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UCI experts can discuss unfolding crisis in Afghanistan

UCI faculty members Dr. Heidi Hardt, associate professor of political science, and Dr. Mark LeVine, professor of modern middle eastern history, are available to speak about the crisis in Afghanistan. Dr. Heidi Hardt Dr. Hardt can talk about NATO's contribution to Afghanistan, implications for NATO's legitimacy, security concerns for Afghan women and provide broader context on military interventions and operations. She can address more specific questions related to the two decades long allied operation. About Dr. Hardt: Dr. Hardt has expertise in transatlantic security, national security and European security and defense, including NATO, the EU and OSCE. Issue areas include transatlantic security cooperation, collective defense, crisis management, military operations (e.g. Afghanistan), coalition warfare, strategy, learning, adaptation, organizational change, gender and diplomacy. She's the author of two books: NATO's Lessons in Crisis: Institutional Memory in International Organizations (Oxford UP, 2018) and Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response (Oxford UP, 2014). She's the recipient of a 2021-2022 Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship and will soon be working as a foreign policy fellow for the Office of Congresswoman Katie Porter. Contact: hhardt@uci.edu Dr. Mark LeVine Dr. Levine was in Kabul in 2019. His point of view on Afghanistan includes: • “Why did the US abandon the embassy when the agreement with the Taliban specifically allowed to diplomatic staff to remain in Afghanistan and there was no imminent threat by the Taliban to the embassy and in fact the US was coordinating with them. They could have certainly kept the lights on and not looked like cowards running, which set the tone for everything else.” • “It seems pretty clear that there was an internal military coup. The Taliban did not just waltz into Kabul without coordination with senior military people who are already handing over parts of the country to them in the days before. Some kind of deal had been worked out behind the scenes and without the knowledge of the president, which is why he felt he had no choice but to flee.” About Dr. LeVine: Dr. LeVine completed his Ph.D at NYU’s Dept. of Middle Eastern Studies in 1999, after which he held postdoctoral positions at Cornell University's Society for the Humanities and the European University Institute's Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, in Florence, Italy before coming to UCI. His research and teaching focus on the following issues: histories, theologies and political and cultural economies of the Middle East and Islam in the modern and contemporary periods; Palestine/Israel; cultural production, revolution and resistance in the Middle East and Africa; modern and contemporary Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco; art and conflict in West Africa (especially Ghana and Nigeria, but also Senegal, Mali and Kenya); comparative studies of imperialism and colonialism, urban planning and architecture (history and theory); critical theory and globalization studies with a comparative focus on popular cultures and religion in Europe and the Muslim world; peace and conflict studies; and comparative nationalisms. Contact: mlevine@uci.edu

