two years for rollout of the MC-21, SSJ-NEW, and Tu-214, as well as of smaller, short-haul aircraft such as the Ilyushin-114 (Il-114) and the “Baikal.” The transition to total import substitution is proving difficult, making it impossible to fulfill early targets of the manufacturing plan. By withdrawing access to Western technology critical for manufacturing, sanctions have successfully shut down production. Russian manufacturers will produce at best inferior aircraft that fly shorter routes using more fuel. At its current rate, the UAC is unlikely to manufacture more than a dozen or so showcase narrow body airplanes before 2030. The manufacturer may have better luck producing simpler planes, such as the Baikal, but the state’s injection of 283 billion rubles doesn’t target its production or that of two other short-haul airplanes. Since the UAC will likely not meet the plan’s annual targets any time soon, Russia’s airlines will have to make do with their aging foreign airplanes and acquire spare parts from third parties. Putin admitted as much at his call-in event in December 2023, during which he praised the import-substitution plan but added that the government would continue to purchase illegally held foreign planes. What Will Russia’s Aviation Manufacturing Plan Actually Produce? Rather than produce new aircraft, the immediate purpose of the state’s manufacturing plan is political theater. The infusion of 283 billion rubles was meant to show the public, before the presidential elections, that Putin’s regime is serious about securing commercial aviation and to generate a sense of normalcy in the midst of war. In the long run, the manufacturing plan is more likely to produce further distortions in Russia’s political economy. These include corruption, secrecy, technologically backward aircraft, and even more state control over commercial aviation. The 283 billion rubles will help Rostec keep state-run subsidiaries such as the United Engine Corporation operating with soft budget constraints and favorable contracts that now lack any competition from Western firms. Executives will siphon off their share of the funds, while Putin’s regime will turn a blind eye as long as everyone remains loyal. If the manufacturing plan continues to falter, state-owned manufacturers will have more incentive to keep their failures secret. In 2023, for example, the Ural Civil Aviation Factory kept hidden cost overruns for the Baikal. When news of a 48 percent increase was finally publicized, Putin’s point man for the Far East region, Yuri Trutnev, was incensed and proclaimed, “Our people are like that: they don’t like to share information.” For now, Putin’s regime allows the Russian business media to report fairly openly about the country’s aviation industry on issues such as spare parts and safety, state subsidies, and shortfalls in production. But if commercial flying becomes more precarious and the manufacturing plan remains unfulfilled, the government will likely limit what the public knows about its airlines and long-term plans to maintain them. As the economic historian Mark Harrison shows in his recent book, Secret Leviathan, secrecy in the Soviet era significantly degraded state capacity in many areas, including production. Post-Soviet autocrats face a similar “secrecy/capacity tradeoff,” while newer techniques of disinformation further erode capacity. In attempting to revive the Soviet Union’s autarkic aviation industry, Putin’s regime will find it hard to avoid similar reductions in capacity. Insofar as Russia’s commercial aviation industry is concerned, the lesson for the West is that it pays to play the long game. Russia has effective tools for blunting sanctions in the short run, but in the long run it faces structural obstacles and the absence of Western technology, both of which will degrade this economic sector. The main question remains whether the United States and its allies can keep up the pressure by enforcing sanctions.
Amid Detainees' Release, Putin Flaunts Power and Flouts Western Influence
On August 1, the United States, Russia, Germany and three other European nations engaged in an historic 24-person East-West prisoner exchange. The largest such swap since the end of the Cold War, the multi-country deal secured the release of three prominent American detainees: Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich, corporate security executive Paul Whelan and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty editor Alsu Kurmasheva. It also freed a dozen Russian opposition leaders, incarcerated in their native country for challenging Vladimir Putin and his authoritarian regime. Lynne Hartnett, PhD, is the chair of Villanova University’s Department of History and an expert on modern Russia, protest movements and dissidents in exile. Recently, she shared some insights on the Kremlin's decision to release the American and Russian prisoners—as well as the egotism, oppressive tendencies and political posturing that drove their detention. Q: The arrests and sentencings of Gershkovich, Whelan and Kurmasheva have been described as "outrageous," "a mockery of justice" and reflective of "a total disregard for basic freedoms." What prompted Putin and the Russian government to detain these individuals? Dr. Hartnett: For Putin, seizing Gershkovich, Whelan and Kurmasheva was a power play. They were pawns for him to use when he deemed it convenient. If they could be used in a prisoner swap, they would be. But if that time never arrived, their incarceration, suffering and even potential deaths were inconsequential to him. Their arrests were also a signal that, in Russia, Putin's authority is uncontested. These were American citizens, and around the world, a U.S. passport opens doors: It holds power; it provides access; and it affords its holder protection. But the arrests of Gershkovich, Whelan and Kurmasheva were Putin’s attempt to demonstrate the limits of American influence. They were meant as a signal that, in Russia, a U.S. passport becomes meaningless if it serves Putin to make it so. Q: In recent years, the Russian government has seemingly worked to rehabilitate the reputations of figures like Josef Stalin, who infamously used the Soviet Gulag to stifle opposition and criticism. Is Putin's use of detentions as a political cudgel similar? DH: The show trials of the Stalinist era are frequently referenced. However, it should be stressed that those were largely intended for domestic consumption. They were used to justify the Communist elites' repression of fellow citizens by broadcasting "evidence" that enemies lurked within. The trials of Americans like Gershkovich and Brittney Griner [a professional basketball player detained on smuggling charges] were designed to show the world, not just Russians, that Putin's regime would not be cowed—even if the person being tried had fame and a powerful enterprise, like the Wall Street Journal or the WNBA, supporting them. Q: The New York Times recently ran a piece on the Russian dissidents released, claiming "hopes are high [they] will breathe new life into a fragmented opposition force." What do you anticipate these political players' activism will look like in the coming years, especially in exile? DH: As in the Imperial and Soviet periods, Russian censorship prevents any news or opinions that are not the government's from coming to light. As Putin has dismantled political opposition in Russia and tightened his grip on any vestiges of civil society in the country, there is little hope that a powerful opposition movement can gain momentum without outside support. This is where the Russian dissidents living abroad come in. They will ensure that a vision for another type of Russia is articulated. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, political exiles smuggled illegal newspapers and journals into the Russian empire to instill hope in their compatriots, to give them some indication that a nation beyond the autocracy was achievable. This, in my opinion, is the role that Russian dissidents living in exile must have today. They must provide the vision. They must provide the hope. While they cannot change the system on their own—they need a movement en masse—the dissidents abroad are needed to demonstrate that a nation without Putin and his repressive regime is possible. This is certainly not an easy venture, and it will require extraordinary sacrifices to be made a reality. However, it may be the Russian people's only hope.