Brexit: UK services are losing out to EU rivals – but Asia could be big winner

"Seven months after Britain’s exit from the EU, the chilly effects on UK trade are being felt. Total exports of UK goods and services were down by 13% (£36 billion) and imports down 22% (£66 billion) for January to May 2021 compared to the same period in 2019." Professor Jun Du, Aston Business School Singapore looks like one of the big winners from Brexit. joyfull In a separate new ONS report into UK services, exports and imports fell 12% and 24% in the first quarter of 2021 compared to the same period in 2019. To some extent this is due to the pandemic, but the decline with EU countries was more severe (exports down 15% and imports by 39%), which suggests Brexit was relevant too. The difference between services exports to EU and non-EU countries was particularly marked in sectors like construction (-43% vs +24%), maintenance and repair (-62% vs +11%), and manufacturing services (-40% vs -12%). It seems to confirm that the UK’s services offering has been made less competitive by the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement hardly covering such business. This has left EU members free to decide whether to allow different UK providers into their markets. But as we shall see, other services exporting countries outside the EU may also benefit as a result. In our recent paper, Ireland looked like the big winner. It has probably benefited from firms relocating and business being re-routed from the UK, not to mention low corporation tax and a young well-educated workforce. Between 2016 and 2019, Ireland’s services exports rose 24% (that’s €144 billion or £123 billion), driven by financial services, IT and transport. Speculation still abounds about which other EU cities will benefit in the medium term. Amsterdam surpassed London as Europe’s largest share-trading centre in January by absorbing much trade in euro-denominated assets, though London has been back on top recently. Other potential winners include Frankfurt (banking), Luxembourg (banking and asset management) and Paris (financial, professional and business services). Even a less serious contender like Berlin can attract tech talents thanks to its culture clusters and affordability. On the other hand, most financial traders have so far remained in London. The city is still strong in hosting stock market flotations and other forms of capital raising. And the flow of financial jobs out of London has been a fraction of what remainers predicted. A four-year regulatory transition period for areas like data protection and electronic trade will undoubtedly be helping. London vs EU rivals is only half the story. James Padolsey/Unsplash, CC BY-SA Yet all this misses a bigger picture, namely that Europe’s ability to provide services may have been weakened overall. Imagine a group of US investors wants to invest £1 billion in European shares and other financial assets. In the past it might have set up a fund in London, making use of the city’s network of lawyers, accountants, bankers and other finance professionals, while filtering some of the work to specialists in, say, Paris and Frankfurt for issues related to France and Germany. But now Brexit means the fund can’t invest in certain EU securities from London. The investors would have to set up a second fund in, say, Dublin to get exposure to all the EU assets they want. The additional expense and time involved makes them decide it will be more lucrative to set up an Asia-focused fund in Singapore instead. When you multiply this effect across every sector, it is potentially huge. Certainly some investors will decide to either switch attention from the UK to EU countries, or to live with the extra cost of doing business across both the UK and EU. But others are deciding that an opportunity somewhere else in the world now looks more attractive. The danger is that this adds up to a global shift in economic weight over time. In fact, we could be seeing signs of this already. Winners and losers In follow-on research that we have yet to publish, we have been analysing the services exports of the major service providers in Europe and globally, using trade data jointly collected by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The data shows the UK was and is the biggest services exporter in Europe and second only to the US worldwide, but appears to have been losing ground since Brexit. Ireland and the Netherlands are the major growth stories in Europe, while China, India and Singapore are leading the way elsewhere. Services exports by country, 2019 vs 2015 Trends in services exports. Left: 2015 data in solid coloured bars; 2019 change in yellow markers. Right: Green bars represent accelerating service growth; red bars represent decelerating growth. BaTIS The UK’s services growth trend fell 11% in the 2016-2019 period compared to 2010-15. This backs up our recent published research finding that the UK’s global share of exported services fell from 8.9% in 2005 to 7% in 2019. Meanwhile, France, Spain, Italy and Belgium’s growth has also been declining, while Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria and also the US were static. Ireland was the fastest growing services exporter among all, but Singapore and India gained momentum too. Strikingly, we see increasing growth in Asia between 2016 and 2019 in sectors like travel, financial, IT and creative services. This includes extraordinary growth in Singapore in finance, business, insurance and pension provision, and also in China in numerous segments. It looks like nothing short of a boom. Shanghai has been on the up and up. Krzystsztof Kotkowicz, CC BY-SA This may partly reflect the industrial transformation taking place in the Asian developing world from manufacturing to services. It may also capture a long-term shift of services centres from the west to the east – a reshuffle on a truly global scale. But at the same time, it’s evidence that Brexit has weakened the UK as the European centre for services. Yes, business shifted to Ireland (and Luxembourg) to some extent, but that could be hiding a wider collective setback. The question for the years ahead, for the UK and its European services peers, is whether they can come up with arrangements that help maintain their collective strengths – and to what extent they can exploit opportunities elsewhere, particularly on developing countries, where US services providers have traditionally been far ahead. This article was co-written by Professor Jun Du and Dr Oleksandr Shepotylo.

Aston University cyber security experts shape government policy around resilience of supply chains

"Cyber security of any organisation, inclusive of its supply chain, should be promoted in conjunction with other organisational targets, such as profitability, productivity and financial/operational risk management" Professor Vladlena Benson, Aston University Researchers from Aston University’s Cyber Security Innovation (CSI) Research Centre have been invited to respond to the call for evidence by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) The centre works with businesses to help improve resilience to cyber attacks It comes after a series of high-profile attacks on managed service providers affecting thousands of firms and compromising government agencies. Experts from the Cyber Security Innovation (CSI) Research Centre at Aston University have responded to a call for evidence by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) on cyber security in supply chains and managed service providers. The CSI centre works with businesses to help improve their security posture and develops state-of-the-art solutions for supply chain resilience and business continuity. Recent research1 from the centre explored organisational approaches to supply chain management in the West Midlands, specifically in the times of remote arrangements and when traditional business continuity practices in supply chain management have been challenged. It comes as two high profile attacks (SolarWinds and Kesya) on managed service providers threatened the world and brought to a standstill credit card processing for major retail chains in Sweden, while US government officials' personal data was compromised. The €6.9m TRACE project, an EU-funded scheme of which Aston University is a key partner, addresses these issues and kicked off on Friday 9 July 2021. Professor Vladlena Benson, director of the CSI at Aston Business School, recently attended a round table by the Minister of Digital Infrastructure. She said: “Based on the conclusions of our research, we make a recommendation that cyber security of any organisation, inclusive of its supply chain, should be promoted in conjunction with other organisational targets, such as profitability, productivity and financial/operational risk management. “The identification and promotion of synergies between cyber security, profitability and productivity is a strong driver to ensure that, at a senior level, organisations take responsibility and accountability for effective cyber risk management. Dr Donato Masi, from the CSI Centre at Aston University, said: “Profitability or productivity are close to the competitive advantage of the firm and security of the supply chain of any organisation underpins its longevity on the market it operates in. “Investment in cyber security measures, including supply chain risk assessment and counter-threat controls, should be viewed as a ‘cost of doing business’ and business success and/or longevity.” 1Find out more about the research of the CSI Centre here

England’s identity: fans sing football’s coming home, but what is home?

Sport matters to national identity. The pageantry of flags, emblems and anthems (both official and unofficial) load sport with symbolism and imagery of the nation. One of the key reasons governments spend billions of dollars to host sporting mega events is to build or reinforce a sense of national identity. However, national identity is fluid, not fixed. Sport offers an arena in which national identity can adapt and change. In England, where many civic institutions represent Britain as a whole, the men’s national football team is particularly important to English identity. In 1996, the country hosted the European Championships tournament. This coincided with the so-called awakening of English national identity, symbolised by the supplanting of the union flag with the waving of the Saint George’s cross at Wembley football stadium and the singing of a new fans’ anthem, Three Lions (Football’s Coming Home). In recent years, celebrating Englishness has often been linked to a narrow and exclusive imagery, which is said to marginalise ethnic minorities and those with a more socially liberal perspective, and has been tied to a football culture often associated with hooliganism. Yet now, as England have reached the finals of the Euros for the first time, the team and its manager, Gareth Southgate, have put football at the centre of a debate about English identity for the opposite reason. Is a more proud, inclusive version of Englishness emerging? Multicultural teams in a globalised world A recent graphic promoted by the UK’s Museum of Migration shows a stark picture of what England’s starting 11 would look like without immigration over the past two generations. With only three players without a parent or grandparent born overseas, the national team is held up as a microcosm of a diverse, multicultural population (although the absence of England’s significant Asian communities is glaring). To paraphrase historian Eric Hobsbawm, the imagined community of multicultural England seems more real as a team of eleven named people. As Southgate said before the 2018 World Cup: “In England we have spent a bit of time being a bit lost as to what our modern identity is. I think as a team we represent that modern identity and hopefully people can connect with us.” In many ways, this is old news. Sport in England and the UK (akin to national identity) has always been a multinational affair, owing to its colonial ties with the countries of the former British Empire. Whether it was Jamaican-born John Barnes scoring against Brazil in 1984, Kevin Pietersen (South African born) winning the Ashes in 2005, or Greg Rusedski (Canadian born), Johanna Konta (Australian born) or, more recently, Emma Raducanu (Canadian born) performing at Wimbledon, British sport has long reflected its colonial history and the tensions and contingencies that brings. Nor is this issue unique to England or the UK. In 1998, the French World Cup-winning team was both celebrated and attacked by pro- and anti-migrant voices for the multiracial makeup of their “rainbow team”, as a large proportion of its players – including its star Zinedine Zidane – had ethnic backgrounds in former French colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. The imperial legacies of Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal are also evident in the diversity of their respective squads. Beyond former colonial powers, most national teams are now more ethnically diverse than they were 30 years ago, due to globalisation and the naturalisation of foreign athletes. England’s quarter-final opponents Ukraine have fielded Brazilian born players Júnior Moraes and Marlos this year, and their captain Andriy Yarmolenko was born in Russia. In addition to historical, cultural and linguistic connections, there is a clear performance imperative: teams that embrace ethnic diversity often outperform teams that don’t. ‘Englishness’ and immigration What is significant about this moment is the wider political context in the UK – particularly the uncertainty over what is “English” national identity and, critically, what should it be. All this comes amid the fray of polarised debate over the issues of immigration and race in England, and the UK more generally. The prospect of a tighter, points-based system of immigration, which has now been introduced, was one of the key themes of the Leave campaign in the 2016 EU referendum. Had such a system been installed several decades ago, the graphic about the English team’s immigration history may well have been approaching reality. And without the talents of Raheem Sterling, Kalvin Phillips, Kieran Trippier and others, England fans may well have been lamenting another disappointing tournament campaign. Amid the euphoria of reaching a final, there remains much soul-searching, as well as division, among the English on the key questions of “who are we” and “what exactly do we want to celebrate”? Fans, quite rightly, are celebrating the achievements of the whole English team, as well as the activism of individual heroes like Sterling and Marcus Rashford. Yet while many fans embrace the diversity of the team, the booing of their own players taking the knee against racism – a gesture that originated in the US – shows that identity politics can still divide, on and off the pitch. In spite of the positive image of diverse modern England projected by this group of players and manager, it is unrealistic to expect football to navigate the current “culture war” and be able to consolidate a more progressive, inclusive vision of Englishness – at least on its own. Other civic, and possibly political, institutions are needed if England is going to mean more than “the 11 men in white shirts at Wembley”. Notwithstanding how people identify themselves in terms of their nationality, research shows that both hosting a football tournament and making successful progression through it can have a positive impact on national feelings of happiness and well-being. If England beat Italy at Wembley on Sunday and win Euro 2020, a feel-good factor will inevitably abound, which may be a springboard to unite a country that is still deeply divided.

Aston University cybersecurity experts hold key to vaccine passport rollout

Vaccine passports are certificates to establish proof of vaccination linked to the identity of the holder Renowned expert, Koji Fusa, visiting professor at the Cyber Security Innovation Research Centre (CSI), on the project to develop a global database for citizens to use in real-time. The CSI Centre at Aston University say creating a clear framework of rules for digital identities is achievable Leading cybersecurity industry expert, Koji Fusa, has made progress towards developing a framework for the world’s citizens to store their digital identities and access them in real-time. Koji is a Visiting Professor at the Cyber Security Innovation Research Centre (CSI) at Aston University. The idea would see a platform that has the capability to distribute over 200 individual keys to each of the world’s eight billion people. Each key could be assigned to personal information such as vaccine passports. It will work by vaccine administrators sending the vaccination details of each individual to a dedicated server. That server will issue a QR code which will be passed to the vaccinated person as the digital key for access. The passport holder will keep the QR code which enables access to the server to check their own record at any time. The framework would segment private data in a separate database, which can only be accessed with the individual key along with fingerprint, face and voice recognition technology, making it extremely hard for cyber attackers and scammers to hack. Koji Fusa, a visiting professor at the CSI Centre, said: “The current EU Green Pass initiative and World Health Organisation's initiative have struggled to find the solution for private data protection and counterfeit prevention. This proposed system would solve these two challenges. We have a solution that is secure, something that others have failed to achieve so far. “By having a cloud security server which gives unique reference numbers to all devices, technology issues pointed out by The Royal Society* have been solved. “This will be a huge step forwards for digital identification globally. Not only for vaccine passports, but for people’s personal information too. The framework would make everyday life more secure and simpler. Professor Vladlena Benson, an industry-recognised expert in cybersecurity risk management and director of CSI Centre at Aston Business School, said: “I am delighted to be working on this project with Koji Fusa. With his experience, I’m confident this could become the first such system where the authenticity of the vaccine certification instantly can be checked globally, something that can’t be done currently. "This work is aligned to the trusted identities framework proposed by the UK Government and addresses the issues of data sovereignty and individual information privacy."

Aston University wins EU funding for ‘game-changing’ age verification project

Researchers from Aston University led by Abhilash Nair are to take part in a ‘game-changing’ new project to improve children’s safety online. The European Commission has awarded the euCONSENT consortium €1.47m (£1.2m) in funding to create child rights’ centred cross-border system for online age verification and parental consent. "As society continues to grapple with inequalities in terms of digital literacy and digital divide between generations, it is important that the tech industry assumes more responsibility for protecting, as well as upholding the rights of children online.”

U.S.-Iran Crisis: Outlook and Implications

Executive Summary: The immediate crisis following the death of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. airstrike and Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes against two U.S. airbases appears to have settled down. However, the conditions for a future flare-up remain in place because the underlying conditions have not changed. Going forward, each side is likely to double down on its stated strategic objective, with Iran pushing for an end to U.S. presence in the region and the U.S. pushing for an end to the Iranian nuclear program. Further, the norms that had previously prevented an open exchange of fire between the two sides have been eroded. Why It Matters: The events of January 3rd and 8th represent the first time since the skirmishes of the “Tanker Wars” of 1987-88 that the military forces of the United States and Iran have directly and openly exchanged fire with each other. For the last three decades, the contest between the two states has been a shadow war of proxy conflicts, plausible deniability, and non-military measures. The American decision to strike Soleimani and the Iranian decision to fire missiles in response removed many of the guardrails that have set limits on previous escalations of tensions. The Iranian decision to renounce cooperation with the 2015 nuclear agreement places back into contention an issue that had previously brought the U.S. and Israel to the point of war with Iran in 2012-13. Business Impact: Markets have been largely taking a wait-and-see approach in order to determine the form of Iranian response to Soleimani’s death, and they responded with relief when President Trump signaled that the U.S. would not retaliate. To an extent, uncertainty in the Middle East had already been priced into the markets due to tensions in the second half of 2019. A significant or prolonged conflict would have an obvious negative impact on energy markets and regional economies. In addition, American and Western companies operating internationally or their employees could suffer collateral damage from any future Iranian proxy attacks against visible symbols of U.S. presence overseas. Looking Forward: In the immediate term, the resolution of the crisis represented one of the best possible outcomes: Iran has publicly signaled that the missile launches conducted on January 8th constituted the extent of their military retaliation to Soleimani’s death and President Trump’s White House address acknowledged Iran’s desire to de-escalate and spoke of finding mutually beneficial outcomes with no further mention of military action. Going forward, both Iran and the United States are likely to double down on their desired strategic outcomes. Iran will seek to use all of the levers of its influence to drive the United States from the region, beginning with Iraq but also including indirect pressure on the Gulf states that host U.S. forces. Offensive cyber operations and deniable proxy attacks against civilian infrastructure in the Gulf could be part of that campaign, returning to tactics observed in the past. For its part, the United States will continue its maximum pressure campaign over the Iranian nuclear program, with President Trump promising additional economic sanctions even as he stepped back from military action. Therefore, although both sides appear to be committed to non-military means, the points of tension that caused the most recent crisis are all still present and have arguably increased based on Iran’s increased non-compliance with JCPOA. It remains to be seen whether coming close to the brink of open conflict will have changed the risk tolerance of either side or whether the first acknowledged exchange of fires between the U.S. and Iran for 32 years will usher in a new period of low-level conflict. The View from Tehran: Iran has played Soleimani’s death for maximum strategic benefit. The messaging of the past 96 hours was aimed at various audiences within the country, the region, and around the world. Having been caught on the backfoot by the U.S.’s strike on Soleimani, the Supreme Leader allowed the IRGC to retaliate against U.S. forces in Iraq in a calibrated manner, likely calculating that a strike with limited casualties would satisfy demands for vengeance while not prompting a response. Khamenei’s Decision: Ayatollah Khamenei is an inherently conservative figure and one who is above all else motivated by the priority of regime survival. Given their long-standing personal relationship, there is ample reason to believe that his displays of emotion of Soleimani’s death, including weeping over his coffin during the funeral on January 6th, were genuine and heart-felt. However, his expressed desire for revenge has been tempered by the overarching imperative to avoid a conflict that would have threatened the regime’s hold on power, either from within or without. Rally Around the Flag: Within Iran, the regime is seeking to use Soleimani’s death and their subsequent retaliation to build national unity following a period of significant domestic unrest. This has been emphasized by the extended period of mourning for Soleimani, days-long funeral spectacle, and the invocation of religious and cultural symbols associated with Shi’a martyrs. The death of Soleimani comes on the heels of a series of mass protests in Iran that originally began on November 15th in response to proposed increase in the price of gas, but which have since expanded to a wider challenge to the regime. Media reporting from late December suggested as many as 1,500 Iranian civilians have been killed as part of a regime crackdown on the protests, which have been characterized as the most serious challenge to the regime since the Green Movement of 2009. JCPOA as a Wedge Between U.S. and Europe: Iran announced on January 5th that it would cease compliance with the remaining provisions of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action but would be willing to return to compliance if sanctions are removed. The nuance in Iran’s position highlights the fact that it is continuing to attempt to use the nuclear issue to drive a wedge between European signatories to the agreement and the United States, which unilaterally walked away from the treaty in May 2018. Regime Dynamics: Soleimani was a high-profile figure within Iran, but his outsized influence on Iranian foreign policy also created friction with other stakeholders in the regime, including leaders of the conventional military forces, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the intelligence services. He was one of few genuinely strategic thinkers in the Iranian national security apparatus and the one with the most extensive and deepest connections within the Arab-speaking world. His replacement as commander of the Quds Force is his long-time deputy who will be familiar with the day-to-day operations of the IRGC’s external operations arm but will not have the stature or the network of Soleimani. As a result, other stakeholders may jockey to move into the vacuum created by his death. The View from Washington: The present challenge for the U.S. is how to maintain both a deterrent posture and establishing the means to avoid further escalation. The policy on Iraq going forward will have to balance President Trump’s desire to disengage from the conflict while not creating the appearance of having been pushed out by Iran. Escalate to Deter: President Trump’s decision to kill Soleimani reflected an “escalate to deter” strategy, using a sudden and unexpected escalation of force during a crisis in order to reestablish deterrence after previous provocations in 2019 had gone largely unanswered. However, deterrence is only as good as the last demonstration of a willingness to respond. The decision to not respond to Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes reflected a pragmatic decision to de-escalate. National Security Decision-Making: Nearly three years into his presidency, Donald Trump feels increasingly confident making national security decisions based on his own instincts. The original coterie of experienced national security establishment members such as Jim Mattis and H.R. McMaster who had populated the Situation Room during the early days of the administration have largely resigned or been fired and replaced with individuals of lower profile and/or proven loyalty. Although the mechanisms of the formal interagency process continue to function, President Trump increasingly makes decisions based on a network of informal advisors and media sources. Domestic U.S. Considerations: The decision to launch the strike on Soleimani came during a period of high political tension in Washington, as it had been expected this month that the U.S. Senate would begin a trial in response to articles of impeachment passed by the House of Representatives in December. The Soleimani strike is being taken up by both Trump’s supporters and opponents as evidence of either his credentials as a decisive commander-in-chief or his unsuitability for office, depending on their perspective. Congress has proposed votes to limit President Trump’s independent authority to initiate hostilities with Iran, but this is unlikely to gain traction in the Senate. Separately, the first voting in the Democratic primary is less than one month away, and a sudden shift in focus to national security issues could have results that are difficult to predict, either boosting those with national security credentials (such as former vice president Joe Biden and military veteran Pete Buttigieg), or rallying support among primary voters for anti-war (such as Bernie Sanders). Third-Party Perspectives and Responses: Iraq: The strike at Baghdad International Airport that killed Soleimani also killed the deputy commander of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Front, a coalition of militias that forms a part of Iraq’s official security apparatus. Iraq’s new Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi has condemned the attack as a “massive breach of sovereignty” and an “aggression on Iraq”. Iraq’s parliament passed a draft law on January 5th calling for the removal of all foreign troops from Iraqi soil, but the law was non-binding and the session had been boycotted by most of the Sunni and Kurdish members of the legislature. Iranian presence has also been the recent target of Iraqi ire, such as in November when a crowd of Iraqis burned down the Iranian consulate in the Shi’a holy city of Najaf, and the Iraqi government will likely try to play both sides against each other to maximize its leverage for military and financial support. Withdrawal from Iraq would mean that the remaining American forces in Syria could no longer be supplied or supported through the western desert of Iraq and would therefore also have to be withdrawn. Iran will likely seek to use all its considerable levers of influence in Iraq to convince the government to see through the expulsion of American forces. The United States leaving Iraq and Syria due to Soleimani’s death would be a fitting legacy from the Iranian perspective and a perverse one from the American perspective given that Soleimani was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of American servicemembers in Iraq (and thousands of Iraqi civilians) through his support for Shi’a militias in the mid-to-late 2000s. Europe: Statements from European capitals emphasized the need for restraint and de-escalation. French President Macron is likely to view this event as further justification for his proposals that the EU develop a defense and security apparatus independent of NATO in order to avoid being entangled by potentially reckless American actions. Iran will likely continue to use this event as an opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe on the nuclear program and other issues, and their chosen retaliation was likely calibrated at least in part to allow them to continue positioning themselves as a responsible actor. For his part, Trump is urging the European signatories to join him in walking away from the JCPOA in order to increase Iran’s international isolation. United Kingdom: The British government has tried to tread a fine line in its responses to the strike, with Prime Minister Johnson calling for de-escalation while also stating that he “will not lament” the fact that Soleimani is dead. The U.K. is likely trying to balance its desire to remain aligned with France and Germany in trying to keep the JCPOA together with its traditional close alliance with the United States and Johnson’s personal relationship with President Trump. Russia: Unsurprisingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin condemned the American strike, which removed a valuable interlocutor for Russian forces in Syria. Russian troops and Iranian-backed militias in Syria had periodically found themselves with diverging interests in their campaign to support the Assad regime, and Soleimani performed a critical function in directing the activities of those militias to ensure that both Russia and Iran achieved their strategic objectives in Syria. A potential American withdrawal from Iraq and Syria would advance Russia’s interest in establishing itself as the indispensable foreign power in resolving the crisis in Syria and within the region more broadly. China: In line with their long-standing principle of non-intervention and their own interest, China condemned the strike, but the response was muted overall. Chinese interests are primarily economic and tied to ensuring a steady supply of petroleum. One of China’s newest and most capable naval destroyers recently participated in trilateral naval exercises with Iran and Russia in the Gulf of Oman. Although such exercises primarily serve a strategic messaging and diplomatic function, they do signal an emerging alignment of interests between the three states that would be significant for the response to any future crises.

Paper ballots, risk-limiting audits can help defend elections and democracy, IU study finds

BLOOMINGTON, Ind. -- With just over two months before the 2020 election, three professors at the Indiana University Kelley School of Business offer a comprehensive review of how other nations are seeking to protect their democratic institutions and presents how a multifaceted, targeted approach is needed to achieve that goal in the U.S., where intelligence officials have warned that Russia and other rivals are again attempting to undermine our democracy. But these concerns over election security are not isolated to the United States and extend far beyond safeguarding insecure voting machines and questions about voting by mail. Based on an analysis of election reforms by Australia and European Union nations, they outline steps to address election infrastructure security -- such as requiring paper ballots and risk-limiting audits -- as well as deeper structural interventions to limit the spread of misinformation and combat digital repression. "In the United States, despite post-2016 funding, still more than two-thirds of U.S. counties report insufficient funding to replace outdated, vulnerable paperless voting machines; further help is needed," said Scott Shackelford, associate professor of business law and ethics in the Kelley School, executive director of the Ostrom Workshop and chair of IU's Cybersecurity Program. "No nation, however powerful, or tech firm, regardless of its ambitions, is able to safeguard democracies against the full range of threats they face in 2020 and beyond. Only a multifaceted, polycentric approach that makes necessary changes up and down the stack will be up to the task." For example, Australia -- which has faced threats from China -- has taken a distinct approach to protect its democratic institutions, including reclassifying its political parties as "critical infrastructure." This is a step that the U.S. government has yet to take despite repeated breaches at both the Democratic and Republican national committees. Based on an analysis of election reforms by Australia and European Union nations, they outline steps to address election infrastructure security -- such as requiring paper ballots and risk-limiting audits -- as well as deeper structural interventions to limit the spread of misinformation and combat digital repression. "In the United States, despite post-2016 funding, still more than two-thirds of U.S. counties report insufficient funding to replace outdated, vulnerable paperless voting machines; further help is needed," said Scott Shackelford, associate professor of business law and ethics in the Kelley School, executive director of the Ostrom Workshop and chair of IU's Cybersecurity Program. "No nation, however powerful, or tech firm, regardless of its ambitions, is able to safeguard democracies against the full range of threats they face in 2020 and beyond. Only a multifaceted, polycentric approach that makes necessary changes up and down the stack will be up to the task." For example, Australia -- which has faced threats from China -- has taken a distinct approach to protect its democratic institutions, including reclassifying its political parties as "critical infrastructure." This is a step that the U.S. government has yet to take despite repeated breaches at both the Democratic and Republican national committees. The article, "Defending Democracy: Taking Stock of the Global Fight Against Digital Repression, Disinformation and Election Insecurity," has been accepted by Washington and Lee Law Review. Other authors are Anjanette "Angie" Raymond, associate professor of business law and ethics, and Abbey Stemler, assistant professor of business law and ethics, both at Kelley; and Cyanne Loyle, associate professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University and a global fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Aside from appropriating sufficient funds to replace outdated voting machines and tabulation systems, the researchers said that Congress should encourage states to refuse to fund voting machines with paperless ballots. The researchers also suggest requiring risk-limiting audits, which use statistical samples of paper ballots to verify official election results. Other suggested steps include: Congress requiring the National Institute of Standards and Technology to update their voting machine standards, which state and county election officials rely on when deciding which machines to purchase. Australia undertook such a measure. Creating a National Cybersecurity Safety Board to investigate cyberattacks on U.S. election infrastructure and issue post-elections reports to ensure that vulnerabilities are addressed. Working with universities to develop training for election officials nationwide to prepare them for an array of possible scenarios, and creating a cybersecurity guidebook for use by newly elected and appointed election officials. "With regards to disinformation in particular, the U.S. government could work with the EU to globalize the self-regulatory Code of Practice on Disinformation for social media firms and thus avoiding thorny First Amendment concerns," Raymond said. "It could also work to create new forums for international information sharing and more effective rapid alert and joint sanctions regimes. "The international community has the tools to act and hold accountable those actors that would threaten democratic institutions," added Stemler, who also is a faculty associate at Harvard University's Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society. "Failing the political will to act, pressure from consumer groups and civil society will continue to mount on tech firms, in particular Facebook, which may be sufficient for them to voluntarily expand their efforts in the EU globally, the same way that more firms are beginning to comply with its General Data Protection Regulation globally, as opposed to designing new information systems for each jurisdiction."

With Brexit looming, more is unknown than known with British economy, trade agreements

Although it has been in the works since June 2016, the transition phase of Great Britain’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) — more commonly known as “Brexit” — is set to take place on Jan. 31. It is a date that will most likely leave a ripple of economic uncertainty in the United Kingdom in its wake as the British prepare for total independence at the end of the year.  “Brexit has created so many new unknown variables. It can be profoundly disruptive to England as we know it today,” says Ralf “Don” Keysser, D.B.A., an associate professor in the MBA program at Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota. Keysser predicts a negative short-term impact to the British economy, whereas the long-term perspective is still hard to predict until new free trade agreements with Europe and the rest of the world are established.  Keysser does not see a clear-cut benefit to the U.S. establishing a free trade agreement with the U.K., simply based on the lack of British imports in the American market, other than maintaining political closeness.  “It’s going to be a shock to the system. England will not be the England that it has been. There’s a lot of speculation, because we’ve never had a country pull out of the EU before, so it’s kind of an unknown. And it’s so highly politicized that it’s hard to get an objective analysis of what it’s going to look like.” Keysser points to a Toyota plant in South Derbyshire that supplies most of its output to countries in the EU through a tariff-free treatment. With Brexit going into effect, the factory may have to vastly reduce its output. Still, the workers in that community overwhelmingly voted to leave the EU. “This is a good example of how people will vote against their economic self-interests for ideological reasons,” Keysser says. “There’s a lot of ideology behind the Brexit vote: anti-immigrant, anti-Europe, pro-nationalist views that very much echoed President Trump’s appeal.” There are a few reasonably good projections, Keysser says, to make about the impact on inflation, unemployment, and economic trends — and none of them look good for Britain. One just has to look at the British pound, which has steadily been losing value to the dollar and euro over the years. In addition, several banks decided to either move from London or expand into other markets within the EU as soon as the Brexit results were announced, which could cost the British capital its status as of the world’s premier financial centers. “I see a gradual diminution of the financial business that’s been a mainstay of London,” Dr. Keysser says.  On top of that, there is a real fear of Scotland and Northern Ireland wanting to leave the U.K. in favor of establishing their own independence and returning to the EU. The last time Scotland voted to leave the U.K. in 2004 it only passed 55% to 45%. “That could be the beginning of the end of the United Kingdom as we have known it,” Keysser says.  The news might not be entirely bad out of Brexit. For international tourists, especially those from the U.S may be able to take advantage of the dollar’s exchange rate with the declining pound. Do you want to know more about the possible economic ramifications of Brexit? Are you a journalist covering this topic and interested in an interview? That's where we can help. Ralf Keysser, D.B.A., has been an active investment banker and business finance consultant for 35 years. He also serves an associate professor for the MBA program at Saint Mary’s University of Minnesota. To book an interview with him, simply click on his icon above to access his contact information.

Scheller College of Business Privacy Expert Peter Swire Summarizes Recent Privacy Ruling in Facebook Case

In the latest round of legal decisions on the enforcement of international privacy laws between the EU and the U.S., Peter Swire, professor of Law and Ethics at the Georgia Tech Scheller College of Business, and associate director for Policy of the Georgia Tech Institute for Information Security and Privacy looks at how the EU may examine foreign intelligence surveillance in his article “Foreign Intelligence and Other Issues in the Initial Opinion in Schrems II” in Lawfare. The Schrems II case is the subject of the recent opinion from Advocate General (AG) Henrik Saugmandsgaard Øe before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In the case, Austrian lawyer Max Schrems challenged Facebook’s ability to transfer personal data from the EU to the United States using the standard contractual clauses, which exist where a company such as Facebook follows EU-level privacy standards when private data is transferred outside of Europe. Schrems’s specific claim is that he cannot access any files that the National Security Agency (NSA) may have collected about him and lacks legal redress for any violation of his rights under EU law. Swire writes that the case examines the transfer of an individual’s personal data from the European Union to the United States using the standard contractual clauses and the Privacy Shield, which was negotiated in 2016 by the U.S. and the EU for privacy data transfers to the United States specifically. Facebook’s headquarters are in Ireland, and the Irish High Court ruled in favor of Schrems and certified 11 broad questions to the CJEU. The AG opinion published this week concerns this appeal in Schrems II from the Irish High Court.  If Schrems wins this appeal, then many flows of personal data from the EU to the U.S. may become illegal. Swire’s expertise in U.S. privacy laws is extensive. He is a sought after privacy expert and he has been highlighted in Bloomberg Law, Le Monde, LawFare  and numerous scholarly publications. He has appointments by courtesy with the College of Computing and School of Public Policy and is Senior Counsel with Alston & Bird, LLP. If you are a reporter covering this topic and would like to speak with Professor Swire – simply click on his icon to arrange an interview or email  media@scheller.gatech.edu.